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In Bolivia, indigenous women have contributed to President Morales’ and MAS 
(Movement Toward Socialism) electoral victories and are exercising an emerging 
influence on the government’s decisions on policy. This contrasts with their experiences 
with failed policy efforts prior to the early 2000s, which presents an interesting puzzle for 
social movement theories. These theories argue that the language of repertoires and 
framing processes, resources of social movements, along with structural opportunities are 
important causes of social movement success. Research on social movement outcomes is 
needed to understand indigenous women’s changing relationship with society and the 
government. As indigenous women’s influence on policy has scarcely been studied, and 
only in relation to a few policy areas, this study broadens our understanding of the range 
of social movements’ influence.  
I conduct qualitative historical analysis of primary, secondary, and field research 
data to test hypotheses about indigenous women’s social movements in Bolivia between 
1994-2012. The empirical chapters investigate the impact of organizational, state, and 
international variables on education reform, land reform, coca protests, domestic 
violence, the Gas War, gas and food subsidies, and the territorial conflict in the TIPNIS 
region. The major finding of this dissertation is that indigenous women need to confront 
very open political opportunities with very high amounts of human capital resources–
especially women in leadership roles and strong networks—in order to have a significant 
impact on policy outcomes. 
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Introduction and General Information 
Introduction to the Study 
 
 What political and organizational factors explain indigenous women’s growing 
influence as political actors in social movements during the past decade in Bolivia? 
While indigenous women have had a presence in indigenous movements for at least the 
past thirty years, their ability to impact policy has truly only been evident since the 
2000s. Their most impressive influences include changes like natural resource 
nationalizations (gas and water) that occurred over protracted bloody struggles in the 
early 2000s. Another notable influence includes their mobilization for Evo Morales’ 
presidential campaign, which significantly changed the course of politics in the country. 
Women were at the forefront of most of these battles, and in subsequent years, they have 
attempted to assert increasing influence over government policy in similar battles. This 
contrasts with an earlier period of low access to political institutions and very low 
influence over government policy. What are the actual steps taken from being a poor, 
marginalized group of activists to becoming a strong group of activists that help shape 
policy? Are marginalized groups in social movements more likely to change policy under 
certain types of organizational and structural settings? Policy success and failure of 
female indigenous women in Latin America presents important puzzles for questions of 
democratization, identity politics, gender rights and especially, social movements. How 
well do theories of social movements explain indigenous women’s surprising success in 
influencing Bolivian political outcomes in recent years?  I propose that a beneficial way 
 
 2 
of approaching this question is by investigating indigenous women’s mobilization and 
outcomes during the last twenty years of important policy events or “policy moments.”  
 In many states in Latin America, the indigenous are a significant portion of the 
population, and have a prolonged history of mixed outcomes in negotiations with 
governments—from land redistribution programs, ejido arrangements, patronizing 
cooptation, to militarized action in indigenous regions. The relationships between 
governments, democracy, quality of democratization, and the mobilization of indigenous 
people often illuminates the contradictions involved in the process of incorporating a 
previously marginalized group into citizenship. Indigenous groups have become ever 
more active in national politics, and their ongoing struggles with the state have taken on 
new dimensions of organization and participation in democratic settings. Studies on 
social movement outcomes are especially relevant to indigenous politics in Latin 
America because indigenous peoples in the Americas have organized more through social 
movements than political parties, corporate interest groups, or guerilla movements (Chase 
Smith 1984; Brysk 2000). Social movements are also relevant because they have led to 
the formation of political parties and electoral victories of indigenous candidates (Van 
Cott 2000).  
 I accept a common scholarly definition of social movements:  “persistent, 
patterned, and widely distributed collective challenges to the status quo” (Darnosvky, 
Epstein and Flacks 1995: vii; Brysk 2000:33). Scholarship identifies social movements as 
distinct phenomena from other forms of representation and political activity because of 
their combined use of collective action, identity, universal goals, and political orientation. 
Moreover, “they generally seek to reshape state policy rather than hold state power” 
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(Brysk 2000:33). This chapter presents the background, theoretical questions and 
literature addressing social movements and the hypotheses derived from them for the 
purposes of researching the policy outcomes of indigenous women’s social movement 
activity.   
 Research on social movements has questioned why social movements emerge, 
which social movement strategies are chosen and why, and how social movements utilize 
cultural components in society to achieve their goals. Among the impressive number of 
studies of modern and historical social movements, the common motivations are to 
explain the causes and consequences of social movements. The main research question of 
this dissertation relates to the consequences of indigenous women’s mobilization to 
policy outcomes. I focus on variables posited by other scholars to be important 
characteristics of social movement organization in order to determine their impact on 
indigenous women’s social movement outcomes in policy in Bolivia.   
 Scholars find a number of variables to be important for answering why and how 
people participate in social movements, and what outcomes result from this participation. 
The major findings of resource mobilization theorists point to material and human 
resources as necessary components of creating and sustaining social movements 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; Foweraker 1991; Klandermans 1984). This perspective is 
extended here to include how resources affect the achievement of indigenous women’s 
social movement goals, as well as which resources are most important to their ability to 
impact policy. Social movement political process or political opportunity approaches 
(Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Tilly 1989; 
Goodwin 1997; Tarrow 1998) have also posited a number of environmental factors that 
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influence social movement emergence and outcomes, including state political opportunity 
structures and international influences like globalization. A significant portion of 
literature drawing from the political opportunity approach points to the role of 
neoliberalism as an important contributor to causes and consequences of social 
movements (Nash 2005; Yashar 1999; Lavrin 1993; Bouvier 2009; Eber and Kovic 2003; 
Gonzales and Kampwirth 2001). The changing status of neoliberal commitments and 
openings within the political opportunity structures between 1994 and 2012 in Bolivia 
allow theoretical reflection on the importance of these variables in affecting policy 
outcomes. Related to political opportunity structures, many scholars have identified 
various international norms, laws, and networks that play into, specifically, indigenous 
movements in Latin America (Brysk 2000; Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000; Yashar 2005; 
Rousseau 2011; Hernández Castillo 2003; Sierra 2001, 2007; Kampwirth 2002, 2004; 
Speed et al 2006). My research follows this cue and asks whether or not changing 
transnational or international structures have a significant impact on indigenous women’s 
policy outcomes. Both resource mobilization theories and political process theories are 
considered structural perspectives, and such theories tend to answer questions related to 
the emergence and endurance of social movements. The social-constructivist or framing 
approach (Snow et al 2004; Davies 1999; Gamson 1992; Carroll and Ratner 1992; 
Alverez et al 1998) argues for extending analyses beyond structural explanations:   
Participation in collective action depends not only on perceptions of structural 
strain, availability and the deployment of material resources, and on the opening 
or closing of political opportunities, or on a cost-benefit calculus more generally, 
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but also on the way these variables are constructed and framed and the degree to 
which they resonate with targets of mobilization. (Snow et al 1986) 
This “new social movement” approach, coined in European social movement studies, has 
largely concerned itself with the “how” of organizing, whereas structural theories are 
more concerned with “why” (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009). Framing 
hypotheses have mainly been asserted to explain the emergence of social movements. But 
I extend the logic of emergence to the outcome, positing that the frames related to 
identity and the message sent to the “targets of mobilization” are likely to be relevant to 
questions of how movements achieve goals. These components have undergone 
significant changes in recent decades, providing significant insight into their movement 
goals and tactics. Informed by advice from various scholars on the importance of 
integrating these theories to further social movement research (Lucero 2008; Eckstein 
2001; Foweraker 1999), I draw from these several strains of thought on social 
movements. Together, these theoretical viewpoints are likely to present a fuller picture of 
the factors that impact outcomes for indigenous women.  
 Following the theoretical guidance of social movement scholars, I ask how 
organizational resources, activist framing, neoliberalism, political opportunities within 
the state, and international influences structure indigenous women’s policy outcomes 
during particular policy moments. I consider policy outcomes to mean the degree to 
which indigenous women are able to get their preferences represented in policy. Policy 
outcomes are conceived of as ending in success, failure, or a combination of success and 
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failure for varied goals. Success relates to a concession, change in legislation, or other 
means of incorporating indigenous women’s preferences into policy.1 
 Bolivia is an interesting location for studying indigenous movements because like 
many states it has instituted constitutional provisions that protect rights, land, and 
identities of indigenous people as part of the democratization process. But at the same 
time, Bolivia, as with many states, engaged in multi-ethnic negotiations with indigenous 
peoples while committing itself to contradictory neoliberal policies that have had 
ambiguous consequences for indigenous communities and urbanized indigenous people 
(Lind 2005; Nash 2005; Yashar 2005). Ongoing economic disturbances and increasing 
economic internationalization have troubled indigenous communities, especially women, 
while state capabilities to ameliorate “market failures” decrease under neoliberalism 
(Lind 2005; Nash 2005; Yashar 2005). At its core, this research questions how 
marginalized groups confront governments with demands for policies and assesses the 
conditions under which they (do not) succeed in getting what they want, given the 
economic, political, and social constraints they face.  
 The focus on indigenous women’s mobilization outcomes in Bolivia is 
empirically interesting because it represents a period of change for a long-excluded 
group, and because Bolivia is an illustration of many of the cultural, geographical, and 
political tendencies in Latin America related to indigenous peoples. For many reasons, 
we may not expect that indigenous women would be particularly effective in promoting 
their interests to governments. Despite comprising great numbers, these women are one 
                                                
 
1 The next chapter on data and methods provides the justification for these definitions. 
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of Latin America’s most economically, socially, and politically marginalized populations. 
But indigenous women do, in fact, organize in Latin America, and sometimes effectively, 
for their own interests, for those of their entire communities, and for the whole of Bolivia 
(Pacari 2002). They confront states with policy demands, and some are successful to the 
degree that they achieve support from the public and government officials, and 
ultimately, the passage of policies they want. What conditions bring about these 
successes, and which bring about failure? What, in other words, makes for successful 
organizing and outcomes for atomized groups within society? Given the history of 
indigenous marginalization in Latin America, and especially the ethnic, linguistic, 
economic and gendered dimension to indigenous women’s experiences, where they (fail 
to) become empowered enough to affect policy, their experiences reveal much about 
relationships between social movements and the state. This study will illustrate how the 
nature of indigenous women’s social movement organizing affects their chances of 
success in achieving policies that benefit their lives. 
 Intersectionality provides the conceptual lens that structures this project. 
Important gender scholarship has contributed to furthering the understanding of the 
divergent experiences people have based on the complex interactions of class, 
race/ethnicity, and gender. Especially important is how these experiences shape political 
phenomena in the comparative context or when explaining ethnic, linguistic and class 
influences on gender politics (Burns 2007; Castillo 2006; Acosta-Belen 1993). This 
investigation addresses the intersections of ethnicity and gender in assessing factors 
influencing indigenous women’s outcomes. In essence, it is an effort to gain 
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understanding of how and when ethnic minority women’s concerns are incorporated into 
the policy-making process. 
 Bolivian indigenous women are an interesting focus for social movement studies 
because they exhibit a lot of characteristics common to social movements that have been 
identified by theorists on the topic. Like other social movements, indigenous women’s 
movements are collective efforts to affect political outcomes, and like many social 
movements of historical significance (i.e., the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S.) they 
provide a venue for political participation for a group that has historically been shut out 
of society and government processes. Their movements exhibit a lot of expected 
characteristics like movement-specific frames, deployment of a range of resources to 
varying consequences, and negotiation with structures (both organizational, state, and 
international) for favored outcomes. Their movements are unique because they contain 
complex gender ideologies, and because the ethnic component of their mobilization 
entails not only a demand for civil and human rights but for the recognition of indigenous 
identity, language, and autonomy. It is, therefore, unlike many social movements, 
simultaneously a quest for inclusion and independence.  
  This movement is also relevant because indigenous women remain under-studied 
in terms of social movements and gender studies. While the research on non-white 
women’s activism has been fruitful, the intersectional perspective suggests further 
avenues for improvement of this scholarship. For example, we need greater 
understanding of non-Western notions of female empowerment. Bolivia’s examples show 
how non-feminist mobilization for non-gendered interests has empowering potential for 
women’s leadership in politics. In fact, many of the testimonies of indigenous women 
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referenced in this dissertation point to a seemingly paradoxical trait: women declaring 
themselves non-feminist while pursuing goals of promoting women’s advancement and 
equality in community, society, and the government. In addition, the complexities of 
indigenous women’s identity formation and guiding philosophies warrant a focus to help 
social movement scholarship grasp the meaning of activism and accompanying 
outcomes. Indigenous women have carved out their own legitimacy and leadership that is 
based on experience as women and follows a gender perspective they view as superior to 
one that combats men for power. Struggles for fair food and gas pricing, land 
redistribution, gas nationalization, territorial autonomy, and women’s reproductive rights 
exhibit indigenous women’s ability to credibly speak about issues that affect “women’s 
responsibilities.”  
 My research also focuses on indigenous women because they are an unlikely 
group to achieve success in most policy areas, given that in Latin America, all women are 
underrepresented in politics. Therefore, where triply marginalized indigenous women are 
able to overcome structural, individual, and societal obstacles to organization, their 
experiences may have much to instruct on social movement organization success. The 
focus on policy success is one way to measure the outcome of social movement 
organization. In focusing on such concrete outcomes, certain nuances may be overlooked, 
including the impact of social movements on the future movement, on people’s current 
ideologies, and other social impacts. But in terms of identifying substantive, clear wins 
and losses of a social movement effort, policy influence is concrete and contains 




This research connects various relevant theoretical traits of social movements 
with successful or unsuccessful policy outcomes for indigenous women. An integrated 
theoretical approach is essential in uncovering certain realities present in a cursory survey 
of the events in Bolivia since the mid-1990s. Between then and now, several variables of 
theoretical import have shown significant changes. During the 1990s, mobilization about 
mainly indigenous issues utilized moderate resources and faced partially open political 
opportunity structures. These factors contributed to moderate results for indigenous 
women’s mobilization efforts; especially notable is that efforts to pass indigenous 
women-specific legislation were unsuccessful. Organizations since the 2000s seem to 
have access to more impressive resources, the state has become decidedly more open 
since 2005, and neoliberal influence is dramatically lower than in earlier periods. The 
post-liberal period has witnessed more impressive successful mobilizations ignited or 
supported by indigenous women’s movements. I investigate which variables among the 
changing composition of organizational, state, and international variables contribute to a 
more successful post-liberal period. The integrated theoretical approach highlights the 
interaction of cultural and structural variables, which is key to the research presented 
here, since it is unlikely that resource mobilization, political opportunity, or 
cultural/framing approaches capture all of the variables of interest on their own.  
 The primary method of inquiry is a structured-focused comparative case study 
that analyzes eight different cases of indigenous women’s mobilization, broken down into 
ten separate policy moments. Policy process tracing is used to fill in causal linkages 
between the variables in this dissertation. This approach allows a comprehensive view of 
the policy process by looking at social movements’ influence on various types of policy 
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outcomes while breaking down policy events to assess causation between variables. My 
study facilitates tests of social movement hypotheses in indigenous women’s movements 
as well as the less-studied aspect of social movements and policies (but see Meyer and 
Rochon 1997; Whittier 2004 and Kolb 2007; Amenta and Caren 1999). I ask questions 
related to specific policy influence of indigenous social movements, in order to add to the 
existing knowledge of the political, social and cultural impacts of indigenous social 
movements and social movements in general.  
 Recent research has applied social movement theories to indigenous women’s 
movements, focusing on important aspects of their organization that affect the 
momentum of these groups (Rousseau 2011; Radcliffe et al; Clisby 2006; Andolina et al 
2002; Hernández Castillo and Elizando 1996; Sierra 2001; Kampwirth 2002, 2004; 
Hernandez Castillo 2003; Richards 2004; Speed, Hernández Castillo, and Stephen 2006; 
Oliart 2008). Some of this research addresses indigenous women’s effects on land 
policies in Bolivia and other countries (especially Deere and León 1998; Deere and León 
2001; Deere and León 2002; Deere and León 2002a).  But to date, no systematic study 
has been put forth that deals with a selected span of cases from different policy arenas in 
an attempt to draw larger conclusions. This study will grant insight into the causes of 
social movement outcomes for Bolivia’s indigenous women, and may have important 
academic and practical lessons for indigenous women and marginalized peoples’ social 
movements in other states. I aim to contribute to the literature by forming a comparative 
study that identifies the combinations of variables correlated with social movement 
policy outcomes. In addition, it contributes to the literature on social movements by 
testing the theoretical value of the variables identified by the literature in a difficult case 
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setting. Also, in focusing on policy outcomes, it fills in gaps in our understanding of how 
and when social movements make an impact on policy. Finally, the attempt to integrate 
most of the major theoretical approaches to the study of indigenous women’s movements 
provides an opportunity to find out if an integrated approach can broaden our analytic 
understanding of such movements. 
Theoretical Foundations 
The following sections identify the major theoretical perspectives informing this 
research, and I hypothesize generally that social movement organizational resources, 
frames, state opportunities and neoliberalism, and international influences condition 
indigenous women’s success/failure in influencing policy. This section presents the 
organizational, state, and international features that influence indigenous women’s policy 
outcomes.  
Organizational Features of Social Movements Influencing Indigenous Women’s 
Policy Success 
 Various theories explain the emergence and, to some degree, the success of social 
movements. I have arranged various theoretical features into two categories of structural 
(resources) and cultural (frames) organizational features. 
Resources 
The research mobilization approach represents a fundamental step toward 
answering the question of why and how social movements emerge, and this is a step in 
the direction of understanding their consequences. In simple terms, social movements 
emerge and change based on the nature and quantity of their resources. The resource 
mobilization perspective attributes social movement emergence to expanded personal 
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resources, professionalization of leadership, and external financial support (McCarthy 
and Zald 1977). The main purpose behind early theorizing in this area was to reconcile 
the expectations from rational choice theory of collective action with reality. According 
to rational choice theory, people would rarely be able to overcome “free rider” problems 
and act in pursuit of one common goal (Olson 1971). Therefore, to explain the emergence 
of strong collective action movements, scholars rationalized that those resources 
mentioned above helped overcome these problems and lead to social movement 
organization. While the research mobilization approach rarely stands alone as an 
explanation in social movement theories, it still remains an essential foundation of the 
theories, because as Foweraker identifies (1991), successful movements must have 
resources—particularly organization and leadership—in order to make strategic choices 
to achieve goals (16). Another important resource claimed in the resource mobilization 
approach is the access of the movement to broader social networks (Klandermans 1984: 
583, 588). Indigenous women’s numbers, their leadership in the movement, networks, 
and financial resources will likely play a role in their ability to organize effectively in 
favor of their cause, though other variables are also quite important. I hypothesize that 
human capital resources like numbers participating in the organization’s activities, 
networks, and women in positions will positively impact indigenous women’s policy 
outcomes.  
Networks as a Resource 
The role of networks warrants its own discussion as a potential resource variable. 
In addition to the resource mobilization approach discussed above, there is a significant 
amount of work that emphasizes the role of networking as an important variable in 
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constructivist/framing theories (Gordon and Jasper 1996, Snow, et al 1986) and political 
opportunity approaches (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tarrow 1983; Meyer 1993). There is 
also a significant amount of work that takes a comprehensive view of networking as the 
main variable in social movements (Diani and McAdam 2003; Klandermans 1993; 
Shentov 2003) and some work that addresses networks with indigenous movements in 
particular (Lucero 2008). Within this viewpoint, networks with other social movements 
have both opportunistic, resource, and cultural theoretical relevance.  
The links that social movement organizations have with external groups may have 
positive or negative effects on movement organizations. Negative effects include defining 
the movement’s goals (Shentov 2003: 217), competing for resources (Rojas and Heaney 
2008; Olzak and Uhrig 2001), and losing resources to a large network movement by 
means of “spill out” (Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Rojas and Heaney 2008). But an 
important reference to how networks increase organizational resources is still quite 
common (Powell and Friedkin 1986; Shentov 2003: 217; Gordon and Jasper 1996: 164; 
Rojas and Heaney 2008). Networks are thus viewed as part of the resource portfolio of 
indigenous women’s movements. Since they comprise a minority status population on 
more than one dimension, the nature of their networks and potential alliances with other 
sectors and social movements is likely to be a very important resource. Do the 
networking tendencies (such as who forms the network) vary depending on issue, and 
how? When indigenous women’s goals are not aligned with any other sector (and stand to 
benefit only indigenous women), what options for networking are available? Can 
networks have negative consequences? This connection between goals and networking is 
an important link in the study of social movements. Indigenous women’s social 
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movement networks, weak or strong, combine with other human capital resources like 
presence of women in movement leadership and numbers in participation to create high, 
low, or moderate amounts of resources. 
Indigenous Women’s Resources 
Various authors have drawn conclusions about the role of resources—especially 
networking and women’s leadership-- in contributing to indigenous women’s policy 
outcomes. Various researchers have shown, for example, how women in the Zapatista 
struggles have taken advantage of resources through transnational and national 
movements (Castillo 2003; Sierra 2001, 2007; Kampwirth 2002, 2004; Speed et al 2006; 
Rousseau 2011). This activity has created opportunity for the “consolidation of women’s 
spaces in male-dominated indigenous organizations and for the emergence of indigenous 
women’s own networks” (Rousseau 2011: 10). Lucero (2008) highlights the role of 
networks within the state as an important determinant of success for indigenous 
movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, as social movement organizations have become key 
actors in current networks of representation in Latin America. However, Brysk (2000) 
argues that the approach does not fully account for the observed outcomes across 
countries in Latin America. She argues that because of indigenous marginalization and 
obstacles to international projection of language, transport, funding, and state sanctions, 
indigenous movement outcomes (in her case, internationalization), are not explained well 
by resource mobilization (Brysk 2000: 37). Something more than resources, in other 
words, accounts for indigenous women’s success in Latin America. This latter point is 
important, since it highlights the recurring interactions between organizational, state, and 
international variables that greatly shape outcomes.  Brysk’s qualification is noted. 
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Resources that include high amounts of numbers within organizations, strong networks, 
and a higher presence of women in leadership positions are hypothesized to be associated 
with successful policy outcomes, depending on other variables, especially the position 
taken by the state on any particular issue. On the other hand, the absence of these 
variables is expected to contribute to failure for indigenous women’s policy goals. This 
research aims to clarify the role of resources for marginalized groups in social 
movements by studying their relevance to indigenous women’s outcomes. 
Frames 
Some scholars argue that a cultural or cognitive understanding of individual and 
mass perceptions of social movement goals is important to social movement formation 
and change. Framing scholars ask how language, culture, and meaning affect social 
movements, and have determined that collective action frames are important for 
providing diagnostic and prognostic solutions and motivation for mobilization (Snow et 
al 2004; Davies 1999; Gamson 1992; Carroll and Ratner 1992). But social movements 
use frames to achieve other goals as well. As Caniglia and Carmin (2005) write: 
In particular, they use them as a means to bridge or connect to potential members, 
to amplify and clarify their existing views and beliefs as well as to shape the 
beliefs of others, to extend their frame so that it is salient to a broader audience, 
and to transform the way the organization is perceived either by integrating new 
views or replacing those that already are present (Caginlia and Carmin 2005: 
205). 
Because the role of assigning meaning is an important factor in social movement 
theory, the language or frames issued by activist indigenous women should have an 
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impact on current and potential supporters and the larger public. These elements are 
important to why social movements emerge, but these same elements (shaping public 
opinion and recruiting of members and supporters) may also affect the decisions 
governments make in policy. The cultural/cognitive viewpoints can be read to expect that 
successful frames will be those that successfully incorporate the necessary organizational 
frames of mobilization to produce broad public support and gain new activist support. 
Based on their marginalized status, I would expect that frames reflecting goals of the 
larger public to be more successful than those that emphasize gendered or ethnic frames. 
Given the extremely marginalized status of indigenous women in Bolivia, I expect 
networks and public opinion to play an important role, thus increasing the importance of 
broader language that appeals to more sectors for support.  Ethnic and gender-centric 
frames, therefore, are expected to contribute to less favorable outcomes for indigenous 
women’s policy. 
Indigenous Women’s Frames 
The frames of social movements define movements, and create the meaning that 
inspires supporters and participants to sympathize with the movement’s goals (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Rousseau 2011:8; Caginlia and Carmin 2005). For indigenous 
women, this meaning derives from their cultural identity as key agents for preserving and 
reproducing the community, and is an important emphasis of their political activities 
(Cadena 1991; Radcliffe 2008; Rousseau 2011). Exploring how this identity translates 




Various scholars argue for the need to examine indigenous movement identities. 
Rousseau (2011) argues that the intersectional viewpoint highlights the need to 
distinguish between social positioning and Andean group identities; while various groups 
might be represented under an overarching classification (such as “Aymara”), the group 
expression of identity may or may not reflect that diversity (8). This idea can be taken 
further by exploring to what degree identity in frames represents goals of the indigenous 
or of the larger public. The idea that framing of issues matter to the emergence and 
support indigenous movements receive is supported by Brysk (2008), who points out that 
framing and identity politics is an important part of explaining why people get involved 
in politics, but also in understanding how social movements change politics (35). While 
they empower members and raise public consciousness, identity-based movements can 
change political institutions and behavior (Brysk 2008: 35). This viewpoint articulates 
that social movement cultural components affect political outcomes, and informs my 
hypothesis that indigenous women’s frames affect policy outcomes.  
Lucero (2008) notes a divergence between framing approaches, one (the master 
framing approach) suggesting that leaders and their opponents are engaged in a contest of 
meaning production, and one in which each side seeks to situate the struggle within a 
particular narrative or master frame (Lucero 2008: 16). As Lucero (2008) and other 
scholars note, the new social movement perspective places less emphasis on the agency 
of movement actors (or how the collective action problem is solved) and focuses on 
cultural codes and the constitution of collective identities and the discursive power of 
movements (Melucci 1994; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998). Lucero (2008) suggests 
that both are crucial to a comparative understanding of political indigenous voice and 
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finds that the framing perspectives have been successfully used to explain indigenous 
identity and the question of how class identities were transformed into ethnic ones (16). 
There are many reasons to expect the relationship between language and outcomes to be 
complex. Indigenous women may choose to articulate their gendered, ethnic demands or 
make broad public appeals to achieve their goals. In addition, there are different 
recipients of every message (participants, potential supporters), so that indigenous 
women’s organizations face the challenge of balancing indigenous identity with the quest 
for public support. Also, the possibility exists that indigenous and gendered language 
could be more important to building group solidarity than to appealing to the larger 
sectors of society, and thus contribute to success. Another, more idealistic possibility is 
that indigenous and gendered identity and language would not need to be compromised 
because the population had begun to recognize indigenous women’s social and political 
legitimacy in their own right.  
The reality is that although cultural and framing scholarship has deepened our 
perceptions of the importance of these variables, the evidence has not truly led to solid 
expectations of how they impact outcomes. From the master framing perspective 
identified above, we may assume that the group that managed to “master the public 
dialogue” would be the “winner” of policy outcomes. But is that always the case, and, 
besides, who wins the challenge to master the dialogue, and how? The “discursive power 
of movements” view gives some insight into how framing may matter, but a lot of 
questions remain. For instance, who is involved in the discourse and who needs to be 
influenced by it to matter? This dissertation takes a hopeful step in the direction of 
making more concrete connections between frames and outcomes. Drawing from the 
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framing literature about the importance of appealing to larger segments of society, I posit 
that non-gendered and non-ethnic (broad) frames are likely to be more successful than 
those that emphasize the gender and ethnicity of the participants in social movements. 
This hypothesis assumes that indigenous identity may need to be downplayed to win the 
support of other members of society and achieve social movement goals.  
State Characteristics 
Social movements are of central importance to modern political systems as a force 
for change, but the state and the political environment are often neglected in research on 
social movements as an important causal variable in this process of change (Fernandez-
Kelly 2006 and Shefner 2006). Jenkins and Klandermans (1995) argue that success is by 
and large a product of the political environment, and that “the state is therefore 
simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as organizer 
of political system and arbiter of victory” (3). These considerations are especially 
significant to this research, which focuses on policy victories as the outcome of interest. 
The State Political Opportunity Structure 
In factoring the state as a crucial explanatory variable in assessing social 
movement outcomes, this dissertation contributes to scholarship that has assessed the 
impact of social movements on public policy and political opportunities as measurable 
outcome variables (e.g., Meyer and Rochon 1997; Whittier 2004 and Kolb 2007; Amenta 
et al 1999). 
 My research argues that the opportunity structures (Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978) 
represented by the state and other contexts affect the chances for indigenous women’s 
success in achieving favorable policy outcomes. Tarrow’s major arenas of political 
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structure will affect indigenous women in terms of policy: openness of formal political 
access, stability of alignments within the political system, and the availability of strategic 
posture of potential alliances (Tarrow 1983: 27-33). Several scholars branch off from 
these three main areas of opportunity to include state organization, cohesion and 
alignment among political elites, the state of political parties (Jenkins and Klandermans 
1995), the nature of relationships between the state and its citizenry (Goodwin 1997), and 
the state’s ability to repress its citizens (McAdam 1996: 29). Indigenous women’s policy 
efforts encompass most of these main areas of influence for policy success to occur, 
including the position of alignments within the system, the formal opening of 
opportunities within the state, alliances with other groups, and the state’s potential for 
repression. Drawing from the political opportunity perspective, political opportunity 
structural openings will make policy success more likely for indigenous women.  
But my hypotheses of social movement outcomes diverges from the political 
opportunity and structural approaches because I view the components of organizations as 
important variables that must combine with state features to produce outcomes. While the 
political opportunity approach argues, for example, that changes in organizations’ 
“repertoires of convention” result from changes in the political structure (Tilly 1989; 
Tarrow 1998), drawing from the cultural and cognitive approach, I argue that changes in 
organizations may also occur independently and in turn, manipulate state structural 
opportunities. Thus, the expectation that political opportunity structures will be important 
is tempered by the expectation that these variables interact with other organizational 
variables to produce social movement outcomes. In addition, this dissertation will 
provide information as to whether the political opportunity structure influence is 
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overstated in its presumed ability to change organizational features such as frames. If 
changes in organization are evident before changes in structure, then we may have a more 
nuanced understanding of how social movements interact with the government. There 
may, in fact, be a feedback mechanism wherein social movements and the state influence 
each other. This dissertation hopes to shed light on this issue as well.   
To summarize, the literature indicates that several features of the state are 
influential in the degree of success or failure of indigenous women’s policy demands. 
Generally, I hypothesize from the political opportunity perspective that political openings 
within the state can generate more successful policy. In short, the operating theory 
relating to features of the state is that the role of state opportunities are among the most 
influential contextual variables on policy decisions, and that these combine with 
organizational and international features to influence successful policy outcomes. 
Indigenous Women’s Political Opportunity Structure 
Many scholars have investigated how state political opportunity structures affect 
indigenous social movement mobilization and success (Albó 1991, 1994, 2002; 
Gustafson 2002; Lucero 2003; Pallares 1999; Van Cott 2000 Yashar 2005; Zamosc 1994; 
Lucero 2008). While most of these studies identify the causes of mobilization and various 
measures of success (from political party formation to influence on particular policies), 
several scholars indicate that structural opportunities should be viewed in light of other 
important variables in order to gain a full understanding of their impact.  
For example, Lucero (2008) emphasizes political opportunity structure as a cause of the 
rise of powerful indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, but argues that state 
political opportunity and cultural components matter to his independent variable (Lucero 
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2008: 14-15). Looking to factors outside the state, Brysk (2000) finds that “although state 
structures do play some filtering role in the form of movement mobilization, state 
strength and capacity do not seem to adequately explain the impact of the movement” 
(referring to Bolivia), but she does comment that democratic openings coincide with the 
resurgence of indigenous rights movements (37). Similarly, Yashar (2005) advocates for 
an approach that identifies structural causes for indigenous movements across Latin 
America, but states that these are likely to present an incomplete picture of ethnic 
political movements. She argues that transnational politics matter in combination with 
state politics and organizational characteristics.  
In addition, various scholars conduct cross-national studies of collective action in 
Latin America, finding that institutional arrangements –including neoliberal institutions, 
party institutionalization, weakening institutions, and electoral institutions—have strong 
impacts on the political opportunity structure and the emergence of social movement 
protest (Yashar 1999; Van Cott 2001, 2003; Van Cott and Rice 2006; Arce 2008, 2010; 
Arce and Mangonnet 2012; Machado et al., 2009). For example, Van Cott and Rice 
(2006) find that among other contextual variables, electoral variables like district 
magnitude and the age of the political party affect indigenous party performance cross-
nationally (725). In addition, while Machado et al., (2009) find that Latin American states 
with weak institutions are more likely to experience collective action protest, Arce (2008, 
2010) and Arce and Mangonnet (2012) find electoral competitiveness in weak 
institutional settings may curb protest. While the institutional research informatively 
addresses the political opportunities involved in different aspects of social movement 
mobilization, it has not addressed how these political opportunity structures align with 
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different policy outcomes. Studying Bolivia contributes to the institutional literature by 
studying a case of weak institutions and their interaction with social movements in 
policies. I therefore assess different levels of opportunity as suggested by the data on 
political opportunities over time in order to determine whether, as hypothesized, open 
political opportunity structures coincide more commonly with success or failure. 
Neoliberalism, Leftist Leadership 
The degree to which a state is committed to orthodox or heterodox economic 
policies is believed to influence policy success among indigenous women. The next 
sections investigate the roles of globalization, neoliberalism, and leftist leadership as 
having possible separate impacts on the rates of policy success as well. These differences 
are due to components of neoliberalism and leftism that transcend economics, and entail 
significant political cultural effects that influence policy success among indigenous 
women.  
The issue of neoliberal economics touches on issues discussed elsewhere in this 
research, including international influences and the influences of leftist leadership. 
Economic crises have had a profound effect on the ability of government to meet the 
needs of emerging voices, and developmental strategies (many of which originate from 
modernization philosophy) have affected the survival and resources of indigenous regions 
and women (Langer 2003; Yashar 2005; Jacquette 2006; Deere 2001). As Jacquette 
(2006) points out, as Latin America follows the prescriptions of the IMF and the World 
Bank for development, social spending is limited, regulations on private capital are 
reduced, and incomes of the middle class and those below it suffer tremendously (27, 36). 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that states with a stronger commitment to 
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neoliberal economic policies will produce less policy success in the areas commonly 
challenged by indigenous women. On the other hand, where states are rolling back 
neoliberal economic policies, instituting nationalization projects, or pursuing other 
heterodox economic efforts, policy success in these areas should be more evident for 
indigenous women.  
Related to the role of neoliberalism is the role of leftist leadership.  Especially in 
Latin America, where neoliberal reforms have produced uneven results, the twenty-first 
century has seen a resurgence of leftist politics in the region. The left has a long history 
of identification with indigenous and women’s claims, even if it has not always been a 
genuine one (Blofield 2009; Bouvier 2009; Rice and Van Cott 2006). Leftist 
governments’ association with more egalitarian gender, class, and racial outlooks lead to 
the expectation that indigenous women’s policies will receive more favorable treatment 
under such leadership. In light of much of the recent activities in Bolivia, we might even 
conclude that leftist leadership is one of the more powerful predictors of success in policy 
arenas promoted by indigenous women. Thus, I hypothesize that declining neoliberal 
commitments and the rise of leftist leadership will be associated with positive outcomes 
for indigenous women’s policy efforts. 
Neoliberalism and Indigenous Women 
Various scholars of indigenous movements document the conflicts and 
inconsistencies between the goals of national citizenship within neoliberal regimes and 
indigenous autonomy, which inevitably affect policy toward indigenous groups across 
Latin America (Nash 2005, Speed 2006, Kellogg 2005, Yashar 1999, Lavrin 1993, 
Bouvier 2009; Chong 2007; Eber and Kovic 2003; Gonzales and Kampwirth 2001). 
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Yashar (1998, 2005) suggests that the combination of political liberalization, neoliberal 
economic reforms, and pre-existing social networks served to trigger the politicization of 
indigenous identity Latin America. She argues that economic integration and 
neoliberalism create the conditions for protest by threatening economic livelihoods, 
national sovereignty and/or cultural boundaries. While she finds a positive correlation 
between neoliberalism and the rise of indigenous movements, when her logic is applied 
to policy outcomes, my dependent variable, I expect the relationship to be negative. This 
is a natural expectation if the policy outcome in question is one that opposes 
neoliberalism; neoliberal governments may give rise to action, but the likelihood of 
achieving success is low under neoliberal commitments. The expectation is that even 
causes that do not oppose the neoliberal design should fare poorly under neoliberal 
government due to the mainstreaming tendencies of neoliberalism (Clisby 2006) and a 
presumed preoccupation with economic over social issues.  
In the effort to understand the changing relationships between states and social 
movements in the context of neoliberalism, it is helpful to understand how neoliberalism 
impacts the rise and organization of social movements. But in terms of understanding the 
full consequences of neoliberalism, it is necessary to understand further how social 
movements’ ability to impact policy is impeded or aided by neoliberal commitments. 
While Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru have all experienced ethnic 
uprisings against neoliberalism, the outcomes of these uprisings vary widely from the 
Zapatista’s failed attempts at influencing policy to Bolivia’s surprising indigenous victory 
over neoliberal governments (Yashar 2005). Clearly, some other factor or factors 
contribute to the outcome of activism aside from the outrage and mobilization against 
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neoliberalism. This research thus tests the hypothesis that neoliberal commitments will be 
associated with less favorable outcomes than leftist commitments by the government. The 
analysis attempts to expand out knowledge of the effects of economic policies on actual 
policy outcomes that matter to social movements.  
International Influences 
Various international factors may have positive or negative effects on indigenous 
women’s goals. Much scholarship has focused on the role of economic 
internationalization or globalization and international law. There are reasons to believe 
that the degree of international integration with the global economy would decrease the 
resources available to indigenous women that might aid in their attempts to gain policy 
success. But a reading of the international economic literature relating to the role of 
international trade provides conflicting evidence. One possibility is that increased 
exposure of indigenous women to international firms, NGOs, and even their piece work 
for MNCs can increase networking and other material and human capital resources that 
assist them in overcoming hurdles to collective action (Razavi 2009; Castillo 2006; Lind 
2002). In addition, in non-economic matters, various other scholars point to the role of 
international law and norms in aiding indigenous women in mobilization (Brysk 2000; 
Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Yashar 2005; Rousseau 2011; 
Hernández Castillo 2003; Sierra 2001, 2007; Kampwirth 2002, 2004; Speed et al 2006). 
Thus, I hypothesize that indigenous women’s policy outcomes will be positively 
impacted by international support. 
However, much evidence points to the effects of globalization in increasing 
pressures on indigenous women in terms of fewer opportunities for work and, ostensibly, 
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opportunities for political participation.  Related to globalization, neoliberalism has 
involved massive cooperation between governments and international lending institutions 
like the IMF, whose influences often run counter to mass preferences (Rakowski 1994; 
Oliveira and Roberts 1994; Postero 2008; Perreault 2006). Fernandez-Kelly (2006) takes 
an even darker view of the role of globalization, arguing that,  
Globalization is therefore more than an economic trend aimed at maximizing 
capital gains through the transfer of production from advanced to less developed 
countries—it is also a political strategy that atomizes and weakens labor forces in 
various locations. (7) 
Based on this reading of the role of international factors on social movements, I 
hypothesize generally that international factors creating a supportive environment for 
indigenous women will increase their chances of policy success, but significant 
international opposition will decrease their ability to achieve favorable policy outcomes. 
However, this hypothesis is conditioned by the expectation that international structural 
forces are expected to interact with framing, organizational, and other state-level 
structural factors to produce outcomes in policy. 
International Influences on Indigenous Organizing  
Scholarship on indigenous communities has emphasized international factors 
responsible for the politicization of ethnic identity and the rise of indigenous rights 
movements and political parties (Brysk 2000; Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000; Yashar 2005).  
Brysk (2000) argues that internationalization has a number of influences on social 
movements, to include external alliances and leverage, as well as the normative basis and 
cultural impact of internationalization. Yashar (2005) argues that the rise of indigenous 
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movements is aided by international influences. Globalization contributes to the rise of 
ethnic movements by creating a “transnational civil society” and provides networks, 
resources, information, and funds that were previously inaccessible to these groups 
(Yashar 2005: 16). The role of globalization increases the ability to create international 
norms and ideas about human rights, indigenous rights, and environmental rights, among 
others. “These ideas shape self-understandings and legitimate the demands of new social 
movements, including ethnic-based movements” (Yashar 2005: 16). Other scholars cite 
international law and norms as an important source of indigenous women’s recourse in 
Latin America (Rousseau 2011; Hernández Castillo 2003; Sierra 2001, 2007; Kampwirth 
2002, 2004; Speed et al 2006). Thus, the findings of scholars point to two potential roles 
of international influences on policy outcomes. Globalization or economic 
internationalization is equated with a rise in social movement activity, but I argue that 
this factor has a negative outcome on policy, because globalization and international 
influences create divergent goals between states and indigenous women. The other view 
of globalization is that it creates important norms and laws that also increase indigenous 
women’s mobilization, and I expect that these also increase the chance of positive 
outcomes. To reiterate, the hypothesis that international support increases the chances of 
success for indigenous women may be conditioned by state alignment on the issue 
supported or opposed by international influences. The analysis presented contributes to 
the literature on transnational movements by identifying the conditions under which 






The above theoretical discussion posits several explanations for indigenous 
women’s mobilization and resulting policy success or failure. I focus on the 
characteristics of several different cultural and structural facets affecting indigenous 
women’s mobilization: resources, frames, opportunity structures, neoliberalism, and 
international influences. In choosing these variables, I consult resource mobilization and 
political opportunity approaches within the structural paradigm, along with framing and 
cultural approaches. The framing literature’s references to culture, identity, and potential 
supporters indicate that where indigenous women use broad reaching and non-gendered, 
non-ethnic frames, greater policy success will be present. The structural approaches 
emphasize that organizational factors unique to the social movement will be important, 
including the resources utilized to pursue policies. A higher presence of indigenous 
women in the movement leadership, strong networks, and large numbers in participation 
are expected to contribute to their success. In addition, external structural factors, 
including the political opportunity structure of the state, the commitment of states to 
neoliberalism/leftist leadership, and international support or opposition also work to 
increase/decrease indigenous women’s chances of achieving their policy goals.  
Social movement scholars have suggested an integrative approach between 
cultural and structural accounts (Lucero 2008; Eckstein 2001; Foweraker 1999). As 
Lucero (2008) identifies, an integrated approach should include political opportunities, 
state and international impacts, and cultural understandings from both master framing and 
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constructivist framing approaches to explain indigenous politics (15-16).2 Other scholars 
(Yashar 1998, 2005; Radcliffe, Laurie and Andolina 2002, 2005, 2004) also provide more 
integrated insight into the emergence of social movements, linking transnational features 
of the movement and organizational characteristics like framing and identity formation. 
Lacking in the expanding research on ethnic movements in Latin America is a 
cultural/structural/transnational approach that systematically assesses conditions of 
indigenous women’s policy outcomes. This research into indigenous women’s policy 
efforts therefore builds upon the value of studies that assess policy outcomes in one arena 
using cultural, resource, or structural explanations. It also applies the integrated approach, 
which has been used more to explain the emergence of indigenous social movements in 
Latin America than their success. In general, this analysis potentially deepens our 
understanding of the role of political opportunity structures, organizational 
characteristics, and international effects, which need to be explored more fully in the case 
of indigenous women’s movements. To achieve these analytical goals, I test the 






                                                
 
2 Master framing refers to the methodological individualism of the rationalist view of 
competition between political actors to create meaning for a group. Discursive 
approaches focus more on identity-construction and the “discursive power of 
movements” (Lucero 2008:16). 
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Higher amounts of resources will contribute to successful 
policy outcomes. 
 
Higher numbers in protesters and members will contribute to 
successful policy outcomes. 
 
Strong networks with other social movements, society, and 
government will contribute to successful policy outcomes. 
 
Higher amounts of indigenous women in leadership positions 











Frames that appeal to broad sectors of society will contribute to 
successful policy outcomes. 
 
Broad, non-indigenous frames will contribute to successful 
policy outcomes. 
 












State structures creating opportunities for indigenous women 
will contribute to successful policy outcomes. 
 
Opening political opportunity structures (especially state 
reforms) will contribute to successful policy outcomes. 
 




Supportive international influences will contribute to 








The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the 
data, methods, and analytical strategy undertaken to evaluate my hypotheses. Chapter 3 
identifies the values of the important independent variables under analysis in this 
dissertation, revealing the coding of organizational resources, frames, state political 
opportunities, neoliberalism, and international support or opposition. Significant 
differences in independent variables are evident over the three time periods investigated 
in this study. The values established for these variables provide an important piece of the 
analytical framework for future chapters. Chapter 4 presents the results for the period of 
1994-2000, the neoliberal period, outlining the findings from qualitative historical 
analysis and process tracing, and connecting the independent and dependent variables to 
assess the power of the hypotheses developed in this chapter. Chapter 5 summarizes the 
results for the interim period between the neoliberal period and the post-liberal period 
during the Gas War between 2003 and 2005. Chapter 6 analyzes the effects of 
independent variables on the outcomes of policies during the post-liberal period. Chapter 
7 assesses generally how the hypotheses perform when the time periods are compared, 
and makes overall generalizations about the possible lessons for other social movements. 
Chapter 8 concludes the research with a summary of findings, major implications and 









Research design: Data, Methods, and Analysis 
 
This research uses a case study design that analyzes theoretically important 
determinants of indigenous women’s policy outcomes over the course of the last eighteen 
years. The overarching investigative technique is qualitative historical case study 
analysis, making use of structured, focused comparisons and process tracing of different 
policy outcomes between 1994-2012. The unit of analysis for this research is the policy 
outcome associated with a given goal of indigenous women’s mobilization. The cases 
include several policies in Bolivia, and include the outcomes of indigenous women’s 
policy efforts during the neoliberal era, a brief period of transition (2000-2005), and what 
is termed the “post-liberal” era (Yashar 1999). I trace the possible causes of policy 
success and failure by assessing outcomes at different values of the independent variables 
to test the relationships posited by my hypotheses.  
This chapter presents the research methods and data used to test the hypotheses 
about the role of organizational, state, and international characteristics in indigenous 
women’s policy outcomes. The first section outlines the overall strategy for the research. 
The next section discusses the data gathering and reporting techniques employed for the 
study. The final section presents the basic rules for measurement and analytical strategies 
used to test my hypotheses. 
Research Design 
Methods 
To test hypotheses regarding the impact of organizational, state, and international 
variables on indigenous women’s policy efforts, I conduct comparative historical analysis 
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of policy outcomes at various moments in individual policies. As Mahoney and 
Reuschemeyer (2003) point out, case studies are seen as crucial elements to building the 
knowledge needed for generalizations as well as understanding the nuanced, path-
dependent nature of historical progression and “causal chains.”  The use of case-centered 
detailed analysis provides the best opportunity to gain leverage on the intricate causal 
mechanisms at work in policy results. While broader generalizations may not be possible, 
this approach does allow for potential applications of these analytical lessons to Latin 
American countries where indigenous women’s social movements are significant. 
Additional generalizations about the role of structures and organizational characteristics 
in policy outcomes for marginalized groups will also likely follow from this study. 
Finally, Bolivia’s former experience in neoliberal politics may extend to the current 
neoliberal governments and social movements in other countries in Latin America.  
The use of case study methods is also important because, though significant in 
population, many obstacles exist to collecting reliable, large-N quantitative data on 
indigenous women that can answer how their social movements impact policy. Also, 
case-based designs are useful in situations confronted in this research—including the 
problem of multi-conjunctural causality—which scholars point out can be confronted 
only through the rigorous contextual analysis of specific cases (George and Bennett 
2005). As Ragin states, “in general, attention to complexity is justified whenever it is 
argued that a certain historical outcome… or set of similar outcomes … is historically or 
culturally significant in its own right and demanding of social scientific interpretation” 
(Ragin 1987: 23). I argue that indigenous women and policy success are the types of 
phenomena cited by Ragin as candidates for case study. Bolivia stands as an important 
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historical example because of its large indigenous population and because of the recent 
shift in power toward certain indigenous people in the country. In addition, case study 
analysis provides the opportunity to investigate important interactions between political 
actors in certain policy arenas (George and Bennett 2005), and is therefore beneficial to 
the range and scope of issues I address here.  
The methods proposed herein are ideal for testing theories of social movements 
because they can explain variation over time within Bolivia on the important independent 
and dependent variables.  In addition, I supplement the analysis with a process tracing 
approach that increases the number of observations and further identifies important 
causal pathways, as illustrated by George and Bennett (2005), Goldstone (2003), and 
Blatter and Blume (2008). George and Bennett (2005) also argue that the “use of process 
tracing does well with cases that exhibit multiple causes” (207) and that contain 
interacting causal variables that are not independent of each other. Process tracing may 
provide insight into path-dependent processes, in which the identification of key decision 
points is a necessary step in establishing the “causal pathways” toward an outcome 
(George and Bennett 2005: 212). The complexity of the decision-making process, one of 
my main points of interest in this study, is a case of multiple causation, in that many 
different interactions occur during the legislative or policy-making process. Identifying 
causes requires analysis of sequential events, guided by the hypotheses posited herein 
regarding state, international and organizational influence on indigenous women’s policy 
outcomes. Reviewing the course of events leading up to an important policy moment 
(successful and unsuccessful) will also increase leverage over the question of how 
outcomes are correlated with levels of resources, types of frames, political opportunities 
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in the state, neoliberal commitments, and international support/opposition. Given the 
“intersectional” view of causes of indigenous movement success, which in essence, posits 
that multiple points of “identity” and oppression are important contributors to outcomes, 
the concern over multiple causes increases (see George and Bennett 2005: 161). Process 
tracing of policy may help to unpack these multiple causes and their intersecting nodes of 
influence. 
Case Selection 
The unit of analysis is policy outcome, and several individual cases of policy 
outcomes are studied within the country of Bolivia. I select the country and set of policy 
outcome cases based on their ability to provide sufficient variance on the important 
independent variables, applying ordinal or ranked coding to the independent and 
dependent variables. The identification of probable correlations between causal variables 
and indigenous women’s policy outcomes is the goal of this research. This makes 
investigation of a range of variables necessary in order to assess whether lower/higher 
values on certain independent variables are associated with differences in policy 
outcomes. Some interactions, like policy outcomes in Bolivia, are inappropriate for 
making deterministic causal inferences because multiple layers of influence and 
interactions between variables must be simultaneously considered (Mahoney 2000:393). 
Social movements engage several types of actors in society, the state, and the globe, 
make various demands, and experience a wide range of responses to their movements. 
This makes probabilistic assessments of the cases and their outcomes more reasonable 
than eliminating potential causes for social movement success. The probabilistic 
approach is also preferred for Bolivia and the policies chosen because the dependent and 
 
 38 
independent variables yield outcomes that are not dichotomous (Mahoney 2004: 84). 
Bolivia and its accompanying cases are selected for the range of values on organizational 
resources, organizational frames, political opportunity structure, neoliberalism, and 
international influences. Individual cases also are chosen to represent a wide range of 
issues that are important at local and national levels, so they are likely a good sample of 
the types of demands indigenous women made on their government during the respective 
time periods.  
The analytical goal of this project is to test the hypotheses suggested by the 
established literature in a relevant illustrative case setting. Bolivia is an example of such a 
case, first, because events there signify a growing amount of indigenous social movement 
influence. Indigenous people equal over half of Bolivia’s total population according to 
World Bank reports (2012), but they have had to overcome centuries of apartheid-like 
oppression. Bolivia also contains elements of a “machista” culture that creates tensions 
between women’s interests and the state, which makes it a difficult setting for indigenous 
women to succeed. Other countries experience indigenous mobilization, indigenous 
political party representation, and indigenous female mobilization. But since the 2005 
MAS and Evo Morales’ electoral victories, social movements, indigenous men and 
women, have an unprecedented amount of leverage in government affairs compared to 
indigenous groups in other parts of Latin America. Indigenous women’s emergent power 
has occurred along with organizational and state structural changes that have been posited 
by social movement theories to impact outcomes. These include changes from neoliberal 
to socialist-leaning governments, an indigenous party leadership, and increases in 
resources for indigenous women’s organizations. Bolivia has also had a changing 
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relationship with international influences, including other countries and international 
organizations. The case of Bolivia gives the opportunity to study these structural changes 
as well.  
Also interesting is that Bolivia’s return to democracy was relatively new when 
this study begins—little more than a decade after the return to electoral democracy in 
1982. The gradual incorporation of indigenous women, largely through their social 
movement ties, into democratic consolidation processes is documented by this study. 
Further, while weak institutions and government instability have been connected to the 
dominant role of social movements in democratic Bolivia and Latin America (Arce 2012; 
Van Cott 2005), we need a clear understanding of how social movements work within 
these weak institutional structures to influence policy. Bolivia is thus an ideal setting for 
studying the role of social movements and institutional changes at various stages in 
democracy.  
Policy moments in the past two decades of Bolivia’s history provide an interesting 
setting for other reasons.  Given the changes in the independent variables between 1994 
and 2012, the three identified time periods in Bolivia present a comparative view of three 
different “Bolivias,” politically speaking. Each of these periods experiences variance on 
the independent and dependent variables in this research. Further, indigenous women’s 
movements in Bolivia represent a hard case for success as theorized by social movement 
theory because they traditionally have lacked many of the items theorized to be 
important, including resources, responsive government and society, and open political 
opportunity structures. Their struggle to gain voice in this historical context provides an 
interesting setting to test social movement theories. 
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Social movement theories need to be tested to verify if they stand in this 
(indigenous women’s) instance of social movement mobilization if we are to maintain an 
evolving sense of how social movements can shape the outcomes of politics. This 
understanding requires an intersectional perspective that seeks explicitly to explain how 
social movement theories operate within a framework of overlapping subalternate 
identities. The selected cases highlight these intersections by analyzing indigenous and 
non-indigenous networks, indigenous women in leadership within the larger indigenous 
movement, what their language of activism represents, and how they relate to the larger 
public in their evolving goals. These characteristics vary by time period and by case.  
The range of cases within Bolivia cover indigenous-centered issues such as 
bilingual education reform, land reform, territorial autonomy in the TIPNIS region, and 
coca. The case selection also extends to issues of importance to larger sectors, including 
domestic violence, gas nationalization, and the pricing of food and gas. These differences 
allow us to determine whether such goals draw from different sets of resources, create 
different frames, or confront different structural barriers, and whether these affect the 
ultimate outcome. Different time periods thus have provided a cross-section of different 
mobilization goals and policy arenas. The cases are representations of typical issues of 
importance and offer a significant range of values on the independent and dependent 
variables to facilitate hypothesis testing. Also, by analyzing time periods separately, I am 
able to observe whether hypothesized relationships hold across two cases of protracted 
struggles.  
 Indigenous women’s gender-specific goals were not successful in the neoliberal 
period, although indigenous community goals fared well, along with non-ethnic gendered 
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efforts in favor of a domestic violence law. This dissertation explains the difference 
between indigenous women’s disappointing outcomes on one hand, and indigenous 
community and women’s successful outcomes, on the other. Indigenous women have 
also been successful in achieving gendered land policy in the post-liberal period, but not 
during the neoliberal period, and so organizational, state, and international factors are 
examined to determine their role in these outcomes.  In addition, while indigenous 
women faced better circumstances in the post-liberal period, when they exerted influence 
over nationalization of gas and land reform, the TIPNIS territorial conflict ultimately 
denied the goals of indigenous and women’s activism. In another instance of post-liberal 
disappointment, indigenous women’s attempts to resolve gas and food crises obtained 
mixed outcomes. These differences are examined to determine what factors combined to 
influence these outcomes. Also important, this analysis spans several years of conflict 
over the nationalization of gas and land reform and highlights how policy over one issue 
can be affected by changes in international and political opportunity structures. In 
summary, this set of cases provides perspective on a wide variety of policies, different 
types of goals, the influence of time and changing structures on outcomes, and significant 
changes within two policy arenas. These cases highlight the influence of changes in 
organizational, state, and international factors, and, taken as a whole, allow the ability to 
estimate the reach of indigenous women’s influence on government by investigating their 
activities under varied structural and organizational arrangements. 
The case of coca is selected for study because it represents an important effort of 
indigenous women to influence policy on an issue that received significant state and 
international opposition. Indigenous women’s participation expanded in the coca era 
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(1990s), but still used non-gendered, non-ethnic frames and made use of moderate 
amounts of human capital resources. State opportunity structures and international 
features are important obstructing variables, and the case of coca provides insight into the 
way these variables function. Thus, coca provides a good test of the hypotheses about the 
role of organizational variables, but the emphasis is on external variables, including 
international and state influences. 
Agriculture reform (1994 and 2006) provides an extended view of the attempts by 
indigenous women since the 1990s to ensure more equitable land distribution to 
indigenous people and to indigenous women. Indigenous women used moderate human 
capital resources and broad frames while ignoring gendered needs during the first phase. 
They employed very high human capital resources and made use of stronger ethnic and 
gendered frames during the second phase. The political opportunity structure was 
partially open during the first phase, very open during the second phase, and international 
influences supported the measures during both phases. The outcome of agriculture reform 
in the 1990s was mixed, while the outcome in the post-liberal period was highly 
successful. These instances present a relevant assessment of the role of organizational 
resources, especially leadership and networks, and the impact of state structural 
opportunities. 
The case of bilingual education reform (1994), like the first phase of agriculture 
reform, offers a chance to view the outcomes of non-gendered, ethnic claims and broad 
frames. Human capital resources, as with the case of education reform, were moderate, 
and this gives an opportunity to view the level of success associated with moderate 
resources. The political opportunity structure, similar to the first phase of agriculture 
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reform, was partially open, and the influence of neoliberalism and international factors 
was strong. The outcome, as with the first phase of agriculture reform, was mixed, 
representing an important victory for community, but not for indigenous women’s 
gendered needs. The case of education reform is an important test of organizational 
frames, as well as social movement resources, particularly the role of networks and 
indigenous women in leadership within the movement. 
The domestic violence law (1995) involves the opportunity to view indigenous 
women’s activism that does not relate to indigenous people, but to women. Utilizing 
broad, gendered frames, and pooling large amounts of human capital resources, 
indigenous women confronted a partially political opportunity structure and a supportive 
international environment. The outcome associated with these variables was success. This 
case is very important in terms of studying the role of networks under partially open 
political opportunity structures, and the role of social movement resources because of the 
interaction between indigenous women’s organizations and broader women’s 
organizations. 
The Gas War (2003-2005) provides three separate “policy outcome moments” 
that span two time periods, the period between neoliberalism and post-liberalism, or the 
transition phase, and the post-liberal era. The three outcomes present a relevant use of 
high amounts of human resources, strong ethnic, gendered, and broad frames, open and 
closed political opportunity structures, different levels of neoliberal commitment, and 
international opposition. Using similar frames as those exhibited throughout the Gas War, 
deploying very high amounts of human capital resources, and under similar political 
opportunity structures and minimal neoliberal commitment, indigenous women were able 
 
 44 
to exert less power over policy than during the final phase of the Gas War. This 
dissertation investigates the reasons behind the difference in outcome between the cases 
of failure and the final outcome on the case of gas nationalization. The Gas War is 
especially important to testing the hypotheses about the importance of state structure, 
weak and declining neoliberalism, and international opposition.  
The protests erupting in early 2011 over the government’s decision to end 
gasoline and food subsidies was led by indigenous women in neighborhood associations. 
Utilizing the same frames as women during the Gas War, deploying a similar amount of 
resources, but facing a partially open state political opportunity structure, the protests 
resulted in mixed outcomes for indigenous women. While their first demand as a social 
movement was met, their remaining demands were lost among negotiations between their 
allies and the government. The case of gas subsidy protests gives important theoretical 
leverage over the networks and resources variables, along with the state variables, 
providing important tests of the hypotheses in this dissertation. 
Finally, the case of the TIPNIS conflict, which involves a smaller group of 
indigenous people living in territories protected by the constitution, results in failure. 
Using high human resources, voicing gendered, ethnic frames, confronting a political 
opportunity structure closed to the topic, and a supportive international environment, 
indigenous women have failed to achieve their preferred policy outcome to end the 
construction of a highway through native ancestral villages located in the TIPNIS region. 
This case thus presents an interesting illustration of the role of state structure, 





This dissertation makes use of secondary and primary source analysis, 
supplemented with field research data. I test hypotheses about the role of organizational, 
state, and international characteristics affecting indigenous women’s policy outcomes.  
Secondary data include various types of scholarly research. I consult comparative 
studies of indigenous movements in the Americas, political geographical surveys, 
political anthropological accounts of various locales, and especially political and 
sociological ethnographic research conducted in Bolivia. These sources comprise about 
one-third of the data used for this project and were located through academic journals and 
books during an intensive inter-disciplinary review of major work done on indigenous 
people, and especially indigenous women, in Bolivia. Comparative studies and other 
social science projects about the indigenous are valuable in that they give voice to a long-
silenced, marginalized group in Latin America whose accounts are lost in many broad 
histories of Bolivia. These studies provide social movement data at subnational as well as 
national levels. Where researchers are not in agreement with the significance of a 
particular event or policy (which was rare), I use news data and publications from social 
movements, non-state and state organizations to determine if there is more empirical 
support for one or the other scholar’s assessment. In the rare cases of disagreement, I rely 
on the more widely accepted view among scholars.  Relying on other researchers’ data 
from the past means that I may be observing specific types of cases instead of all types of 
cases—for example, those protests that make the national agenda or those which succeed. 
To compensate for this potential issue, I include in my analysis many documents from 
NGOs and social movement organizations that operate in a regional capacity to determine 
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whether there are serious discrepancies between indigenous women’s goals in local and 
national organizing. Where discrepancies are found, the reasons for them are discussed, 
giving a richer view of indigenous women’s activism. The more plentiful, national-level 
information remains very useful since indigenous women’s ability to achieve a national 
agenda for their issues, given their marginalization in society, is unexpected and worthy 
of investigation. Scholarly analyses are coded based on their categorizations of 
organizational frames, resources, state political opportunity structures, neoliberalism, and 
international influences.  
Aside from analyzing other researchers’ assessments of variables, a large part of 
the qualitative data comes from newspaper articles from the period of 1994-2012. To gain 
perspective on indigenous women’s political participation over time, I reviewed, selected, 
and translated various international and domestic news sources for the entire time 
period.3 I rely heavily on the use of articles from the La Paz-based newspaper El Diario 
for the period between 1994 and 2000 due to limited availability of microfilm and time 
limitations in locating alternate sources. Newspaper articles from international sources 
covering indigenous women’s issues were located through Internet searches for general 
and topic-centered phrases suggested by El Diario  (i.e., “agriculture reform and women 
in Bolivia”). Unfortunately, the international coverage of Bolivian women’s issues is 
limited during this time frame, so I rely heavily upon scholarly research and the 
newspaper for data. I read every ninth daily newspaper from the periodical El Diario in 
Bolivia from the years 1995-1999, choosing all articles that referenced indigenous 
                                                
 
3 Unless otherwise specified, all translations, including quotes and paraphrasing of 
articles, interviews, and scholarly work, are those of the author. 
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women’s mobilization or the issues about which they were mobilizing. For the time 
period from 2000 through 2012, more varied domestic news sources relevant to this topic 
are available from El Diario, El Deber, La Razon, Los Tiempos, and La Prensa as well as 
smaller online publications. These newspapers cover a larger range of ideological 
viewpoints. This portion of the analysis is further supplemented by international news 
coverage of Bolivia from Al-Jazeera, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Latin 
American and Spanish news sources such as El Mundo and El Diario Internacional, and 
U.S. news sources including more center and left publications like The New York Times 
and Green Left Weekly. The search for material was conducted with the intent to gather 
information from any news source that reported on an event selected through an initial 
time-line building search. The reason for this approach is that I seek to build the analysis 
around the stated goals of indigenous women’s movements, so I surveyed any news 
report or news video clip containing a quote or reference to explicitly-stated goals by 
indigenous women activists. In a second stage, I sought articles about the state’s response 
to fill in information not found during the first search related to how the government 
responded to important mobilizations. These articles are cross-referenced and catalogued 
based on their topic of mobilization, the statements of indigenous women, statements of 
officials, and discussion of any elements relevant to the hypotheses about organizational, 
state, or international characteristics. To find material about indigenous women’s 
mobilization, I relied upon keyword searches within newspaper archives and scholarly 
search engines (Google, Googlescholar, Bing) to identify reports that outlined events in 
which indigenous women were involved. Many of these search examples were derived 
from the initial data gathering of microfilm news articles, during which I was able to 
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hone in on relevant journalistic terms. Examples of the keywords used to locate articles 
included variations of “indigenous/native/peasant women’s activism/protest,” and after 
identifying the relevant policies for this study, phrases like “indigenous/native/peasant 
women and the price of food and gas,” “indigenous/native/peasant women and gas 
nationalization,” or “indigenous/native/peasant women and land rights.” Because the 
second period of analysis involved a change in news sources and search method, I 
duplicated the original search method using the newspaper El Diario during the years 
2000 and 2003, two important years of indigenous women’s activism, in order to assess 
the reliability of the newer search method. I drew similar conclusions about general 
events from the analysis of El Diario as from other news sources, granting a reasonable 
amount of confidence in the Internet search method. However, it stands to be noted that 
the Internet search returned a greater volume of materials directly related to indigenous 
women’s organizing than did manual searches during any period. Each of the news 
sources consulted in this dissertation contains their own political biases,4 but the reliance 
upon a broad range of sources—journalistic and academic—helps keep this tendency in 
check. Each news source is more or less in agreement with the chain of events on topics, 
even if interpretations (which are disregarded) vary.  Since I investigate event reports, 
and public rhetoric of officials and activists, ideological concerns are less of a concern 
than the potential for omitting important cases. Reviewing the social science work about 
that time period allows for some alleviation of the concern about case omission.  Articles 
                                                
 
4 The national and available Bolivian periodicals tend to be center-right, while the 
international, domestic, and online sources are more left-leaning, 
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are coded based on characteristics or statements reflecting organizational, state, and 
international characteristics affecting social movements. 
  Because I find a strong amount of agreement among primary and secondary 
sources, particularly in the period of the 1990s when the diversity of news sources is most 
limited, I am confident in the quality of information being analyzed. I supplement these 
national perspectives from news reports and secondary sources with the local 
perspectives of indigenous women activists obtained from social movement5 
publications. These publications were accessed through Internet searches, online 
publications of indigenous women’s proposals, and organizational websites. Again, focus 
was on the CSUTCB (Syndical United Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia), 
OMAQ Mujeres, and especially Bartolina Sisa. Searches for such documents were 
conducted using keyword searches that included organizational names and important 
political issues gleaned from newspaper and scholarly analysis. Where possible, I used 
the Internet website “Waybackmachine” (archive.org 2013), which has archived 
“captures” of old updates to websites. Using this tool, I was able to gauge what issues 
were posted as important to indigenous women’s organizations at various times since 
their website went online. Unfortunately, no indigenous group’s website went online 
before the early 2000s, but some early goals from the 1990s were still reflected in the 
materials on their websites. These data are some of the most valid assessments of the 
properties of indigenous women’s activism, but are less plentiful than other sources of 
                                                
 
5 Examples include the National Confederation of Peasant Indigenous, and Native 
Women of Bolivia, Bartolina Sisa (Bartolina Sisa) OMAQ Mujeres (Organization of 
Aymara Qullasuyo Women) and Mujeres Contra Violencia (Women Against Violence). 
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data. It is used with field research data, where possible, as a dominant means of drawing 
conclusions about indigenous women’s goals, concerns, and obstacles. As with secondary 
and news data, I code these documents based on which variables are evident and what 
values they indicated on state organizational features, state characteristics, and 
international influences. 
In addition, I incorporate information from various government documents and 
legal analyses as well as data collected from international organizations, online news 
sources, and websites of various NGOs and indigenous women’s activist organizations, 
with a special emphasis on the most widely known group, Bartolina Sisa.6 Also included 
are NGOs like UNICEF, UNIFEM, FoodFirst, Access to Land and Right to Property of 
Women in Bolivia (supported by Habitat for Humanity), Center for the Promotion of 
Women, Bolivia, CIPCA (Center for the Investigation and Promotion of Peasants), 
OMAQ Mujeres (Organization of Aymara-Qullasuyo Women), Bolivian Women Against 
Violence, and CEDLA (Center for Studies and Latin American Documentation), among 
others. Among international organizations, I consulted the websites and documents of the 
United Nations, ILO, and Economic Commission on Latin American and the Caribbean. 
State and government organizational documents included those from the CIA Factbook, 
the United States State Department, Bolivian government archived documents (i.e., the 
constitutions and legal code), and documents from other Bolivian government agencies 
such as Mujer Coordinadora (Women’s Coordination).  I located this information through 
                                                
 
6 The most influential women’s organization in Bolivia is named after national heroine 
Bartolina Sisa, wife of the famed anti-colonial insurrectionary who was executed in 1781. 
Thereafter, Bartolina continued to lead natives against the Spanish colonizing forces until 
her execution in 1782 (Bartolina Sisa 2011; Morales 2009). 
 
 51 
Internet keyword searches, through reading scholarly references to important documents, 
and through browsing government and nongovernmental sites using keyword searches in 
archives (where possible). These data are translated, analyzed, and coded by international 
support for indigenous women’s issues, state structural opportunity openings or closings, 
levels of organizational resources, and changes in organizational frames. 
Field research data draws from observation of social movement organizational 
activities and interviews with female indigenous movement participants and social 
movement leaders. This experience facilitated collection of pertinent data related to 
important variables influencing policy success. During June-July of 2011, for twelve 
days, I observed the daily activities of the Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Indigenous 
Native Women (“Bartolina Sisa” hereafter) in La Paz, Bolivia. The organization’s base 
serves not only as a location to conduct official business, but also a meeting point for 
women who travel together during daily “commutes” from surrounding areas, especially 
El Alto, located 45 minutes away by car. The base also serves as a general socialization 
location, and women come and go throughout the day, passing news, gossiping, arguing, 
knitting, and chewing coca leaves. Many conversations and meetings fluctuated between 
Spanish and Aymara, but the informal nature of the meetings made it possible for one of 
the local administrative assistants to give me rough translations (a task she accepted 
cheerfully). My observations of the Bartolina Sisa are the product of sitting in the 
cramped main meeting room for four to six hours daily, watching women come and go 
and conduct their organizational duties at the base.  
I also conducted two focus group sessions, and seven informal interviews with 
women who attended meetings and served in various capacities in the organization. The 
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participants in these activities ranged in age from twenty-one to approximately sixty 
years old, which roughly mirrored the age range of the organization’s membership. 
Further, the participants in focus groups and interviews represented both rural and urban 
communities (Buice 2011). Focus group sessions involved 15 women in one session, and 
13 in another. The timing of the focus group was arranged during a regular mid-day 
socialization time, when women were not too busy with official business or with their 
work outside of the organization. During this time, I asked general questions about the 
organization and individuals’ goals, the main policy efforts in which they were engaged, 
and how they viewed the organization’s role within the new government. My Spanish 
questions were, half the time, answered in Aymara, after which other group members 
translated in Spanish (my questions did not seem to need translation). I assigned 
pseudonyms to participants for anonymity and kept brief journal notes throughout the 
sessions and rigorously wrote field journals in the evenings after the sessions. These 
observations are coded by their characterizations of the relevant independent and 
dependent variables.  
Interviews were obtained by references from the executive secretary and from 
other voluntary participants, who have been kept anonymous for ethical reasons.  Of the 
seven, three of these were elected leaders (ejecutivas) from their locales or provinces, two 
were administrators for the organization based in La Paz, and three identified themselves 
as “general participants” within the organization.  Interviews were unstructured, 
questions were open-ended, lasted anywhere from 15 minutes to an hour and a half, and 
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were conducted in the respondent’s and the interviewer’s second language of Spanish. 7 
Interviews were hand-written and transcribed in English, and later coded to reveal the 
interest or issue mentioned, whether women experienced an opening political opportunity 
structure, any organizational characteristics, international influences, or any unanticipated 
themes they mentioned as significant. In addition to this data are relevant observations 
gathered during six weeks in the city of La Paz, during which time I became acquainted 
with various female indigenous street vendors, security guards, neighbors, and the like, 
which assisted me in understanding the culture and the general political perspective of 
non-activist people.  
Variables, Definitions, and Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
For the purposes of this dissertation, policy moments at points in time are the 
units of measurement and the policy arenas covered include a wide array of indigenous 
issues and concerns affecting the larger society. The main dependent variable of interest 
is the policy outcome for various policies during the 1990s and 2000s in Bolivia. I define 
policy success as any outcome that constitutes momentary or lasting success for the 
proponents of specific policies, including but not limited to temporary concessions, 
litigation, constitutional provision, or legislative outcomes. My coding of policy 
outcomes is drawn from Gamson’s (1975) identification of collective action “success” 
(the specific type of outcome in which I am interested) as being linked, in part, with 
                                                
 
7 Bilingualism is more common among indigenous women who travel to La Paz than in 




material outcomes. 8 Other researchers have identified different types of movement 
success, to include agenda acceptance, agenda access, policy victories, output response, 
and structural changes (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995:12). Similar to these scholars, I 
conceptualize success as a change in policy in response to challenges that are either 
proactive (pursuing “new advantages”) or reactive (preventing “new disadvantages”) 
(Gamson 1975: 29). Other scholars in the bourgeoning literature on social movement 
outcomes have expanded Gamson’s original definition of success to include social 
movement effects on future mobilization and cultural outcomes (Burnstein et al 1995; 
Staggenborg 1995). In essence, scholars have expounded upon the idea of assessing 
social movement outcomes, but policy success or failure is the chosen dependent variable 
because this allows more concrete measurement than cultural, societal, and future 
outcomes. The expanded conceptualizations of movement success are necessary and we 
may benefit from making a directed investigation into various influences they have on 
society, the state, other movements, and future mobilization.  Yet societal, government, 
and future mobilizations will still likely involve policy at some level. While these various 
characterizations of social movement outcomes are evident throughout this dissertation, 
my focus is on the basic dimension of policy change. 
 Indigenous women’s success in Bolivia warrants a deep inspection into all of 
their potential impact points in society. An important first step in that direction involves 
the understanding of social movement interactions with the state and how they effect 
                                                
 
8 The author identifies more than one measure of success for social movement activity, 
including participatory rewards, material gains, and cultural or discursive gains. I focus 
on material gains in this dissertation. 
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change on state policy. Policy outcomes are coded successful if a policy, portion of a 
policy, or manner of implementation of policy that coincides in time and in content with 
items identified by indigenous women as goals of their movement. I define policy failure 
as a situation where indigenous women’s claims fail to get addressed in policy outcomes. 
But policy outcomes are also sometimes mixed at various points in the policy process; 
allowing a mixed coding gives deeper insight into diverse types of outcomes of social 
movement activity. To summarize, if a case achieves the majority of the social 
movement’s expressed goals, then it is coded as a success. If a case does not achieve any 
or most of its expressed goals, then it is coded as failure. If a case has success for a 
significant number of its expressed goals but a significant number of goals remain unmet, 
then the case is categorized as a mixed outcome.  
Organizational Characteristics 
My first hypothesis states that high amounts of social movement resources are 
likely to increase the chances of success for indigenous women’s policy efforts. High 
numbers of participants, strong networks with influential actors and social movements, 
and high levels women’s leadership in the indigenous movement will increase indigenous 
women’s chances of success. I use the variables relating to social movement resources to 
measure participation strength in numbers, networks/public support, and women in 
leadership in social movements. These variables assess the importance of the resource 
mobilization approach (Foweraker 1991, McCarthy and Zald 2003) in predicting policy 
success for indigenous women. To measure human capital resources, or the numbers of 
people and organizations engaged with a particular policy arena, I examine scholars’ 
assessments of the numbers of people engaged in protests led by indigenous women, as 
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well as the numbers of organizations or sectors that comprise the human capital support 
in these protests. I measure the strength of networks for indigenous issues by following 
the assessments of Latin American indigenous specialists. I measure the estimated 
number of women in leadership in social movements (also shortened to women’s 
leadership) using a wide variety of indigenous scholarship that comments on intra-
organizational gender dynamics. These three dimensions of resources are “averaged” 
together to determine the overall level of human capital resources used in a particular 
case. For example, if a case exhibits high numbers of participants, enjoys strong networks 
and public support, and more women have assumed leadership positions in the 
indigenous movement, human capital resources are coded as very high. If, on the other 
hand, one or more elements of resources are lacking, but other dimensions of resources 
are high, then the case is coded as high. If the case exhibits low or moderate values on 
more than one dimension, but exhibits a high value on the other dimensions, then it is 
coded as moderate. The chapters reflect both the individual coding of these variables as 
well as the overall human resource variable coding. 
I posit that broad, non-ethnic, and non-gendered frames will be associated with 
indigenous women’s successful policy pursuits. I assess the importance of the variable 
relating to frames of indigenous women’s social movements to determine whether 
broader-stated frames that include more of society than indigenous or women are more 
likely to achieve policy success. Frames refer to the language used at various points in the 
attempt to influence policy. This language can include slogans, types of public speech, 
and symbols that define the social movement to the public (Benford and Snow 2000; 
Davies 1999). Sometimes different types of frames overlap within cases, and at times 
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they are exclusive. The data are coded as containing ethnic, broad or (non) gendered 
frames, or a combination of frames. For example, the framing may be ethnic, gendered 
(EG), ethnic, non-gendered (ENG), broad, gendered (BG), broad, non-gendered (BNG), 
and at times, ethnic, broad and gendered (EBG) and more rarely ethnic, broad, non-
gendered (EBNG). The specifics of how each case is coded are revealed in the case study 
chapters. 
State Characteristics 
This research assesses the role of organizational, state, and international variables 
on the chances of policy success among indigenous women. The third hypothesis of this 
research posits that opening political opportunity structures will be associated with policy 
success for indigenous women, while political closures will be associated with less 
successful outcomes. I assess political opportunity structure opening or closing within 
the state and its relevance to policy success among indigenous women. Political 
opportunity structure refers to openings or closings within the state that can produce 
opportunities for social movements to increase access and influence (Tarrow 1983: 27-
33). Political opportunities pertaining to state structure that are relevant to indigenous 
women’s movements include decisions or actions of the government, policies, or laws 
that affect the opportunity for women to engage in political activity that influences 
policy. I expect to find that an overall open political climate related to the indigenous is 
likely to increase policy success. Data are coded based on whether they indicate a closed, 
partially open, open, or very open political opportunity structure.  
 I also hypothesize that decreasing neoliberal commitments (and increasing 
leftism) increase indigenous women’s chances of success. I use the variable neoliberal 
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commitment to measure a country’s commitment to free market, capitalist policies and 
austerity programs associated with capitalism. Based on the literature, I expect that 
neoliberal commitment will be an impediment to policy success among indigenous 
women. This variable captures as well the degree of leftism in a country, but for 
simplicity, the coding of neoliberal commitment is reported here. Hence, neoliberal 
influence or commitment is coded as weak, declining, and strong, depending on the data.  
International Characteristics 
 The final hypothesis posits that supportive international environments contribute 
to the success of indigenous women in policy matters, while international opposition 
works against success. I investigate the impact of international influences on policy 
success among indigenous women, examining evidence regarding the support or 
opposition to indigenous women’s policy efforts. International influences are defined as 
external countries, agencies, or other entities that interact with indigenous policy. These 
may include non-governmental organizations, international organizations, international 
lending agencies, other countries, and networks associated with indigenous groups in 
other countries. They may exert influence through cultural information, diplomatic 
relations, or financial relations.  International data are coded as supportive, moderately 
supportive, or obstructive.   
I code an array of primary and secondary materials available on indigenous 
women’s policy efforts, creating an index of sources and a summary of the evidence 
presented by each source. I analyze the outcome of each case based on this data to see 
how often success or failure coincide with different values on the independent variables, 
while making comparisons between cases and between time periods. The remainder of 
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this dissertation evaluates the proposed hypotheses by analyzing differences between 
cases and time periods to reveal which variables condition the outcomes for indigenous 
women’s policy efforts.  
Conclusions 
The previous sections have mapped out the methods, sources of data, coding of 
data and variables, and analytical strategy to establish the framework for the research 
conducted for this dissertation. To find out which factors influence the outcomes of 
indigenous women’s policy efforts over roughly the past two decades, I organize, code, 
and assess a wide variety of data to determine how organizational resources, frames, 
political opportunity structures, neoliberalism, and international factors matter. The use 
of qualitative historical analysis and structured, focused comparisons provides a rich, 
theoretically-driven approach to establishing which independent variables likely increase 
or decrease indigenous women’s chances for success. The following chapter establishes 
the values of these independent variables over the time period in question, while the 





From ‘Exercising Voice’ to Leadership: Indigenous Women’s Mobilization in 
Domestic and International Context, 1994-2012 
 
The discussion presented in this chapter examines the factors that I have 
hypothesized as potentially influential in shaping indigenous women’s policy outcomes.  
In order to establish the historical, political, and social context in which 
indigenous women’s social movements have taken place, I employ a comparative time 
perspective that examines the values of the independent variables over three periods 
between 1994 and 2012 in Bolivia. I focus on the neoliberal expansion from 1995-2000, 
the interim period between 2000 and 2005, and the post-liberal period from 2006-2012. 
This discussion of the examination and measurements of the main independent variables 
provides the foundation for understanding the outcomes associated with social movement 
efforts, which are the focus of the remaining chapters of this dissertation.  This chapter 
codes state political opportunity structure, organizational characteristics, and international 
influences, my main independent variables.  
Organizational Characteristics: Resources and Frames 
This section addresses how various organizational characteristics have changed 
over the time period under analysis, 1994-2012. The broad term “organizational 
characteristics” refers to two main facets of indigenous women’s organizations. First, I 
investigate organizational resources like the amount of human capital resources in 
numbers used on a policy arena, women in leadership positions in social movements, 
networks and public support. I also examine the language used to articulate the public 
rhetoric and claims or demands of the movement.  The subsections below define these 
more fully and map out their evolution over time.  
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Social Movement Resources 
  I have hypothesized that indigenous women’s social movement resources are 
important predictors of success in policy measures. Human capital resources are divided 
into several different indicators. I present data on human capital resources in numbers, 
which is predicted by the first hypothesis to have a positive impact on social movement 
success. I also investigate whether networks/public support were strong or weak, as I 
expect that strong networks are positive for indigenous women’s policy influence. 
Finally, this hypothesis posits that indigenous women’s leadership in social movements 
will increase their chances of success, so I estimate the presence of women’s leadership 
in movement activities.9 The averages across these dimensions (outlined in the previous 
chapter) result in a moderate, high, and very high range of human capital resources.  
Human Capital Resources in Numbers 
While there are no consistent data on the number of indigenous women’s 
organizations in periods before the 2000s, several scholars identify the period of the early 
1990s until the end of Sanchez de Lozada’s first term (1997) as one of increased 
mobilization and participation of indigenous women in organizations (Pallett and 
Cubieses 2004: 7; Deere and Leon 2002:71; Burt 2004:61; Lind 2003: 230). Indigenous 
women began to exhibit a stronger national presence in the early 1990s, beginning with 
the March for Territory and Dignity (1990) in which indigenous women displayed new 
power in terms of visibility and voice. Throughout the next several years, indigenous 
women would show up in waves to support various causes of importance to the 
                                                
 
9 While this is not an exhaustive list of possible resources (see McCarthy and Zald 1973), 
these focus on important measurable aspects of collective action of indigenous women.  
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indigenous community. However, analysis of news reports indicates a sharp decrease in 
the number of indigenous women’s protests publicized beginning in the year 1997, the 
first year of Banzer’s administration. Also, scholars note that during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, peasant networks lacked the popular support necessary to mobilize the 
Andean population (Van Cott 2000: 195 Postero and Zamosc 2004:200-204), and other 
sources note the general decline of indigenous and indigenous women’s political 
mobilization during this time (Calla1998: 77; Lind 2004:55; Burt 2009: 59; Blofield 
2009: 170).  The number of women involved in protests and organizations visibly grew 
during the Cochabamba Water War, which was a crucial turning point in indigenous 
women’s social movements because they played crucial roles as leaders in the movement 
(Boelen et al 2010; Bennett et al 2006; Monasterios 2007). In addition, by 2012, the 
largest indigenous women’s formal group Bartolina Sisa has increased to over 100,000 
members (Monasterios 2007). By my assessment of the data over the years, all accounts 
seem to note a high amount of numbers of indigenous women involved in protest during 
the early to mid 1990s; this period is coded having high amounts of participants and 
mobilizers. From 1997 until 2000, women’s numbers in protest and organization can be 
described as low, while from 2000 to the present, the numbers of indigenous women 
engaged in protests is coded as having very high numbers of participants and mobilizers.  
Human Capital Resources and Networks/Public Support 
  Various scholars cite the March for Territory and Dignity in 1990 (Van Cott 
2000; Goodale 2006; Albro 2005:443) as important in beginning the process of raising 
public support and acceptance of indigenous among the lower and middle classes in the 
1990s. It was also an important moment of solidarity between the diverse and numerous 
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indigenous groups in Bolivia, who participated in the march. During the 1990s, loose 
affiliations and occasional coordination between indigenous groups emerged, as 
evidenced in the support Andean women of the Bartolina Sisa showed for cocalera 
activists (El Diario: 1995b; 1995c; 1995d; AFP 1995p18) and the eventual agreement on 
the issues of land reform (Ruiz 1993:20; Chase 2002: 65) and education reform (El 
Diario 1995u). However, during this time networking with other sectors was extremely 
weak or nonexistent, and the majority of cooperation networks that existed remained 
between indigenous groups.  
By the time of the Cochabamba Water War, beginning in 2000, with the 
exception of the elite class, public support for the issues led by indigenous women had 
greatly increased, giving the indigenous and the women’s movement a new human 
capital resource from which to draw in making demands on the government (Van Cott 
2000: 45; Perreault 2006; Roper 2003: 140; Bennett et al 2005). Participating with many 
sectors of society, indigenous women mobilized strongly against neoliberalism, 
especially water privatization (Stephenson 2002; Boelens et al 2010; Bennett et al 2005; 
Perreault 2008; Delgado 2012). As Perreault states, “Since at least 2002, indigenous 
representation and leadership in public affairs appears to be broadly (though not 
universally) accepted by the Bolivian public” (2008: 19). The large number of groups 
with which indigenous women cooperated, along with the level of support from the 
greater public, warrant the coding of the period between 2000-2006 as having strong 
networks. 
Today indigenous groups are divided today on issues like the TIPNIS conflict, 
where many Andean groups support the president’s plans to build a highway through 
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indigenous land, but some indigenous inhabitants of this territory are stringently opposed. 
They also find agreement on issues like land reform during the same time period, which 
shows that the degree of cooperation between indigenous groups varies. More important 
than indigenous solidarity networks, however, may be the ability to network outside of 
indigenous sectors. During the period following the Cochabamba Water War, indigenous 
women’s mobilization has been increasingly aligned, compared to the period of the 
1990s, with many non-indigenous segments of society, including labor, human rights 
supporters, churches, women’s groups, parts of the middle class, and the greater public 
(Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006: 154; El Deber 2005; Lewis 2005). Also, another important 
network comes from the ties between the Morales administration and indigenous 
women’s social movements, which played such a strong role during his election and 
continues to shape the functioning of government (Vargas and Draper 2010). The period 
following Evo Morales’ election (2006-present) is coded as having very strong networks.  
Human Capital Resources: Women’s Leadership in Social Movement 
I expect that when women have greater representation in the leadership of 
indigenous movements, their goals are more likely to take priority. Indigenous women’s 
issues have often been de-prioritized in favor of larger community goals, and this has 
influenced the scope and type of demands made at the national level. Various scholars 
and activists have remarked upon these within-organization tensions that keep women 
from assuming leadership positions and muffle their specific policy interests (Nugert 
2002: 216-217; Burt 2004: 61; Deere and Leon 2001: 71; Radcliffe 1990; Clisby 2005; 




Indigenous women accompanied the formation and consolidation of mixed 
indigenous organizations from their beginning, in front of large marches that 
made indigenous villages visible from that region of the country. However, within 
their organizations their participation was to advance the platform of collective 
rights for their villages, as the progressive construction of their specific demands 
as women was a disputed area. (9) 
This dynamic has been cited as fairly obstructive to indigenous women’s interests, 
especially in the 1990s. But today, women’s persistence in political uprisings since the 
Water and Gas Wars (Los Tiempos 2011b; Monasterios 2007; Jiminez 2003; Liendo 
2009; Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006; Vàsquez 2006), and their visible involvement in 
creating indigenous women-specific clauses to the constitution in 2006 (Rousseau 2011; 
Monasterios 2007) illustrates that indigenous women have taken on more positions of 
leadership in recent mobilizations. Women’s presence in leadership positions is 
characterized as extremely low in the 1990s, moderate during the early 2000s, and high 
from 2003 on. 
Human Capital Resources Summarized 
For the purposes of characterizing indigenous women’s human capital resources 
throughout the time period, the period of 1994-1997 can be seen as one of moderate 
human capital resources because while indigenous women mobilized strong numbers, in 
most cases, the networks formed with other groups were indigenous or women’s groups 
that did not provide the human capital and broad-sector support witnessed during the 
post-liberal period of the 2000s. The Banzer period between 1997 and 2001 experienced 
diminished human capital resources, as evidenced by the scholars above. The period 
 
 66 
beginning after the Cochabamba Water War is characterized as one of high levels of 
human capital resources. This level is established by secondary and news accounts’ 
evidence of growth in their organizational involvement and by the important role played 
by other groups in society joining in indigenous-led protest (Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006: 
154). The period after Evo Morales assumed the presidency in 2006 is characterized as 
having extremely high levels of human capital resources because in addition to the 
advantages of networks, leadership, and numbers in the previous period, indigenous 
women enjoyed a networking advantage due to their connections with the state. 
Indigenous women’s own impressive human capital was often a product of effective 
networking and indigenous women’s alignment with the Morales state from the 
beginning. This latter component especially allows an even greater pool of resources 
from which to draw for influencing policy.   
Frames—the Language of Social Movement Articulation. 
  I have hypothesized that the frames used by indigenous women activists affect 
their likelihood of achieving success. The second hypothesis indicates that broad (non-
ethnic) frames will be more successful than ethnic frames, while gender-neutral frames 
will be more successful than gendered frames. There are three basic types of frames 
relevant to this dissertation, which are used by indigenous women in combination or 
exclusively, including ethnic frames, gendered frames, and broad frames (non-ethnic 
language).   
These factors are closely related to identity politics of ethnicity and gender, 
subjects that conjure the complexities of constructing a movement based on a group’s 
marginalized status. The study of indigenous women’s activism engages the 
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intersectional approach to identity politics, which draws attention to the fact that 
indigenous women’s experiences are different from indigenous men and women of other 
races in Bolivia (see McCall 2005; Denis 2008; Gill 1993: 74; Rousseau 2011:8; 
Radcliffe 2004: 388). This is because of their dual and triple marginalization in society 
and because of their particular gender ideology. In the sections that follow, I code data on 
how the ethnic, gendered, or broad public interest subtexts of indigenous women’s frames 
were depicted. In the next subsection, I present the findings of my analysis of interviews, 
field notes, newspaper articles, secondary scholarly resources, and documents from social 
movements that contain information regarding the language of articulation between the 
years 1994 and 2012. 
Ethnic Frames  
The qualitative evidence relating to indigenous women’s organization and 
mobilization shows an identifiable shift, not only in the extent of women’s involvement 
in policy decisions, but in the language used to describe that involvement to the 
government and to the public. One significant change in frames includes an adoption of a 
more readily identifiable “indigenous” (as opposed to the peasant or campesino) label 
into the public frames of indigenous women’s activism. Framing is a complex 
phenomenon: although indigenous women now carry an ethnic banner more proudly and 
clearly than in previous years, they simultaneously promote the interests of the broader 
population in their claims, which relates to the amount of public support they enjoy.  
Although an emerging public discourse about multiculturalism and indigenous 
issues existed in the 1990s, the conceptualization of indigenous identity was still strongly 
intertwined with peasant (campesino) politics of the 1950s. The cultural and political 
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meanings associated with indigenous people had changed repeatedly over the years with 
the abolition of the hacienda system, attempts to modernize the legal code, and in line 
with corporatist and populist politics of the MNR (National Revolutionary Movement) 
which emerged victorious after the mid-century revolution (Farthing and Ledebur 2004: 
40). “Indians” were rechristened campesinos under this system, and they continued to use 
this label well into the 1990s and held on to it as an important basis for emerging ethnic 
mobilization even after the 1994 Bolivian Constitution declared the state a multi-ethnic, 
pluricultural nation (Van Cott 2003: 170; Canessa 2007: 195; Lucero 2005: 35). As many 
scholars have identified, the main political motives behind indigenous-state relations in 
the 1990s were to integrate indigenous peoples through assimilative policies and rhetoric 
(Choque 2000:14; Albo 2002: 74-75; Seider 2002; Van Cott 2000:158; Lucero 2008; 
Albo 2002; Van Cott 2003 169; Van Cott 2000: 158). Campesino remained a political 
identity for indigenous people until the late 1990s, although the use of indígena 
(indigenous) as a cultural reference is found in various reports of festivals, dances, and 
other indigenous events during the mid-1990s (El Diario 1995d). By the time the Law of 
Popular Participation (LPP) passed in 1994, some finer distinctions between indigenous 
groups had become somewhat more common, with highland indigenous adopting the 
campesino label and lowland Amazonian indigenous groups more likely to associate with 
and be described as indigenous (Perreault 2008: 2; Lucero 2007: 133-136; El Diario 
1997a). Overall, my analyses of news reports support the conclusion that most people, 
including the indigenous themselves, identified indigenous people as campesinos most of 
the time during the 1990s (El Diario: 1995a; 1995c; 1995c; 1995c; 1996a; 1996b; 1997b; 
1997c; 1995e; 1995f ; 1996c; 1996d; ANSA 1995). Interestingly, the issues most 
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important to indigenous women during the 1990s reflects indigenous or ethnic interests, 
even though the public rhetoric shied away from indigenous identification. Aside from 
their attempts to pass a domestic violence law, the issues on which indigenous women 
wanted the most change were those that addressed their community needs. Coca 
legislation, land reform, and bilingual education are all, regardless of how they were 
labeled, issues that affected indigenous communities more than non-indigenous 
communities. Indigenous women’s activism in the period of the 1990s is coded primarily 
as one of broad frames, as these were the common activist references, regardless of the 
issue. 
The difference in how women are spoken about in headlines in the 2000s is 
striking, as indigenous or “originario” (native) women were far more likely to be 
depicted leading broad sector strikes, mobilizing, protesting, and taking political office 
than were “campesinas” or “cocaleras”10 of the 1990s (El Diario: 2012c; El Diario 
2012a; El Diario 2012b; Periodico Digital 2011). Moreover, issues represented by 
indigenous women’s frames in the 2000s are often non-ethnic or broad in nature, 
meaning that the claims indigenous women make include, unlike earlier periods, 
concerns that affect non-indigenous people as well as indigenous people (El Diario: 
2012c; El Diario 2012a; El Diario 2012b; Periodico Digital 2011). However, the interim 
period is interesting because there is overlapping use of “campesino” and “indigenous” 
within single news stories, and this occurs throughout the period of analysis, but is more 
striking in the period between 2002 and 2004 (Dellien 2002; El Diario 2002; El Diario 
                                                
 
10 A term meaning “coca grower,” that has indigenous connotations because coca is 
farmed by mainly indigenous people. 
 
 70 
2004). In these reports, the protagonists are indigenous women, but headlines were still 
likely to label them as campesina. By 2012 and my brief field research in La Paz, Andean 
women had rejected campesina altogether,11 adopting either the term indigenous 
(indígena) or “originario,” reflecting their legitimacy as social leaders through their pre-
colonial heritage in the Andes (McNeish 2003: 229; Buice 2011). In addition, the history 
of naming the Bartolina Sisa is instructive. Since their establishment in 1980, the main 
organization of indigenous women was known as the Federación Nacional de Mujeres 
Campesinas de Bolivia—Bartolina Sisa.  In 2008, the organization officially changed its 
name to the Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas y Originarias de 
Bolivia (Bartolina Sisa 2009), incorporating new and identifiable ethnic frames into their 
activism. The period of the 2000s is thus coded as coexisting broad and ethnic frames. 
 The growing trend of incorporating indigenous as opposed to campesino identity 
created a stronger label that placed ethnicity at the forefront of organization frames. But 
why should it matter what label is used to describe their own activism? Scholars such as 
Radcliffe (1996) remind us that although “campesino” made appropriate regional 
distinctions for the purposes of rural justice in a country wracked with regional and class 
inequities, the fact remained that “indianness” and the associations with marginalization 
were not addressed by this label (113).  Compared to a label imposed from alienating and 
co-opting government structures, originaria or indígena manifests agency and 
empowerment gained from having contested and re-defined the terms of indigenous 
women’s activism in their own words. 
                                                
 
11 When I mentioned the term “indigenous” on the first meeting observation, participants 
suggested that I add “or native” to correct my terminology. 
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The majority of the activists of the Bartolina Sisa exemplify the traditional visual 
stereotype of Bolivian Andean women. Pollera skirts, shawls, bowler hats, and the 
trademark braiding of hair mark them as indigenous women. Their devotion to preserving 
their own traditions, language and music was explicit in conversations I had with 
members of the organization. For example, 
It’s not just about money (the reason for organizing). We want children to know 
the music, the Aymaran language, and our traditions. The Aymara are connected 
to a past that we pass on with our food, the Aymaran music, with Aymaran 
festivals. It is okay that the schools provide bilingual courses, but it is our 
responsibility, to teach everyone. (Buice  2011)  
The women organizing with Bartolina Sisa expressed pride in their ancient roots 
in Bolivia and felt compelled to make it part of their political agenda (Buice 2011; 
Radcliffe, Andolina and Laurie 2004: 397). 
Indigenous women were empowered little by the frames of non-ethnic or broad 
frames used in the 1990s.  Today, indigenous women have abandoned the generalized 
and culturally neutral label of campesino.  Instead they organize, publicize, and widely 
acknowledge their cultural heritage, their language, and their indigenousness (El Diario: 
2012e; El Diario 2012a; 2011a; Bartolina Sisa 2012; Buice 2011). Ethnicity has been 
incorporated into indigenous women’s organizational motif in a complex manner, 
meaning that non-ethnic or broad claims may be overlapped with ethnic claims (or vice 






 Since the 2000s, indigenous women are more likely to publicize their ethnic 
struggles, meaning that ethnic frames are increasingly important in contemporary politics. 
But today a large part of the population shares interests with indigenous women, 
particularly on issues like water privatization, natural gas, and gas and food subsidies.  
The scope of the protests during the 2000s has tended to cover broader interests and make 
broader claims than those witnessed in the 1990s, but during the 1990s, broad frames 
were represented by the non-ethnic use of the campesino frames, as I discussed fully 
above. This means that broad and ethnic frames have coexisted in the current milieu of 
indigenous women’s politics in Bolivia at least since the 1990s, but with different 
combinations of broad and ethnic frames. Specifically, it is common to witness 
indigenous women utilizing ethnic frames along with frames that represent large parts of 
the rest of society during the 2000s. It was more common to see “peasant” or 
“campesino”—broad, non-ethnic frames—during the 1990s even while interests 
surrounding mobilization were quite indigenous. Scholars’ assessments and news stories 
show that the frames used by indigenous women ranged in inclusiveness of society over 
time, becoming perhaps the most inclusive after the mobilizations of 2000 and 2003 over 
gas nationalization and water privatization.  
Indigenous people in contemporary times are entrusted with leadership on 
cultural, environmental, and economic values in Bolivian society, and their claims are 
given legitimacy because of their ancestry and long history of political struggle. 
Therefore, while an increasingly “indian” face has been given to activism, the motives 
behind their activism are for the people (Postero 2008: 208; Canessa 2007: 157-158). The 
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2010 LAPOP survey asked why some indigenous groups had become more influential in 
politics. The far most commonly identified reason for indigenous influence, with 51 
percent of respondents agreeing, is that the indigenous groups represent the population. 
Only 3.58 percent offered more money/resources as a cause, whereas 15 percent believed 
good ideas were the source of indigenous influence, and 26 percent believed that good 
leadership was an important reason (AmericasBarometer 2010). 12 
Indigenous support of mining and labor struggles has long shaped the protest 
landscape in Bolivia, so promoting causes that extend beyond indigenous issues is not 
necessarily new, but is rather increasing in scope (Rousseau 2011:13; de Chungara 1979). 
In the 1970s, indigenous women’s protests reflected the common interests held by these 
groups because they shared issues pertaining to the economic wellbeing of miners and 
laborers, many who are of indigenous descent. A comparison between the struggles in the 
1990s over coca eradication and the recent protests over gas and food subsidies highlight 
how indigenous women’s movements have shifted the substance of frames over time. 
According to El Diario, the cocalera marches and protests of the 1990s were the most 
publicized indigenous women’s social movement activity in the 1990s, and they rarely 
resorted to the use of ethnic (or gendered) rhetoric to advance their claims (El Diario 
1995m; 1995n). On the other hand, more recent indigenous women’s mobilization to 
                                                
 
12 The actual question posed was, “In your opinion, why have some indigenous groups 
been more effective in influencing politics?” Possible answers were: “Because they have 
more money/resources,” “Because they can work well with groups,” “Because they 
represent the population,” “Because they have good ideas,” and “Because they have good 
leaders” (AmericasBarometer 2010). I thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International 
Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available. 
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combat privatization of natural resources, highway constructions, and price hikes freely 
employ rhetoric or frames that refer to indigenous heritage and rights, while representing 
concerns of a broad sector of society which had been disadvantaged by neoliberalism (El 
Diario 2002; El Diario 2012a; 2012d; El Diario 2011). This points to the change in 
public discourse and an evolving relationship with the greater public. 
Gendered Frames 
 One of the more significant changes in frames relates to the adoption of various 
feminist goals adopted into indigenous women’s gender activism. The following 
discussion addresses the gender ideology of indigenous women and the related political 
frames of indigenous women’s social movements. 
The types of frames indigenous women used in the 1990s emphasized the 
wellbeing of indigenous groups over the specific needs of indigenous women. The topics 
of activism for this time period are related to women’s leadership within the indigenous 
movement, as indigenous women’s ability to promote their own issues can be influenced 
by these dynamics. In addition, indigenous women’s claims remained somewhat 
conservative in the sense that they did not openly challenge stereotypes of gender 
hierarchies of Bolivian society. This stance contrasts with more recent efforts of 
indigenous women who have pressed for a number of changes in the treatment of 
indigenous women in Bolivian culture (Jordán 2010; Bartolina Sisa 2009). A significant 
change in gender perspective is also evident in the amendments to the mission statement 
of Bartolina Sisa in 1998, which stated that their organization stood to challenge the 
assumption of male authority in political matters (Bartolina Sisa 2009).  
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To understand indigenous women’s activism on various counts, diverse gender 
relations in indigenous communities, and the accompanying gender ideology, are 
relevant. A representative statement of indigenous women’s gender ideology can be seen 
in one of the core principles advanced in the proceedings of the First Summit of 
Indigenous Women in the Americas in 2003, where the concept of gender relations is: 
Duality or dualism: in which the feminine and the masculine in a same deity are 
two energy forces found in one. By considering the Supreme as dual, father and 
mother, one can act with gender equity. This attitude is basic for the eradication of 
machismo. (quoted in and translated by Hernandez Castillo 2010: 540) 
The above principle of “dualism” (or “Chacha-warmi” in Andean culture) is also 
related to the indigenous concept of  “complementarity,” which represents principles of 
valuing both male and female contributions to the family and society (Radcliffe 1990: 
236; Weismantel 2001:141). Since complementarity and duality are considered 
indigenous values, these concepts have often been recalled to indict 
European/Spanish/mestizo society for the imposition of machismo and sexist relations 
between men and women (Richards 2005: 206; Joyce 2000: 145). Indigenous gender 
ideologies as expressed above have prompted some feminist criticisms of the indigenous 
women’s movements as essentialist and conservative (Rousseau 2011:15; Hernandez 
Castillo 2003: 541; Richards 2005: 205).  The indigenous critique of feminism denounces 
western feminists’ goals for their ethnocentric assumptions and their activists efforts for 
the “racist reproduction of unequal social relations on the terrain of social movements” 
(Hernandez Castillo 2003: 541).  Resistance of feminism explicitly defines much of the 
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activism of indigenous women –it relates to both the types of issues they pursue as well 
as the language they use to define their activism.  
The intersectional view of race and gender warns that “westernized” gender 
interests may not carry the same importance among more marginalized peoples. Indeed, 
activists in the early 1980s in Latin America criticized feminist theorists for their lack of 
depth and understanding of the true situation facing non-white and non-mestizo citizens. 
Mining activist Domitila Barrios de Chungara’s (1978) statement in Let Me Speak is 
telling: 
Our position is not like the feminists’ position. We think our liberation consists 
primarily in our country being freed forever from the yoke of imperialism and we 
want a worker like us to be in power and that the laws, education, everything, be 
controlled by this person. Then, yes, we’ll have better conditions for reaching a 
complete liberation, including our liberation as women. (Barrios de Chungara and 
Moema Viezzer 1978) 
In Bolivian culture, indigenous women (especially the more visible and urban 
Quechua and Aymara indigenous women) are seen as important links between mestizo, 
white and indigenous culture, between the formal and informal economy, and between 
the market and the home. Mostly this role of indigenous women is assigned because of 
their roles in agriculture and as representative voices of the informal marketplace (Albro 
2000: 32; Widmark 2007: 85; Seligman 1993: 206; Seligman 1989: 706). Indigenous 
women are a unique population in Bolivia that remains segregated from mestizo and 
white culture though they operate both within and outside the norms and values 
associated with the dominant culture (Seligman 1993: 197, 206). A preoccupation with 
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market issues has become an important focal point to indigenous women’s increased 
leadership in contemporary movements, as evidenced by many of the creative co-
operative projects promoted by Aymara women in Bartolina Sisa. These activities, 
though bound up with ideas of economic empowerment for women, are also related to 
women’s traditional roles as agricultural providers in Bolivian society (Buice 2011).13 
 Women’s growing strength in social movements is related to a layering of new 
onto old frames. Two statements by Sra. Barrios de Chungara (quoted above) three 
decades apart illustrate how layering happens within one activist’s gender perspective 
over a lifetime. When asked what obstacles stand in the way of women’s progress in 
Bolivia, she stated in 2009: 
Machismo, mainly. Not long ago, after finishing one of the literacy programs, a 
compañera came up to me. She was sad and told me that she hadn’t participated in 
the course because her husband didn’t want her to go. He told her that if her 
parents had ’raised a donkey, that’s how she should stay.’ That’s why I think that 
the first battle Bolivian women need to win is in the home. (Latinamerican Press 
2009) 
Especially in the instance of a marginalized group that wishes to be incorporated 
into the larger political system, the need for continuous and recognizable aims, both 
within and outside the organization, cannot be understated. Society’s perception of 
indigenous women is also important, and keeping these recognizable frames are helpful 
                                                
 
13 Among economic projects indigenous women worked on at the time were llama 
product exports, guinea pig (gúy) exports, and wool. In addition, the women were 




for amassing support and resources necessary to accomplish their goals. Indigenous 
women’s activism has built upon these former frames in a creative effort to extend 
activist’ goals without losing their philosophical origins or broader base of public 
support, another vital resource for indigenous women’s social movements. The hallmark 
of indigenous women’s participation in the 2000s is their organization under a 
recognizable banner (as indigenous women) while clearly representing the cause of a 
greater population. This factor has enhanced their leadership in the country’s social 
movements. Like the emergence of ethnicity, gendered claims and frames were adopted 
gradually, and because the broader public had acknowledged that indigenous women 
represent the greater good of Bolivia. However, unlike ethnic frames, gendered claims 
entered later, and after indigenous women had already experienced organizational 
successes, such as the Cochabamba Water War (Bennett et al 2008: 109-115). While 
gender strategic goals entered indigenous women’s national activism in the mid to late 
2000s, these goals were not necessarily missing from their activism previously. As I have 
discussed above concerning women’s leadership in movements, indigenous women 
acknowledged the need to organize based on recognized gender inequality in the 1990s, 
but their public, national claims were either (indigenous) community or broad-sector 
based, obscuring gender problems about which they were expressing concerns at local 
meetings. Later, indigenous women were more visible as leaders in the Cochabamba 
Water Wars, and the issue framing and claims necessarily contained gendered 
connotations since women experience the effects of privatization most harshly (Bennett 
et al 2008:108-110; Lind 2003: 231). After the election of Evo Morales, indigenous 
women placed their ethnic and gendered frames at the forefront of their activism. This is 
 
 79 
especially evident in the frames and claims set forth by indigenous women during the 
Constituent Assembly, in the language of indigenous women’s involvement in the 
TIPNIS conflict, and in highly publicized demands for indigenous women’s land justice 
(Federacion Nacional Campesino de las Mujeres Bartolina Sisa 2012; Rousseau 2011; 
Chavez 2009; Chavez 2010). However, their critique of non-indigenous women’s 
movements has been sustained. For example, as a rural activist comments:  
We are participating as objects. In public life, those who have more access are the 
non-indigenous women. But we’ve changed things a lot. Before, if we wanted to 
report incidents to the police, we weren’t able to; a man would have to go with us, 
with him exercising our rights. Now that freedom is used by liberal, feminist 
women. I don’t agree because there hasn’t been feminism in the Ayllu.14 We were 
more about complementarity. (Nicastro 2010: 7) 
This rejection of feminism may be why gender equality in representation and 
participation has emerged as a goal of indigenous women’s groups, but other feminist 
issues such as abortion are not promoted by indigenous women’s organizations. 
Indigenous women’s reproductive issues focus more on assured access to maternal care, 
rights to make reproductive health decisions, and directives to medical staff to 
accommodate indigenous birthing practices in clinical settings (Chavez 2010; 
latinamericanpress 2009; Speed 2006; Rousseau 2011). “Gender strategic” goals 
(Molyneux 1985) intersect with other ethnic-based claims by indigenous women in the 
pursuit of policies that better their daily lives, as activist indigenous women remain 
                                                
 
14 Ayllu references the traditional Andean form of community organization. 
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motivated by the ethnic justice, autonomy, and preservation of culture, but interweave 
gender parity into the substance of indigenous women’s pursuits. Although as a whole, 
indigenous women in Bolivia remain perhaps the most conservative about gender 
relations among indigenous women in Latin America, some indigenous women’s 
organizations in Bolivia criticize machismo, indigenous women’s reproductive rights, 
violence against women, and call for the creation of equal economic and political spaces 
for women’s empowerment (Buice 2011; Monasterios 2007;Choque 2007; Rousseau 
2011:18; Farthing 2007; Informe Ejecutiva 2008: 29-30).  
As Choque (2007) comments, indigenous women are engaged in what is known 
as a re-narration of indigenous traditions, seeking to strengthen their positions of 
leadership by complementing these frames with strategies and ideas of middle class Latin 
American feminists decades ago (Choque 2007: 173). New generations of women 
activists in Bolivia are now empowering themselves uniquely by acknowledging their 
traditional roles while using the concept of complementarity of the sexes to justify the 
need for their empowerment. The members of the organization Bartolina Sisa exemplify 
the growing trend in indigenous women’s organizations in emphasizing equality, 
elimination of sexism and racism, and the promotion of a fair economic system in 
addition to former essentialist claims of the neoliberal era (Rousseau 2011; Speed 2006: 
38).  
Because indigenous women’s gendered claims and frames were not evident in 
their activism at the national level, indigenous women’s activism is characterized as 
gender-neutral during the 1990s. Because indigenous women’s leadership in activism has 
increasingly brought both gendered claims and gendered frames to the attention of the 
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nation and to policymakers, the period between 2000 and 2004 is categorized as using 
emerging gendered frames, and the period between 2004 and the present is categorized as 
having gender equality frames.  
Summary of Frames 
Combining the gender and ethnic frames and claims of the periods, 1994-2000 
represents a period of broad (non-ethnic) non-gendered frames The period between 2000 
and 2006 represents a period of transitioning frames, categorized as emerging gendered, 
ethnic and broad sector frames. The final period between 2006 and present represents a 
period of the use of ethnic frames, broad sector and gendered frames.  
The State: Ideology and Opportunity 
This dissertation takes a view of indigenous mobilization and state response in the 
form of policy as a means of understanding the outcomes of social movements and also 
to understand the decision-making process as it relates to marginalized groups in society. 
I propose that understanding the outcomes of mobilization requires close attention not 
only to the features of the movement itself but also to the particular state political 
opportunity structures that indigenous women face. I hypothesize that two main features 
of the state political opportunity structure affect indigenous women’s success. One 
feature involves the noneconomic structural opportunities created in conjunction with 
attempts to consolidate neoliberalism. The other feature focuses more closely on the 
neoliberal economic commitments of the executive administrations. In the subsections to 
follow, I assess evidence concerning the nature of these state characteristics and explain 




State Structural Political Opportunities 
Political opportunities have fluctuated greatly between 1993 and the present, with 
a partial opening between 1993 and 1997, then closing of state structural opportunities 
from 1997-2005. The situation since 2005 indicates a very open political opportunity 
structure. The structure of the state in the 1990s is a product of the fierce neoliberal 
economic commitment of governments between 1994-2003, which I address more fully 
below. In Sanchez de Lozada’s first administration (1993-1997), this commitment was in 
tandem with institutional reforms intended to garner international support and to quell 
indigenous unrest (Perreault 2008; Hofmann and Pereen 2010; Van Cott 2000; Kohl 
2002; Albó 2002). The context of social movement organizing should also be viewed 
along with the process of democratic transition and attempts at consolidation occurring 
during the neoliberal period and after. The passage of the Law of Popular Participation 
and Decentralization, enacted in 1994, devolved certain powers to districts and 
communities by strengthening local forms of governing and also by creating a set of 
rights related to political participation, including the goal of encouraging participation of 
men and women and previously marginalized “campesinos.” The Law of Popular 
Participation was especially important in its recognition of “indigenous” forms of 
governance. It also provided funding and spaces for representation among important 
social movement actors by recognizing the legitimacy of civil society groups. These 
measures were especially important for indigenous people since they created local posts 
for governing and leadership, whereas leadership limited to national elections had been 
simply unattainable (Perreault 2008; Hofmann and Pereen 2010; Van Cott 2000; Kohl 
2002; Albó 2002). The true impact of these reforms, however, on indigenous women’s 
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mobilizing and policy influence, was negligible (Albro 2000: 31). Consequences of these 
reforms were in some cases even harmful, when their previously occupied spheres 
become contested political environments due to competition for new funds allocated to 
local governing posts (Lind 2002: 242; Clisby 2006: 24-27; Widmark 2007: 87; Yashar 
1998), or when resources or legitimacy failed to be properly allocated to indigenous 
women’s needs (Kohl 2002: 463, 466; Quirogaflores 2010: 4).  
State structural changes were also evident in the constitutional reform of 1994. 
The first article in the reforms to the constitution defined Bolivia as a “multi-ethnic and 
pluricultural” republic, and other articles recognized the juridical and territorial 
personality of indigenous people (Articles 61, 222, 223, 224), as well as economic, social 
and territorial rights to natural resources within “original” (native) communities (Bolivian 
Constitution 1994 Article 171). The major reforms introduced by the Sanchez de Lozada 
administration, including the Law of Popular Participation, the Law of Decentralization, 
agricultural reform (INRA), and education reform, were backed by these constitutional 
changes, which were responses to World Bank pressure to modernize and decentralize 
government (Perreault 2008; Hofmann and Pereen 2010; Van Cott 2000; Kohl 2002; 
Albo 2002).  
The historical perspective gained by analyzing this period of constitutional reform 
is imperative, especially since much of the involvement of indigenous people in social 
movements, policy, and even the drafting of the most recent constitution can be seen as a 
partial result of constitutional changes that occurred in the previous period. Thus, while 
the constitutional structure of the 1990s was important by its own merit, the future 
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possibilities opened by the language of indigenous rights would be the most outstanding 
features of the 1990s constitutional reforms (Van Cott 2002; Lucero 2008). 
The state structure provided uneven openings throughout the next two decades, 
and indigenous women were slow to take advantage of the possibilities for local 
leadership (Van Cott 2000: 255-57; Clisby 2005: 24-29; Lind 2002:242; Albro 2000:31; 
Clisby 2005; MADRE 2012; Albo 2002; Choque 2000; Roper 2003: 140; Stephenson 
2002; Yashar 1998; Bennett et al 2006). Women (and especially indigenous women) 
remain vastly under-represented at the national level, a state of affairs that is still quite far 
from reversing itself. However, the urbanization of indigenous people due to rural de-
location in the 1980s and 1990s created opportunities for higher education, with greater 
numbers of indigenous women entering into universities. This has led to the gradual 
adoption of gender consciousness among urban indigenous women, who move into the 
public sphere and attempt to make changes to policy (Choque 2007: 178). The political 
opportunity structure is more complex than a set of public institutions and the policies 
they make. It may be important to investigate the spillover effects of policy change, such 
as education and migration, which may have both negative and positive consequences for 
indigenous women. One positive consequence is the opportunity to engage in politics that 
was not present under previously existing political and social arrangements. 
During the early 1990s a series of top-down reforms introduced a newly 
permissive atmosphere for indigenous women’s mobilization. But the following 
governments, including Sanchez de Lozada’s second term, contributed to an increasingly 
closed political opportunity structure for indigenous people. For example, as Van Cott 
(2000) identifies,  
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the promotion of ethnic diversity as a major theme of government lost centrality 
and coherence in the Banzer government. There is no evidence of continuing state 
discourse on multiculturalism outside of policy documents produced for 
international consumption. (213) 
Instead of the commitment to campesino justice, which had been an important (if 
shallowly treated) focus of the Sanchez de Lozada administration, the Banzer 
administration (1997-2001) shifted attention to generic commitments such as ending 
poverty, while implementing even more stringent neoliberal reforms (Assies et al 1998: 
90; Van Cott 2000: 195). Part of the blame for the demobilization of indigenous people 
has been placed on the Banzer administration, citing his generic presidential rhetoric that 
shifted resources and support away from the multicultural emphasis of Sanchez de 
Lozada. The Banzer administration treated indigenous communities differently than the 
previous president and moved from political rights and culture to a view of the peasant 
communities as “productive units” of the neoliberal system (Van Cott 2000: 214; Assies, 
et al 1998: 175). In addition, after Sanchez de Lozada’s presidency ended, the 
organizational space for indigenous authority, which had been opened by the Law of 
Popular Participation as well as the laws of decentralization, lacked the popular support 
and the technical knowledge to take appropriate advantage of the structural changes that 
might have benefitted them (Van Cott 2000: 195).   
The specifics of neoliberal commitments are covered below, but it is important to 
note that increasing neoliberal commitments following Sanchez de Lozada’s first term 
caused a significant closing of the political opportunity structure for indigenous women, 
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as government energy and resources became more focused on privatization measures and 
means of building the economy than on ensuring the implementation of laws designed to 
promote indigenous justice (Van Cott 2000: 195). It is important to note this effect of 
neoliberalism on structural opportunities, since the neoliberal leaning of the government 
became the very topic of indigenous women’s mobilization beginning in 2000 with the 
Cochabamba Water War over privatization (Bennett et al 2005; Bakker 2008; Laurie et al 
2002; Lewis and Olivera 2004). Beginning with Sanchez de Lozada’s first administration 
and covering the next four presidential administrations, privatization of natural gas, 
water, and other state resources, including the mining sector, was aggressive. As I argue 
in future chapters, the progressively neoliberal state of government increased survival 
pressures on indigenous people, while the state became increasingly closed to social 
movement protest (Webber 2005;Webber 2005b; BBC 2004; Agramont 2012). I 
characterize the period between 1993-1997 as a partially open political opportunity 
structure. Given the state of neoliberal commitments and the lack of response of 
governments to indigenous demands, I characterize the period between 1997-2005 as a 
closed political opportunity structure.  
The state structural opportunity facing indigenous women in Bolivia was changed 
drastically during three major events between 2003 and 2006. The first was the 
resignation of Sanchez de Lozada in October of 2003 over the gas issue, and the second 
was eventual ousting of Carlos Mesa a mere two years later (BBC 2004; Associated Press 
2005). The final events were the campaign and election of Evo Morales, whose 
leadership in the mobilizations against gas privatization plans ousted Mesa. Morales 
gained fame during the 1990s as a cocalero union leader and campesino (peasant) 
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Aymara, served time in Congress, and served as a leader of the opposition during the war 
over gas nationalization in 2003. In 2006 he became the first indigenous, most popularly 
elected president in Bolivian history (Rousseau 2011: 12). Moreover, he was both elected 
by and responsible to, a large, angry popular sector, often led by indigenous women, 
which had crippled two previous administrations. Evo Morales’ presidential campaign 
was the campaign of the indigenous social movements,15 which established an early 
relationship between social movements and the administration that heavily influences the 
political opportunity structure today (Mayorga 2006: 6). Given this set of 
circumstances— institutional instability resulting from massive protest, coupled with a 
new integration of social movements into government—the political opportunity 
structure of the state is extremely open to indigenous women’s demands regarding policy. 
The second wave of constitutional reforms is especially significant in terms of the 
gendered interests of indigenous women represented in the text. The 2009 constitution 
includes provisions that provide for indigenous women’s equal access to land titling 
(Article 14), water (Article 20), health care (Article 18), protection of indigenous 
medicine (Articles 41, 42), and family care as basic rights, protection against family 
violence (Article 15, III), and advancement to political office (Bolivian Constitution 
2009). The top-down constitutional amendments (Lucero 2008: 134; Van Cott 2005: 69) 
relating to indigenous rights in 1994 failed to address indigenous women’s concerns, 
                                                
 
15 Major campaign elements included land reform for indigenous people, increasing taxes 




whereas indigenous women have managed to secure quite specific indigenous women’s 
rights in the constitution passed in 2009.  
Another important structural change introduced since 2006 includes the 
commitment of Evo Morales and his party, MAS (Movement Toward Socialism) to 
ensure that women gain access to political office. In the 2005 elections, MAS gave over 
46% of its seats to women (Rousseau 2011: 12), making it the most gender equitable 
distribution in the history of party politics in Bolivia. While female politicians still do not 
equal one-third of all posts, they have gained more in recent administrations than 
previously in history. In the December 2009 elections, the number of women elected to 
parliamentary positions rose from 14% to 28%. Six indigenous women who had 
participated in workshops organized by the organizations MADRE and Bartolina Sisa 
were elected to parliament (madre.org 2012). In addition, Morales swore in the most 
gender equitable cabinet in 2009, with half of the posts belonging to women, and close to 
a third of those belonging to indigenous women activists (Chavez 2010). These 
developments, while important outcomes by themselves, are relevant to the structure 
indigenous women’s social movement’s face in certain policy efforts that have taken 
place in recent years. For this reason, the introduction of indigenous women into forms of 
governance is expected to create an extremely open political opportunity structure for 
indigenous women’s social movements. 
The evidence suggests that structural opportunities were present in the 1990s 
during Sanchez de Lozada’s first administration, but that these were limited in their 
utility to indigenous women. This structural opportunity all but closed during and after 
Banzer’s administration and remained closed until mass frustration led to the water and 
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then gas uprisings, which unseated Sanchez de Lozada’s during his second term. After 
the election of Evo Morales, indigenous women faced the most open political opportunity 
structure encountered in Bolivia due to constitutional changes that protected indigenous 
women’s rights and because of the commitment of the administration to form 
partnerships with indigenous women’s social movements (Monasterios 2007). Because of 
these noted changes in structural openings, I characterize the early period of the 1990s as 
a partially open political opportunity structure, the succeeding three neoliberal 
presidential administrations (1997-2005)16 as possessing closed political opportunity 
structures, and the period between 2006 to the present as a very open open political 
opportunity structure.  
Neoliberalism and the Leftist Reaction 
In Bolivia neoliberal economic reforms included the transfer of state-owned 
industries to privately owned enterprises, cuts in social spending, and a turn toward 
retracting state intervention in the economy. Like many other Latin American countries, 
Bolivia adopted structural adjustment programs as conditions for International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank financing in the 1980s. By the time of Sanchez Sanchez de 
Lozada’s first cabinet appointment during Paz Zamora’s administration in 1985, the 
country was experiencing crisis level inflation and was in the throes the “lost decade” 
which resulted from the debt crisis in Latin America. To pay off debts, the Bolivian 
government instituted privatization and capitalization laws (as conditions for loans from 
the IMF and World Bank) that resulted in massive firing of public workers in education, 
                                                
 
16 These include Hugo Banzer (1997-2001), Sanchez de Lozada’s second term (2001-
2003), and Carlos Mesa’s term from 2003-2005.   
 
 90 
transportation, sanitation, and health, the displacement of over 20,000 miners, and the 
loss of close to 35,000 manufacturing jobs (Sanabria 2000; Perreault 2008; Postero and 
Zamosc 2004: 24; Postero 2005:129; Kohl 2002: 456). In addition, privatization meant 
that land could be purchased by foreign and local agribusiness, and “pro-business” laws 
allowed local markets to be flooded by cheap U.S. products that made small-scale 
farming impossible. Privatization of public service jobs in energy, transportation and 
utilities led to multinational corporation control over vital sectors of the economy and 
lay-offs of additional 14,000 workers in these industries (Sanabria 2000; Postero and 
Zamosc 2004: 24; Postero 2005:129; Kohl 2002: 456). These factors had a devastating 
impact on the indigenous population of Bolivia. Urban migration due to rural 
unemployment and unfavorable farming conditions increased, as did the number of 
makeshift communities on the outskirts of towns to accommodate informal housing. The 
real income of Bolivians dropped significantly during this time period, and by the end of 
the 1980s, the informal economy became the major source of income for 70 percent of 
the working population (Sanabria 2000; Postero and Zamosc 2004: 24; Postero 2005:129; 
Kohl 2002: 456; Perreault 2008). Though Bolivia was long cited as a success story of 
IMF lending due to its achievements in stifling inflation in the early 1990s, the Bolivian 
public, and specifically, the indigenous public, grew disillusioned by the limited recovery 
of the economy and growing unemployment (Romer 2008). While other sectors of the 
economy (industry, mining, petroleum) protested as Bolivian industries were sold off, the 
government remained closed to anti-neoliberal demands to end privatization, and this 
attitude was maintained even as more and more sectors, including, finally, the 
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indigenous, joined in protest against the government’s neoliberal policies (Kohl 2004: 
889-893).  
The era of neoliberal commitments in Bolivia stands in stark contrast to the 
commitments of the government today. For instance, following the mass demonstrations 
regarding natural resource privatization in the early 2000s, Evo Morales ran for president 
and won on a platform of nationalizing the country’s natural resources. While 
privatization, capitalization, and lowering inflation were the important landmark 
accomplishments of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s administration, emphasis on internal 
markets, social inclusion, and redistribution of land stand out as the major attempts of the 
Evo Morales administration.  
Figure 1 illustrates the decline in neoliberalism from the point of view of the Wall 
Street Journal’s Economic Freedom Index, which scores and ranks countries based on 
trade liberalization, inflation control, internal market controls, business freedom, social 
spending, labor protections, and like components. I utilize this together with the more 
qualitative assessments above to measure the country’s neoliberal commitment. Higher 
scores denote higher levels of economic freedom and neoliberal commitment. 
The graphic portrayal of the changes in economic freedom assessments traces the 
neoliberal experience for the period in question. It indicates that during Sanchez de 
Lozada’s (1993-1997) and Banzer’s administrations (1997-2001), Bolivia’s Economic 
Freedom score was increasing rapidly until it dropped dramatically in the year 2000, 
reflecting both the government’s compromise over water privatization and the unease of 
foreign investment due to massive unrest. This is expected given the ideological leanings 
and goals of these presidents and the policies enacted during the 1990s. The score 
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recovered somewhat until 2004, while the Carlos Mesa government continued 
negotiations with other countries on privatization of natural gas, and began a steady 
decline with the onset of new protests and the president’s resignation. These scores 
coincide with the Gas War in 2003, and the election of Evo Morales as president marks 
another swift decline in 2006. The scores have continued to drop throughout the 
president’s re-election and subsequent years to lower than in 1995, the first year of the 
analysis. Because I observe a steady decline in neoliberal scores, I categorize neoliberal 



















Figure 1: Economic Freedom  
























This section has illustrated the justification and coding for two major 
characteristics of the state. The first variable relates to the state structural changes that 
introduced political opportunities to indigenous women’s mobilization, and these are 
coded open between 1993 and 1997, closed between 1997 and 2005, and very open from 
2005 on. The second variable of interest is neoliberal commitment of the executive 
administration, found to be strong during the 1995-2002 period, declining between 2002-
2004 and weak between 2005-2012. 
International Forces 1994-2012 
To test the hypothesis that international forces impact indigenous women’s ability 
to influence policy, I investigate various facets of the international environment, 
including international women’s organizational meetings, foreign state influences, 
influence of international lending agencies, and characteristics of the international 
indigenous rights movement. The international networking capabilities (and additional 
financial and membership resources) provided to indigenous women, and increase in 
international support for the cause of indigenous rights should create an atmosphere 
where indigenous women are more likely to succeed. In the period of the 1990s, this 
dialogue was only emerging, but in the 2000s, the idea of indigenous rights was more 
pervasive. This positive influence has been somewhat hampered by international lending 
agencies’ prescriptions for future lending.  
International Indigenous Movements 
During the 1990s, a very significant international influence, from the perspective 
of indigenous people in Latin America, was the Zapatista’s indigenous uprising in 
response to Mexico’s signing of NAFTA in 1994. Various facets of the Zapatista struggle 
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resounded with indigenous people in Bolivia. Like the Zapatistas, indigenous people in 
Bolivia shared the outrage against the adoption of neoliberal economic policies that 
disproportionately disadvantage indigenous people in rural areas. They also shared a 
condemnation of colonizing forces and made demands on governments to recognize 
indigenous rights, including their rights to culture and autonomy as indigenous citizens, 
as important elements to democracy. The Zapatista uprising is relevant to the emergence 
of indigenous social movements elsewhere in Latin America not only because of its wide 
coverage as an international issue that garnered support from many countries and regions 
around the world, but also because it represented the beginning of transnational 
indigenous identity (Stephenson 2002; Choque 2007; Andolina et al 2005; Brysk 2000). 
The references to the Zapatistas entered indigenous public rhetoric in local and national 
spaces in Bolivia. For example, in 1995, Guido Anez Moscoso of the MIR party stated 
publicly that forceful eradication was leading to greater violence—“turning Chapare into 
another Chiapas!”-- because of the government’s unilateral action to eradicate crops (El 
Diario 1995k). These statements are important, because, as Stephenson (2002) argues: 
The importance of international ties among indigenous organizations cannot be 
overestimated…indigenous peoples throughout the Americas are engaged in “un 
desnacionalismo de estado,” looking to interlocutors beyond the nation-state with 
the desire to construct alternate forums of political and cultural identification. 
(Stephenson 2002: 114) 
The internationalization of indigenous movements was also cemented through the 
hemisphere-wide mobilization of indigenous organizations to protest official celebrations 
of the 500th anniversary of Columbus in 1995. Also important was indigenous women’s 
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participation through many of the international organizational meetings that formed broad 
agreements on internationally recognized rights of indigenous people and women.  
International Organizations and Agreements  
In the 1990s, other important international factors also changed as indigenous 
women in Bolivia seized upon the opportunity for participating in the 1995 United 
Nations Women’s Conference in Beijing, in which the Declaration of Indigenous Women 
demanded: 
1) Recognition and respect for indigenous self-determination, 2) recognition and 
respect for the right to indigenous territories and development, education, and 
health, 3) stopping human rights violations and all forms of violence against 
indigenous women, 4) recognition and respect for indigenous cultural and 
intellectual inheritance and the right to control biological diversity in indigenous 
territories, and 5) assurance of the political participation of indigenous women 
and to amplify their access to resources. (United Nations 1995) 
 
This declaration came after Bolivia’s ratification of CEDAW (United Nations 
Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) in September 1989, 
which subjected the laws and practices of Bolivia to review under subsequent 
conferences (United Nations 1995b). In 1995, the convention’s meetings addressed 
several issues which motivated indigenous women’s mobilization during the period, 
including the domestic violence law, the Law of Popular Participation’s effects for 
indigenous women, concerns about the effects of economic development on women 
(United Nations 1995a: 2; United Nations 1995b: 2-4), and the issues surrounding 
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indigenous girls’ and women’s barriers to primary education and reproductive health care 
(United Nations 1995a: 2-5). While CEDAW is concerned with the rights of all women, 
the themes of “indigenous” women’s rights run throughout the documents, which 
question and analyze the legal situation of Bolivia (United Nations 1995a, 1995b). 
Questions were repeatedly raised by convention members on the gender implications of 
bilingual education, rural indigenous women’s access to reproductive health care and 
contraceptives, as well as mechanisms within Bolivian law to allow for the integration of 
indigenous women into the political sphere. The representatives from Bolivia indicated 
that while in 1995, 
Bolivia’s judges and judicial authorities had very little knowledge of the 
Convention and did not often invoke its provisions in handing down judgments… 
the situation was changing and a growing number of lawyers were using the 
Convention to defend women’s rights. (United Nations 1995b: 2) 
 
The 2008 meeting lauded a number of Bolivian political landmarks for indigenous 
women, including intentional acts by Evo Morales to ensure indigenous women’s 
representation in the cabinet and an increase in congressional elections of women, but 
also suggested that there were continued cultural, logistical, and political barriers that 
remained to women gaining representation and leadership in local and national posts in 
Bolivia (United Nations 2008).  CEDAW is a significant accord in its ability to influence 
states to recognize forms of discrimination and in the international consensus to enforce 
the convention, signified by its ratification by 186 other countries by 2010 (ACLU 2010). 
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Beginning in the 1990s, there has been a striking process of state integration and 
hemispheric and global growth of indigenous rights movements, with a series of UN 
projects and ILO attempts to change standards and rules for governments’ treatment of 
indigenous peoples (Brysk 2000:249). These agreements give an approximation of the 
growth of the strength of the indigenous movement internationally, especially in 
comparing two different indigenous rights accords and the number of signees. ILO 
Convention 169, which recognizes the rights and territories of indigenous peoples, was 
signed by Bolivia in 1991 and 22 other countries at various times (ILO 2011). In fact, 
many of the changes in the legal code, which came under Sanchez de Lozada’s 
administration, were responses to the ratification of the convention. Twenty years later 
Bolivia made the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into 
national law. The law dictates an extensive set of standards for indigenous rights to 
autonomy, indigenous forms of justice, and land rights (ILO 2011). This declaration 
passed the United Nations General Assembly in 2007, with 144 states in favor (United 
Nations 2007). 
Foreign States 
 Various international factors affected the specific issues about which indigenous 
women mobilized over the time period in question. Sometimes international forces were 
overtly exercising control over Bolivian policy, as in the case of coca policy and the 
United States’ war against drugs during the 1990s (Farthing and Ledebum 2004; AFP 
1995e5; El Diario 1995j1). In other cases, international influences were subtler, and 
included, for example, the unpopularity of selling natural gas to foreigners California and 
Mexico via a Chilean pipeline and Brazilian petroleum companies during the early 2000s 
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(Energy Information Administration 2012; Webber 2005a; Hodges-Copple 2007; BBC 
2004). Similarly, resentment over foreign construction companies from Brazil in the 
disputes over the highway through the TIPNIS territory represents tensions with foreign 
businesses as an important political influence (Echazú 2011; Saucedo 2012; L. Press 
2012). Finally, while the United States held significant power over Bolivian domestic 
policy during the 1990s, by the time the cocalero union leader Evo Morales became 
president, the United States was exhibiting much less influence. President G.W. Bush’s 
and Barak Obama’s “decertification” of Bolivia as a drug war ally, the subsequent 
ceasing of foreign aid from the U.S. and the International Monetary Fund, and the 
expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador from Bolivia (Wolff 2011; Corz 2012), are all factors 
that decreased the ability of the United States to impact Bolivia’s domestic policy, which 
has contributed to a more supportive international political environment for indigenous 
women’s issues. 
International Lending 
International companies and lending institutions placed a great deal of pressure on 
the Bolivian government to increase privatization measures related to natural resources in 
the country as conditions for further lending (Kohl 2004; Eurodad 2006; PBS 
2002;Samper 2003). As Kohl (2004) and La Razon (2003) report, in early 2003, the IMF 
demanded that the Bolivian government reduce its deficit from 8.5% to 5.5% of its GDP, 
or by $240 million. The major issues of contention in the 2000s interim period included 
bitter disputes over the privatization of water and natural gas reserves, with IMF and 
World Bank continuing to press for policies that were largely unpopular with the 
indigenous, women’s, and broader sector social movements (Kohl 2004: 902; Hodges-
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Copple 2007; BBC 2004). The IMF cut off new lines of credit to Bolivia in 2006, due to 
failed negotiations with the Morales government (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2006; Weisbrot 
2007), effectively stifling their influence on the country. Thus, for the period of the Gas 
and Water Wars in Bolivia (2000-2005), the international environment is coded as 
obstructive to indigenous women’s policy goals, and supportive after Evo Morales’ 
election. 
International Influences, Summary 
Because international accords were signed in the period between 1991 and 2000, 
but because few countries committed to these accords, and because significant opposition 
to certain indigenous mobilizations (coca, specifically) was present from foreign 
influences, I consider the international environment as supportive of indigenous women’s 
policy issues.  Largely because there were no international agreements to analyze during 
the period between 2000 and 2007, and because of the evidence that the World Bank and 
IMF strongly opposed nationalization of natural resources, the transition period is coded 
as having an obstructive international environment. Because the international community 
has grown more favorable to indigenous women in the post-neoliberal period, and 
Bolivia has maintained its efforts to keep these indigenous and women’s rights accords 
ratified in the legal code, I characterize the period between 2006 and present as highly 
supportive of indigenous women’s issues. This period is also categorized as highly 
supportive since international opposition includes tensions with states that have little 
actual control over Bolivian policy, and there is also limited influence exercised by the 
United States since the election of Evo Morales. While I expect international influences 
to be important, it can also be noted that the international dialogue exists everywhere in 
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Latin America, to different ends. Responses within Bolivia may also be less impacted by 
international events than other Latin American countries because their indigenous 
movement is large and relies less upon transnational support than many in the region 
(Brysk 2000: 16, 76).  
Conclusions 
This analysis places independent variables selected for study under investigation 
to assess their values at different times during the period between 1994 and 2012. This 
chapter has addressed the status of the major independent variables over the time period 
in question, and determined that several important changes have occurred. The increase 
in important resources such as membership and women’s leadership in social movements, 
the adoption of gendered and ethnic along with broad frames, and the increase in public 
support stand out as important changes among my independent variables. Changes in 
state structure –the decline of neoliberalism and state reforms--that allow for indigenous 
women’s mobilization, have also experienced significant changes through this time 
period. Finally, the adoption of the indigenous rights discourse by a growing number of 
countries indicates a more supportive international environment for indigenous women’s 
mobilization. The values of the independent variables are presented in Table 2. These are 









Table 2: Summary of Independent Variable Coding 
 




















































*Frames: BNG= Broad, Non-Gendered; EBG: Ethnic, Broad, Gendered 





Struggles for Land, Literacy, Coca and Justice: a Record of Indigenous 
Women’s Mobilizing in the 1990s 
 
In the early 1990s, mobilization of indigenous women in Bolivia surged 
significantly, exhibiting a number of protests, strikes, and demonstrations against the 
government’s discriminatory policies and practices. Much of this mobilization was in 
response to failed policies on agricultural reform, education, and the mission to eradicate 
coca plants in impoverished regions that were home to both tropical-born indigenous and 
displaced indigenous tin miners (Yashar 2005:185-185; Brysk 2000: 117).  The election 
of Sanchez de Lozada and his intellectual, indigenous running mate Victor Hugo 
Cardenas, signaled a shift in Bolivian policy toward pacifying the indigenous population. 
A former cabinet member to Paz Zamora’s administration, celebrated for ending 
hyperinflation in the 1980s, Sanchez de Lozada carried twin objectives of capitalization 
and modernization, which necessitated appeasing intensifying indigenous tensions. While 
instituting a range of privatization measures for the economy, the Sanchez de Lozada 
administration also amended the constitution in favor of indigenous recognition and 
territorial rights and passed the Education and Agricultural Reform laws. Each of these 
reforms contained both neoliberal and indigenous-inclusive elements. These laws 
combined clauses of indigenous recognition with decentralization and municipalization, 
which, to some degrees, created political opportunities for indigenous women and other 
marginalized people.17 
This chapter analyzes the impact of indigenous women’s mobilization in 
                                                
 
17 But see Clisby (2005), Nugent (2002), and Radcliffe (2004) for arguments about the 
unevenness of the impacts of these reforms. 
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particular “policy moments” in the mid-1990s related to the cocalera movement, the 
INRA, education reform, and the domestic violence law. This research hypothesizes that 
several features of women’s organization, the state, and the international environment are 
likely to influence indigenous women’s policy outcomes. 
First, greater human capital resources are expected to enhance indigenous 
women’s probability of achieving their policy goals. I assert that greater numbers in 
protesters, strong networks, and women’s leadership will increase indigenous women’s 
chances of policy success. My second hypothesis posits that the language of activism, or 
frames, influence the success of indigenous women’s policy efforts. Frames that appeal to 
the non-indigenous sector of the public are expected to be more successful than frames 
and claims that represent indigenous people, or indigenous women specifically. Further, 
non-gendered frames will be more successful than those containing claims for the rights 
of women. The third hypothesis posits generally that state structures creating 
opportunities for indigenous women will help produce outcomes in their favor. Reforms 
or other structural changes that create political opportunities will positively impact 
indigenous women’s policy success. However, neoliberalism will be negatively 
associated with most indigenous women’s claims, due to the fact that neoliberal aims are 
often at odds with the demands that indigenous women make. Finally, I expect that 
international support for indigenous issues will increase indigenous women’s chances of 
success by influencing state structures to extend justice to indigenous people. However, 
in some instances, international influences that oppose indigenous women’s policy efforts 
are expected to decrease their chances of favorable outcomes. This chapter tests these 
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hypotheses with the cases of the cocalera movement, the INRA, education reform, and 
the domestic violence bill of 1995.   
 The evidence in this chapter is based upon qualitative analysis of newspapers, 
secondary research, social movement organizations’, NGO’s, state ministry’s, and 
various other organizations’ publications.18 In addition to coding of organizational, state, 
and international characteristics as outlined in the previous chapter, I analyze historical 
records, scholarly accounts, and news reports to determine the outcome of cases as 
successful or failed. If the policy outcome is successful, then it incorporates the claims 
made by indigenous women during mobilizations. If the outcome is failed, then policy 
has excluded the demands of indigenous women from the policy outcome. Mixed cases 
are those policy outcomes that incorporate part of women’s goals while neglecting other 
important goals.  
The outcomes associated with the INRA and education reform are considered 
mixed due to the fact that indigenous women’s activism for their community was 
successful, but attempts for gendered justice in land reforms fell short of meeting their 
goals. Both of these movements expressed concerns that related to the entire indigenous 
community as well as to indigenous women’s particular concerns. The case of domestic 
violence is successful due to the fact that the singular goal of passing the law was 
achieved by indigenous women and their co-protesters. Finally, the case of coca 
                                                
 
18 Sources include Foodfirst, CEDLA-Bolivia (Center for Labor and Agricultural 
Studies), the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, Bartolina Sisa, UNIFEM (United 
Nations Development Fund for Women), the Bolivia legal code, the Bolivian 
constitution, Ministry of Gender documents.  The procedure for coding of the 
independent variables is the same as outlined in Chapter 3. 
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represents a clear case of failure, due to the fact that during the time period investigated 
here (1994-2000), indigenous women’s efforts to influence coca eradication policy 
consistently fell short of their goals. Table 3 offers a view of the cases and their outcomes 






































Table 3: Selected Cases and Coding 
Policy Moment Outcome 
INRA passage 
Education reform passage 
Domestic Violence passage 









 The Law of the Coca Regime and Controlled Substances, Law 1008, adopted in 
1988, established the prohibition and criminalization of the coca leaf as well as the 
guidelines for forced eradication and penalties for cultivation of the plant (Bolivia 1988). 
The law reflects restrictions the United States placed on aid to Bolivia, an important part 
of the U.S. war on drugs. Eradication efforts escalated in the Andean region during the 
1990s, creating massive unrest among indigenous peoples (United States Congressional 
Report 2007). Because indigenous people have a cultural connection with the use of the 
coca leaf, the conflict relates as much to the need for cultural autonomy as for economic 
subsistence. The issue of coca cultivation in the country has greatly influenced the 
political landscape since the 1990s (United States Congressional Report 2007). 
Indigenous people have demanded that the government stop forced eradication and have 
accused the government of rampant human rights abuses in the process of eradicating 
coca crops. This section focuses on the height of indigenous women’s efforts in the mid-
1990s, and explains how organizational, state, and international influences affected the 
outcome of coca eradication policy. The value of the dependent variable, as described 
above, reflects whether or not indigenous women’s demands were considered at an 
important policy moment. This particular “policy moment” covers an intense but 
protracted battle during 1995-96 and its culmination in government negation of 
indigenous women’s goals. The government’s refusal to adequately address human rights 
abuse accusations or respond to indigenous women’s demand for an end to forced 




Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement: Numbers, Networks and 
Leadership 
The issue of coca eradication in the 1990s presents an interesting case for 
indigenous women in Bolivia. No other issue garnered as much activity among 
indigenous women as did the issue of coca. The news reports from the 1994-1996 period 
reveal a strong presence of thousands of female indigenous coca growers in protests, 
marches, and demonstrations. The news reports also refer to ongoing protest against the 
government’s eradication policies since the early 1990s. During the years 1995-1996, 
working alongside the CSUTCB (Syndicated Campesino Workers Union of Bolivia), 
indigenous women from coca growing regions organized numerous massive marches. 
Sometimes they protested, conducted roadblocks, and participated in other acts of 
rebellion with their male counterparts, but many times they conducted activities on their 
own, for example marching from Cochabamba to La Paz on foot, with in tow (El Diario 
1995a; 1995g; 199d5; 1995o; 1995o1). This activity reflects a historical tendency among 
indigenous organizations to mobilize women as an extra force on behalf of the wider 
community. Indigenous women were highly regarded as meaningful contributors to 
larger goals, even while gendered obstacles within the organizations kept women from 
sharing in positions of power and having their goals integrated with those of the larger 
community (León 1990: 143-144). The combined local coca growers’ union, the Six 
Federations of Coca Growers of the Tropics of Cochabamba, which served as the base for 
cocalera activism in the 1990s, was originally based on male participation, with women 
taking on roles of food preparation and childcare. Though Evo Morales, then president of 
the Six Federations, began calling female members into more active roles like protests 
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and marches in 1994 and 1995, it was not until 1997 before women leaders were elected 
to lead alongside male leaders (Vargas and Draper 2010).  
The mobilization of significant indigenous women’s resources in numbers was 
not enough to overcome women’s low presence in leadership positions and weaker, 
ethnic-based network ties. Although cocaleras gained the support of networking allies in 
Andean groups Bartolina Sisas and the CSUTCB (El Diario 1995a; 1995b; 1995c; 
1995d; AFP 1995p18), these particular ties signified a narrower ethnic base, and thus, a 
weaker one that did not include broad sector involvement. Moderate amounts of 
resources deployed against the state resulted in failure for indigenous women’s goals, as 
the state ultimately refused to respond to their demands. The hypothesis that high 
amounts of human capital resources are more likely to contribute to favorable outcomes 
gains support from this evidence. Similarly, indigenous women’s lack of leadership on 
the coca issue supports the hypothesis that high numbers of women in leadership 
positions in the movement increase indigenous women’s chances of favorable policy 
outcomes. 
Organizational Characteristics: Frames 
 While the numbers of marchers represented impressive resources, and the 
networks with other women’s and indigenous groups in El Alto (especially Bartolinas 
Sisas) created a support base for indigenous women coca activists (El Diario 1995i), 
several other organizational features were also displayed in the news reports of 
indigenous women’s mobilization. The coca issue carried broad frames related to 
campesino rights, and the interchanging of the term cocaleras and campesinas in the 
coca-growing region is pervasive in public reports of the conflict in coca growing regions 
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(El Diario: 1995f, 1995g, 1995d; 1995i). Second, the news reports documenting 
women’s frames emphasize their suffering at the hands of the government (El Diario: 
1995j, 1995k, 1995l). This was an important framing tool in that it diagnosed the social 
problem faced by women and called for action to address it (Snow et al 2004; Davies 
1999; Gamson 1992; Carroll and Ratner 1992). Indigenous women publicly denounced 
kidnappings, rapes and beatings of women, in addition to alleged looting, robberies and 
dispossessions from homes due to the presence of soldiers and the militarization of the 
tropical region (El Diario 1995e, 1995q, 1995r, 1995s). Important to note is that the 
human rights violations were broadly situated frames that were notably absent of ethnic 
and gendered references, consistent with the coding of frames as broad and non-gendered 
for the time period. Indigenous female coca growers in the 1990s also relied upon an 
accusatory and derogatory framework that held the government and U.S. “imperialism” 
to blame for the policy of forced coca eradication (El Diario: 1995a, 1995n, 1995o). In 
addition, indigenous women and their organizations disputed the government’s 
statements about the militarization of the Chapare zone, and argued that the government 
was only giving lip service to the plans for “alternative development” that were never 
fulfilled (El Diario 1995r).  
The noteworthy language of frames of their activities was neither ethnic, nor 
gendered; coca was not framed as an issue that included gendered human rights in 
referencing the rights of the coca-growing region. In the march from Cochabamba to La 
Paz, cocaleras named their protest “For Dignity, Sovereignty, Life, and Coca” (El Diario 
1995w). Further, a statement released by the Bartolina Sisa in El Alto called for all 
Bolivian women to show solidarity for the cocaleras, stating that while the government 
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“energetically continued the brutal repression,” the children and women were 
experiencing “the disgrace of living without protection or guarantees in a country where 
they say total democracy rules” (AFP 1995p18). These non-ethnic references to 
repression and suffering resonate throughout the news reports of coca activism. Such 
frames for are somewhat contradicted by the fact that the substance of the claims related 
exclusively to issues that affected an indigenous group.  
The government forcefully discredited indigenous women’s claims of human 
rights violations by the government officials of UMOPAR (Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje 
Rural/Mobile Rural Patrol Unit) and the ecological police, who were in charge of 
executing eradication plans in the region of Chapare.  Repeated demands by the 
CSUTCB (Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) and COB (Center for Bolivian 
Labor) for the government to investigate human rights violations and the constitutionality 
of Ley 1008 (the law establishing eradication goals of hundreds of thousands of hectares 
of coca) were eventually recognized by the government, but the government’s decision to 
modify the law was restricted to clauses regarding double jeopardy and the innocence of 
the accused. In the later months of 1995, the government ignored the human rights 
violations that included more brutal acts against coca growers, especially against women 
(AFP 1995p18). The failure of the movement’s appeals to broader issues such as human 
rights and U.S. interference contradicts the expectation of the hypothesis that broad, non-
ethnic frames would increase indigenous women’s chances of favorable policy outcomes. 
The coca movement provides some important insight on what issues in the 1990s could 
be pressed and gain public and government support. First, coca mobilization failure alerts 
us to the fact that the language used to represent a movement is important, but the actual 
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content of the demands also matter, both to the government and to potential supporters of 
the cause. Second, as I investigate in coming subsections, international and state 
characteristics are important components that shape the final outcome.  
State Characteristics: State Political Opportunity Structure (Reforms) 
The effects of the state structure on indigenous women’s success on the coca issue 
are reflections of international pressure to control narcotics trafficking from the U.S. and 
the requirements from international lending institutions to modernize the state, including 
instilling the rule of law. Repeatedly, news reports quoted officials within government 
citing the rule of law and U.S. agreements as important principles to be considered in the 
eradication controversy. For example, repeated references by government ministry 
officials revealed a preoccupation with meeting the established eradication goals in order 
to remain eligible for aid from the United States (El Diario: 1995e5, 1995f6). Various 
officials quoted in April of 1995 denied the militarization of Chapare and insisted that the 
government was following the law in eradication of coca. These officials justified state 
action with various references to nationalism and building a stronger, more stable Bolivia 
(El Diario 1995n). The COB and CSUTCB countered with accusations that the 
government was repressing peasants in the region of Chapare, citing the death of an 
innocent elderly man and thirteen-year-old girl in the skirmishes as proof of the 
government’s transgressions against cocaleros (El Diario 1995e5). In addition, the COB 
and CSUTCB publicly denounced the government’s reaction against various peaceful 
marches by women and children from coca growing regions. According to these 
organizations, military and police dispersed women and children using tear gas, pepper 
spray, intimidation, and violence (El Diario: 1995f6, 1995n). As mentioned above the 
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government negated indigenous women’s demands to end forced eradication, and only 
addressed the language of Law 1008 in order to make it accordant with the standards of 
domestic and international human rights watch groups on double jeopardy and innocence 
of the accused (El Diario: 1995n; 1995h8; 1995i9). By the beginning of 1996, when 
cocaleras made the long march from Cochabamba to La Paz, the government showed no 
signs of compromise toward indigenous women, publicly stating that the discussion of 
ending coca eradication would not happen (El Diario 1996g). In the previous chapter, I 
identified the political opportunity structure as partially open during the neoliberal period, 
but case-specific details reveal more nuanced differences in opportunity structures. When 
indigenous women confronted the state about coca, its stance was closed, resulting in 
failure for their policy objectives. This fact highlights the importance of political 
structural opportunities, which supports the political opportunity hypothesis.  
International Features 
A variety of international events and agreements created a favorable atmosphere 
for indigenous mobilization, motivating women to push for policy change. The ILO 169, 
already mentioned, was a vital force in creating both international and state cooperation 
on the matter of indigenous rights. Bolivia’s adoption of statutes both in the constitution 
of 1994 and in the INRA that reflect indigenous rights to territories and land are 
examples of that particular international influence overlapping with domestic pressures to 
alleviate ethnic inequalities in Bolivia. As referenced in the previous chapter, the 
Zapatista uprising was making international headlines along with a general atmosphere of 
protest in the American continent surrounding the “celebration” of Columbus’ 500th 
Anniversary, making indigenous complaints internationally significant.  
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Considering the international pressure and direct intervention coming from the 
United States on the issue of coca may provide some clues as to why the issue failed 
where others did not during the neoliberal period. The United States first began trading 
aid for eradication with Bolivia in the 1980s as an effort to combat the supply side of the 
United States’ drug use epidemic. Although protest against the policy was high, Bolivia’s 
government continually entered into and enforced the eradication agreements forged with 
the United States (El Diario1995j; 1996h). On the national level, the direct international 
influence of the United States is apparent, but a more indirect international influence 
relates to the ways in which international influence catalyzed indigenous mobilization. 
“Neocolonialismo,” “imperialismo” and a shaming rebuke of the Bolivian government 
for kneeling to the United States’ foreign policy were common cries of protest during the 
cocalera movement’s marches during the last months of 1995 and early 1996 (El Diario 
1995e5; 1995o; 1996). International forces have been coded as supportive for indigenous 
women’s causes over the course of the 1990s. However, as with state structural 
opportunities, further breakdown of case-specific environmental factors indicates that 
international forces look different than the overall international environment for the 
period. Coca is the only policy arena discussed in this chapter that was the source of 
international opposition, and it was the only protest to be so harshly put down. This rare 
deviation from the general coding of independent variables draws attention to the fact 
that there may be different structural factors to consider with different types of policies. 
The evidence that international opposition can be detrimental to indigenous women’s 
efforts supports the hypothesis that international opposition may interfere with 
indigenous women’s policy objectives. In addition, I argue that international influences 
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are best seen as mitigated by organizational and state characteristics, and that the closed 
opportunity structure combines to create an especially unfavorable outcome for 
indigenous women’s goals. 
Summary of Coca Policy Outcome 
The previous sections have outlined the major factors influencing the outcome of 
coca policy. Exhibiting high numbers of protesters and participants, but weak network 
ties and low presence of women in leadership, indigenous women’s overall assessment of 
resources is coded as moderate. State structural opportunities were considered partially 
open during the 1990s, but the closed nature of structures for this particular issue resulted 
in failure for indigenous women’s efforts. In addition, while international forces were 
largely supportive of indigenous women’s issues in this period, the coca-specific 
response from the United States interacted with the political opportunity structure to 
prevent indigenous women from changing eradication policy. Together, moderate 
resources, broad, non-gendered frames, closed political opportunity structures, and 
international opposition obstructed indigenous women’s attempts.  
Education Reform 
 The Law of Education Reform in 1994 established a new set of policies to 
modernize the education system. A large part of the reform was to address the lagging 
access of indigenous people to primary education, particularly that of girls, who have an 
especially hard time getting education in Bolivia due to poverty, distance from schools, 
and especially, being non-Spanish speaking. Along with the land reform measure, this 
piece of legislation was specifically designed to bring legal statutes in line with 
constitutional revisions passed in the same year to recognize indigenous peoples’ rights. 
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These reforms were made to respond to growing indigenous pressure in the country, 
which had culminated with the March for Territory and Dignity and the mobilization 
against the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Columbus’ “discovery” of the 
Americas (Brysk 2000: 77; Lucero 2008: 96, 166; Deere and León 2002a: 65; Van Cott 
2000: 170; Postero and Zamosc 2004:195-196). Although the policies were top-down 
reforms that could be controlled by the state, indigenous women were nonetheless 
extremely vocal through their participation in the larger indigenous groups CSUTCB and 
Bartolina Sisa. Through their organized protest activity, they attempted to persuade the 
government to include various measures (such as bilingual education) and to pass the law 
into legislation (El Diario: 1995t, 1995u). Moreover, in response to indigenous demands 
to implement the law (El Diario 1995u; El Diario 1995m2), the government also 
responded with bilingual and distance education programs to benefit indigenous people 
(El Diario 1995x2). The outcome of indigenous women’s attempts to shape education 
reform policy is mixed: on one hand, they advocated for, and got, bilingual education 
policy, but they also advocated more quietly, and less successfully, for measures that 
would address the inequalities in women’s access to education. 
Organizational Characteristics: Human Resources Variables 
In the previous chapter, I established the values of resources in numbers as high, 
but network resources are coded as weak (for reasons identified below) while indigenous 
women’s leadership is coded as low. This mixed outcome for indigenous women is 
associated with moderate amounts of human capital resources.  
 Although the concern over the access to education for indigenous girls appeared 
as an imperative issue for indigenous women with the plan for bilingual and intercultural 
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education (Law #1553) in 1994, Luykx (2000) finds that in major national mobilizations 
regarding education reform and other initiatives,  
When the movement and its participants face scrutiny over the solidarity and 
identity of indigenous culture, indigenous women are likely to place higher 
salience on indigenous people’s concerns over their specific concerns as women. 
(Luykx 2000:161) 
Therefore, while indigenous women mobilized in support of the reform, the 
strength of their activism was limited in the degree to which they pushed gender issues. 
Although records of some interactions at local meetings and international meetings 
indicate that they were aware that cultural, economic, and geographical obstacles 
prevented girls from attending school (World Bank 1993; Luykx 2000), community 
needs nonetheless were the items broadcast most loudly by indigenous women (Luykx 
2000). Thus, the degree to which the law addressed gender was limited to “nonsexist 
language” that discussed equal access of education for girls and boys (Bolivia 1994: 
Article 1, #5)19. Although the pursuit of gendered objectives by indigenous women was 
limited, it should not be taken as a sign that gender issues, “as a question of the social 
construction of relations and identities of men and women, are absent from indigenous 
communities” (Luykx 2000:161). While education reform failed to address the roots of 
discrimination against indigenous women, the benefit to the entire indigenous community 
represents progress. By addressing one of the long-standing causes of indigenous 
peoples’ continued marginalization, education reform would provide opportunities by 
                                                
 
19 Translated in Hornberger 2000 
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opening a range of knowledge through bilingual education that had not previously existed 
(El Diario 1995v).  
When women attempted to improve indigenous women’s situations with low 
leadership in the movement, the government was less likely to respond to their full 
demands, which were unlikely to be fully articulated anyway. Women’s lacking 
leadership and mixed outcome of education reform during the neoliberal period supports 
the hypothesis that various human capital resources matter to the policy pursuits of 
indigenous women. Women’s mobilization in favor of community goals may meet 
community needs, but not on issues that are gender-specific, as the case of education 
reform illustrates.  
Networks 
Education reform contained fragmenting elements for the indigenous movement, 
related to the loyalties of highland indigenous groups to teachers’ unions, who were 
adamantly opposed to the 1994 legislation (El Diario: 1995u; 1995t; Van Cott 2000: 
295). Amazonian indigenous groups were supportive of bilingual education and had 
begun a campaign for such in 1992 (Gustafson 2008: 213). These indigenous groups did 
not ally with teachers and other unions, and had less confrontational interactions in the 
past with the state (Gustafson 2002: 278; Gustafson 2008: 213; Lucero 2008: 117-118). 
In addition, in the early stages of education reform (late 1994 to early 1995) there was 
significant speculation by lowland and especially highland indigenous leaders that 
education reform was another trick by the government to co-opt and manipulate 
indigenous voters (El Diario 1995s2; 1995t2; Gustafson 2002: 278). In fact, the 
indigenous leadership was suspicious of all of Sanchez de Lozada’s proposed reforms 
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that addressed indigenous issues, which were nicknamed the “leyes malditas” (“damned 
laws”) by many indigenous indigenous organizations (El Diario 1995z; EFE 1995t).  
However, by late January 1995, the CSUTCB, which had stood by teachers’ unions 
during their protests of the law, were now calling for implementation of the education 
reform (and agricultural reform) in their protests (El Diario 1995u; El Diario 1995m2). 
The importance of networks as important human capital resources is illustrated by the 
challenge to the relationship between long-time allies in teachers’ unions, and the 
indigenous-centered plan for bilingual education. Because of these difficulties, the overall 
value of human capital resources is coded as moderate.  When these resources confronted 
the reforms in education, they resulted in mixed outcomes. My first hypothesis argues 
that various organizational resources matter to the success of mobilization by indigenous 
women. The initial fragmentation between highland and lowland groups, as well as the 
lack of women in leadership positions, slowed progress on women’s issues in education 
reform, and led to less cohesive efforts to achieve gender parity in education.  
Organizational Characteristics: Frames 
My hypothesis that broad claims and frames increase chances of policy influence 
is somewhat corroborated by the fact that education reform achieved significant gains for 
goals that identified the needs of indigenous people. It is also interesting to note that even 
though these laws addressed ethnic inequality in the country, the language of protest and 
organization—the frames-- remained expressive of “campesino” activism (El Diario: 
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1995v, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d; 1996k).20  News reports reveal that the concerns of 
indigenous women who were in favor of education reform aligned with the major 
indigenous leaders about increasing access of bilingual education to indigenous people. 
The women of Bartolina Sisa expressed this solidarity with the CSUTCB and the COB in 
statements that called upon the government to implement education reform, but these 
statements did not reflect women’s need to address gender inequity in access to education 
(El Diario 1995m; 1995d). However, undeniable messages about ethnic inequality were 
present in indigenous claims pressing for education without discrimination and to ensure 
that indigenous people receive education in their native language. This case illustrates 
that non-ethnic or broad framing can achieve some goals for the community, since the 
government responded to these claims by initiating reforms to accommodate indigenous 
needs. However, these types of frames did not ensure complete success, which introduces 
some doubt about the hypothesis that broad and non-gendered frames are more conducive 
to success.  
State Characteristics: Political Opportunity Structure (Reforms) 
The indigenous protests since the early 1990s had resulted in partially successful 
outcomes for their goals. Even after the promulgation of the law, government continued 
to respond to indigenous demands for the implementation of the reform. Bilingual 
education reform fit into the multicultural project and the aims for modernization because 
it included “the sociocultural heterogeneity of the country in an atmosphere of respect for 
                                                
 
20 The emerging language relating to indigeneity began to emerge during battles over 
education reform; it was inevitable in passing as references to “indigenous languages” 
(Reforma Educativa 1994), but it would not be commonplace for print news to 
consistently reference people as indigenous until the mid-2000s. 
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all, male and female” as an important principle (Bolivia 1994: Article 1, #5)21.  Non-
sexist language can be found in other parts of education reform, including one of the 
eight overall objectives: "to construct an intercultural and participatory educational 
system that facilitates educational access by all Bolivians, with no discrimination 
whatsoever" (Bolivia 1994: Article 2, #5).22 The inclusion of indigenous—and 
indigenous women, however marginally—into policy language falls in line with the 
hypothesis that state restructuring presented opportunities that would increase indigenous 
women’s access to political processes in the country. Research at the time was clear in 
making a connection between increased education and economic development, and the 
causes for failing indigenous education were also thoroughly researched and documented 
(World Bank 2000; El Diario 1996g). Again, given the need to modernize, and given the 
fact that bilingual education itself was a program specifically promoted by the World 
Bank (Gustafson 2002), the political will existed to support a clause that ensured equal 
access of bilingual education to men and women. However, the state structure also 
influenced the degree of success in following the neoliberal tendency toward 
mainstreaming policies that were rarely effective in achieving goals of gender parity. The 
openness of the opportunity structure is reflected in Bolivia’s passage and 
implementation of the law between 1994 and 1995. These laws have been criticized 
because they only nominally factored girls’ education needs into the policy, while 
ignoring the geographical, economic, and cultural reasons that girls were often excluded 
from education (Contreras 2003). And while today there is evidence that years of primary 
                                                
 
21 Translated in Hornberger (2000) 
22 Translated in Hornberger (2000) 
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education for girls is now closer to that of boys, and the educational gap between 
indigenous and other groups closing, sizeable gendered and ethnic gaps remain 
(Contreras 2003:8). Because of the somewhat progressive stance of the Sanchez de 
Lozada administration toward indigenous issues in the mid-1990s, education reform was 
able to achieve partial success. News reports indicate this success continued through 
implementation of the reform in response to indigenous demands (El Diario 1995y2), 
There is therefore some evidence for the hypothesis that political opportunities are 
important factors. At the same time, the failure to include gendered specifics into policy 
may also be evidence of the “partial” nature of the political opportunity structure’s ability 
to obstruct gendered success. 
State Characteristics: Neoliberalism 
Education reform was undertaken in a period of neoliberal reforms intended to 
limit intervention in the economy, but education was seen as an acceptable arena for 
government intervention because of its importance to development and modernization by 
improving human capital (Gustafson 2002: 277). Although neoliberalism might be seen 
as obstructive to indigenous women’s interests, the reforms undertaken to meet state 
goals of political development and economic growth created a political opportunity 
structure that was open to some of the demands of impoverished indigenous 
communities. Sanchez de Lozada lamented teachers’ and universities’ resistance to the 
education reform bill, arguing that states must become educated to become wealthy and 
that there was a “necessity for bilingual education for speakers of indigenous languages 
to become educated and contribute to development” (El Diario 1995t). The government 
of Sanchez de Lozada hastened to respond to the proposals that gender equity be built 
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into the letter of the bilingual education policy because these goals aligned with the goal 
of national neoliberal development, which requires a more educated population (El 
Diario 1995t). The high neoliberal commitment of the period and partial success of 
bilingual education gives some reason to doubt that neoliberal governments must always 
be at odds with indigenous women’s success. However, any optimism to be gained from 
this is clouded by the fact that more specific measures to address indigenous women’s 
educational status were not addressed, and this is likely due to the mainstreaming 
tendency of neoliberal reforms.  
International Features 
Education reform was an internationally and domestically promoted issue 
addressed by policies from Sanchez de Lozada’s first term as president. Various 
organizations, such as UNESCO and the World Bank supported the plans for Educational 
Reform in Bolivia, creating a more favorable international environment for indigenous 
women’s policy influence (Gustafson 2002: 277; Gustafson 2009: 38, 154, 149, 166-
167). In addition, the International Labor Organization Convention 169 on Indigenous 
and Tribal People proposed state-funded education programs at all levels to teach 
indigenous languages and make educational materials available in native tongues (ILO 
169 1989).  
There were no gender-specific clauses within the language of the ILO 169 (Chase 
2002: 28).  However, the World Bank recognized the problem of gender inequality, 
arguing that deficiencies in Bolivian education resulted from the problems with 
government cuts in education spending. Other causes included, 
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various barriers to access and obstacles to educational attainment, including 
materials, inadequate teacher training, inattention to the needs of non Spanish-
speaking populations, and deficient infrastructure, which particularly affect girls 
and rural populations. (World Bank 1993: v) 
Therefore, while the need to educate girls is recognized by the World Bank’s 
projects in Bolivia, the end result is “legally equal” language that fails to address 
underlying causes of women’s lack of access to education (including cultural, economic, 
and geographic obstacles). Again, such tendencies are insufficient to ameliorate the 
disadvantages of indigenous women because the measures failed to address their 
underlying causes. The supportive international environment results in a mixed outcome 
in the case of Education Reform, which partially supports the hypothesis that 
international forces can affect indigenous women’s outcomes. On the one hand, 
international support does seem to be important to the passage of the law from the 
standpoint that the laws reflect ILO and World Bank recommendations for indigenous 
rights. On the other hand, Bolivia’s failure to re-iterate the more extensive view of the 
World Bank’s gender concerns into domestic policy indicates that international support 
may have a limited effect on policies that affect indigenous women. 
Summary of Education Reform Policy  
With large numbers of participants, but weak networks and low women’s 
leadership, the coding of indigenous women’s resources in the 1990s was moderate, and 
indigenous women were able to achieve a limited victory for their community. However, 
they made less impressive advances toward treating the issues that affect indigenous 
girls’ lagging education. The mixed outcome in this case is consistent with my hypothesis 
 
 126 
that the amount of social movement resources employed affects policy outcomes. Also, 
organizational frames of broad, non-ethnic, non-gendered public rhetoric surrounding 
quite specifically indigenous demands indicated a fragmented public message that was, 
regardless, able to attain a measure of success. The hypothesis that broader frames would 
be more likely to succeed receives mixed support from this evidence. The public rhetoric 
(the frames) surrounding education reform was non-ethnic or broad, so the mixed 
outcome on education reform receives some support for the hypothesis that broad non-
gendered frames increase social movement success. Gendered frames, on the other hand, 
were not an important factor in the attempts to influence policy, and to the degree that 
community needs were met, there is limited support for the hypothesis that non-gendered 
claims would contribute to indigenous women’s success. State political opportunity 
structures were partially open, and indigenous women’s policy efforts for their 
communities were conducted in an environment that was moderately favorable to their 
outcomes. Similarly, neoliberal influence may actually have promoted education reform 
to the degree that education is seen as a positive force for development, contradicting 
expectations of my hypothesis. Finally, support from international forces spelled out 
explicitly in agreements and meetings about indigenous women, indicates that while 
support for education reform on the whole was helpful, international influence on the 
treatment of women’s issues was less successful. Indigenous women’s ability to promote 
these issues in their own spheres met with limitations because of their low leadership in 
indigenous movements during this time. This point is relevant to the fact that the 
independent variables under scrutiny interact with each other differently at different times 
to affect outcomes.  
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Land Reform (INRA) 
 Initial land reform in Bolivia was brought about through the land-takeovers 
during the revolution in 1952, in which indigenous women played a well-documented 
role (Kellogg 2005: 137; Bartolinas Sisa 2012). One of the most highly lauded successes 
for indigenous groups during the 1990s was the passage of a new agricultural/land reform 
bill, the INRA (Instituto Nacional Reforma Agraria), which, at least on its surface, 
signaled a willingness of the Bolivian government to negotiate fairer dealings with 
indigenous people. The issue of land distribution exploded in Bolivia during the 1990 
March for Territory and Dignity, which was joined by all major indigenous groups (men 
and women) in Bolivia.23 In response, the government of President Paz Zamora issued 
four supreme decrees recognizing the rights of the major indigenous groups of the 
Amazon and their rights to indigenous lands, a step that had never been taken in Bolivian 
law at that point. The following year, Bolivia ratified the ILO’s Convention 169, which 
recognized indigenous peoples’ rights to ancestral lands and territories. Still, the 
government reserved a loophole for itself in declaring the lands as “original communal 
lands” instead of “indigenous lands” because, according to the ILO Accord, indigenous 
land rights included the right to subsoil, which includes mineral rights (Chase 2002: 65). 
However, much to the frustration of indigenous communities, several years passed after 
these political moves, without the development of necessary implementation mechanisms 
(Ruiz 1993:20; Chase 2002: 65). In 1992, another major march from the lowlands of 
Bolivia to La Paz resulted in another eight decrees issued by the government, recognizing 
                                                
 
23 This major protest had originated with Amazonian, lower tropic groups (i.e., the 
Guarani), which had been excluded from earlier land reforms. 
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lands of other indigenous groups (Ruiz 1993:20; Chase 2002: 65). These commitments 
were cemented in the 1994 constitution and the Law of Popular Participation (LPP), 
which recognized the rights of all indigenous people to their original communal lands, the 
inalienable character of collective property (Bolivia 1994: Article 171; Bolivia 1994: 
Article1) and the recognition of Bolivia as a multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural state (Bolivia 
1994: Article 1). The subsequent passage of the Law 1715, or the INRA, in 1996 (Bolivia 
1996) in order to make policy commensurate with the LPP and the constitution was seen 
as an important victory for indigenous movements. This outcome qualifies as a partial 
success because the policy promised a more equitable land distribution among the 
country’s poorest people. However, because indigenous women’s own concerns land 
titles were not addressed, the outcome of the INRA policy is coded as mixed.  
Organizational Characteristics: Human Capital Resources 
 In August 1996, indigenous women were highly active in demonstrations to press 
for promulgation of a new agricultural reform bill. Law 1715 of the National Service of 
Agrarian Reform (or INRA) was promulgated on Oct. 18, 1996 to put fair land 
distribution into practice, a goal that had been on the statute books for decades but never 
realized (Bolivia 1996; Inter Press Service 2008; El Diario 1996e). While an estimated 
half of these protesters were women, women’s access to land was not addressed in 
national mobilizations (Deere and León 2002a: 66). 
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Indigenous women lack access to land for a number of reasons, which they 
articulated in the 1995 Beijing Conference preparatory meetings in Bolivia. 24 The main 
obstacles for land ownership identified by indigenous women in the 1990s included the 
preference of men for inheritance of property within families, denial of credit to women 
without property titles, denial of the right to own the land one works, and local cultural 
traditions which view women as having relationships to the land through male relatives 
(Deere and León 2002a: 71-72; Chavez 2009). In addition, many indigenous women lack 
access to land reform institutions because they are illiterate and lack legal documentation 
of their births (Deere and León 2001: 206; World Bank 1997). These problems are 
exacerbated by male migration patterns, because access to credit depends upon land 
ownership, and without male family members present, women and the family suffer 
economically. The same situation holds for women who are abandoned by their 
husbands—they often lose access to and benefits from lands they have managed for years 
(Deere and León 2002a:72; Zoomers 2001:49-51).  
 While the concerns of indigenous women were voiced at the local and regional 
level, when indigenous leaders entered national meetings to negotiate with policy makers, 
they privileged the more general demand for recognition of indigenous territories and 
defense of communal land (Salguero 1995:48; Deere and León 2002a: 72). To return to a 
concept that helps shape indigenous women’s gender ideology, it is important to refer to 
the role of complementarity in shaping women’s views of their oppression as something 
external to their societies (Joyce 2000; Kellogg 2005). From this viewpoint, gender 
                                                
 
24 In the period 1956-1994, women represented 17% of the beneficiaries of Agrarian 
Reform (Fundación Tierra 2010). 
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oppression is not a part of the complementary relations between indigenous men and 
women, but comes from the colonizing forces and mestizo society. The attempt to 
include the distinctive issues of women in land reform was seen as divisive to indigenous 
unity, and women viewed their responsibility in activism as important to recognizing 
collective land rights and defending their communities (Salguero 1995:48; Deere and 
León 2002a: 72). While scholars have identified that the number and membership of local 
women’s groups had grown by the 1990s, indigenous women failed to gain power in 
decision-making processes in larger mixed-gender indigenous groups, and they failed to 
include a gendered perspective in the reforms of the 1990s (Deere and León 2001: 50-
52). Further, the proliferation of local-level women’s organizations since the 1980s had 
resulted in greater participation of women—but their participation was in male-
dominated institutions that made negotiations with the government over policy (Deere 
and León 2002a: 71; Burt 2004: 61). Nugert (2002) identifies the problems associated 
with local organizations and women’s roles within them, finding that even in the rare 
cases where women are titled property owners25 and therefore permitted to attend 
political syndicate meetings, they are marginalized and segregated from men and 
excluded from decisions on political issues (Nugert 2002a: 216-217). Other ethnographic 
and qualitative research on indigenous women’s gender ideologies and participation 
concludes that within-organization dynamics can hinder women’s advancement in mixed-
gender indigenous organizations (Radcliffe, et al 2003: 393; Clisby 2005; Deere and 
                                                
 
25 Property ownership is a requirement for participation in government recognized 
Organizational Territorial Base (OTB), or local units of decentralized governance within 
smaller villages and indigenous communities. 
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León 2001: 44-49). This dimension of organization deserves emphasis, since my 
hypothesis about mobilization resources posits that increasing mobilization resources, 
including female leadership in the movement, increases the likelihood of policy success. 
Indigenous women mobilized numbers to push their claims for land justice, which 
contributed to their success, but the lack of female leadership interfered with a larger 
success related to gender discrimination in land practices. The coding of human capital 
resources as moderate includes the consideration of weak networks of mainly indigenous 
actors and lacking leadership of women in the 1990s. The outcomes associated with these 
qualities include success for community matters and failure for gendered concerns. A 
mixed outcome is fairly consistent with the expectation that resources matter; moderate 
resources produce moderate results.  
Organizational Characteristics: Frames 
Even though indigenous female leaders and activists recognized a unique plight 
facing women with regard to access to land, protests by indigenous women were situated 
around the frames of land justice for the entire indigenous community (Deere and León 
2002a; Deere and León 2001; Chavez 2009; Suarez 2012:195).26 Thus, their mobilization 
shared broad frames of peasant, rural justice, instead of relaying issues that directly 
affected them in terms of equitable distribution of land. Indigenous women’s ability to 
employ gendered frames was impeded by the tendency of the larger indigenous 
                                                
 
26 El Diario’s reports of women involved in activism on the INRA reform made no 
mention of women’s access to land, even though women were highly publicized political 
actors in the protests and organizational efforts to make reforms to agriculture law.  
Reports on the concerns of women were made at local meetings and organizations, and at 
the preparatory meetings for Beijing, according to researchers.  
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organizations to sideline women’s interests as well as women’s own sense of obligation 
to the greater community. This interaction provides some support for the evidence that 
women’s leadership in movements is an important resource contributing to the success of 
indigenous women’s goals. These difficulties highlight the intersectional nature of the 
experience of indigenous women in social movements. As the discussion of 
complementarity and women’s goals related to land rights illustrates, the obstacles facing 
indigenous women are different than those facing whites or mestizas in Bolivia, because 
they are fighting oppression on more than one dimension. Indigenous women’s ethnicity 
and their gender create a marginalized situation for them in mainstream society, whereas 
they experience discrimination based on their gender within their ethnic communities.  
 If the lack of gendered rhetoric is striking in relation to women’s pursuit of 
agricultural reform, it is also curious that news reports illustrate that indigenous and 
campesino persons were still referred to interchangeably, even in the same stories that 
present a discussion of “native territories” (El Diario: 1996e; 1996f; 1995j; 1995k; 
1995x). Therefore, an interesting set of circumstances is presented by indigenous 
women’s mobilization on land reform. The evidence about women’s mobilization 
provides mixed support for the hypotheses about language of activism. Broader frames 
such as the use of campesino and few references to the indigenous are associated with 
partial success. Non-gendered frames are associated with success for the community and 
failure for gender parity goals. This only provides limited support for the hypothesis that 
success follows the use of broad and non-gendered frames. The issue of land reform in 
this and the next chapter illustrate possible lessons for how indigenous women can 
successfully petition for rights that are specific to their needs. 
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State Characteristics: Political Opportunity Structure (State Reforms) 
Land reform has long been part of the political agenda in Bolivia, and a number of 
protests were influential enough to initiate government response. In 1996, the 
government passed the INRA into law (Bolivia 1996), and earlier decrees in 1990 and 
1992 had also been responses to indigenous protest (Ruiz 1993:20; Chase 2002: 65). All 
of these occurred because of administrations’ partial acknowledgement of the need for 
indigenous justice and rule of law in the name of modernization. However, the legal 
reforms discussed in this chapter all incorporate language that seeks to ensure women’s 
equal access to political and economic resources, but nuances to the incorporation of 
gender rights were not taken into consideration. Scholars have emphasized how the 
incorporation of gender-neutral language is insufficient to create women’s leadership 
roles for women in society, and how the policies themselves fall short of creating true 
opportunities due to policy makers’ blindness to the issues which create women’s 
marginalization in the first place (Lind 2003; Yashar 1998; Clisby 2002; Deere and León 
2002; Deere and León 2002a; Deere and León 1998).   
The failure of women’s issues to emerge coherently in land reform policy is in 
part due to the inefficiencies of earlier structural reforms, especially the Law of Popular 
Participation (LPP), which intended to empower local communities and even, to some 
degree, women.27 In addition, the changes made to the constitution in 1994, by granting 




27 The language of the Law of Popular Participation included the phrase “strengthening 
economic and political tools towards a more perfect representative democracy, 
incorporating citizen participation in a participative democratic process and guaranteeing 
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rights to indigenous people to own and administer ancestral lands, created the opportunity 
for indigenous people to make claims against the government’s system of distributing 
land. The result of the decentralizing reforms was to empower indigenous communities to 
some degree. These reforms theoretically could have presented greater opportunities for 
indigenous women to increase their influence as well, but in some instances created a 
dual face of oppression for indigenous women, wherein they had to confront local as well 
as national manifestations of discrimination. Echoing the earlier case of education 
reform, the partially open opportunity structure facing indigenous women resulted in a 
mixed outcome wherein indigenous women’s specific goals fell short while greater 
community gains were achieved. This evidence supports the idea that the political 
opportunity structure is an important contributor of social movement success. 
Neoliberalism 
Multiple scholars have remarked upon the impact of neoliberalism on land reform 
efforts of indigenous people in Latin America, identifying the contradictions between 
“free market” land titling logic and indigenous claims to communal land ownership 
(Deere and León 2001; Deere and León 2002; Deere and León 1998; Chase 2002; Brysk 
2000; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Kohl 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Van Cott 2000:198). The 
ways of enacting or creating reform in the 1990s with respect to agriculture often resulted 
in failure to recognize or honor indigenous autonomy and dignity, and in many cases the 
schemes were carried out in such a way as to strengthen neoliberalism (Kohl 2002, 
2003a, 2003b). However, the case of Bolivia offers an interesting example, because the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
equality of opportunities in representative levels for both men and women (Bolivia LPP 
1994: Article 1) (translated in Irahola 2005)  
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1996 land reform and the 1994 constitution preceding it had made the most advances in 
Latin America in terms of acknowledging indigenous territories, guaranteeing land access 
for indigenous people, and committing to issuing titles to communal ancestral or 
traditional original lands. This occurred under the period coded as strong neoliberal 
commitments, which casts doubt on the hypothesis that neoliberalism necessarily 
damages social movement policy efforts.  
International Influences 
The international effects of the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995 also 
presented numerous points of organization and mobilization for indigenous women, as 
five separate meetings were set in preparation for the conference (El Diario; 1995j2; 
1995k1). It was in these preparatory meetings where indigenous women voiced their 
concerns about the inequitable land situation in Bolivia (Deere and León 2002:53). 
Unfortunately, indigenous women reported a similar situation in the Beijing as they had 
faced in the national indigenous federations in their own country: their issues were 
sidelined. UMBO (Unidad Mujeres Populares de Bolivia) complained that no real 
presence was given to Bolivian women in the Beijing Women's Conference. In their 
opinion, the conference ignored the violence in Chapare, the ongoing genocide of 
cocaleros, the Bolivian “fixed state,”28 government corruption, impunity, and extreme 
poverty of Bolivian communities (El Diario 1995l1). Interestingly, although indigenous 
                                                
 
28 According to numerous El Diario reports, the “Estado de Sitio” went on from April 
until October of 1995, declared by President Sanchez de Lozada due to widespread 
marches against coca eradication, privatization, and education reform, mainly. The “fixed 
state” –or state of siege--consists of suspension of civil society organizations, and 
includes curfews, strict police control, and other losses of citizenship rights.  
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women voiced their gendered land rights locally, on the international scene (and 
ironically, the scene which favored gendered rights most specifically), they remained 
committed to community efforts. This is evident in the critique of the undertakings of the 
Beijing women’s conference, and is highly typical of indigenous women’s viewpoint on 
oppression in the 1990s.  
This fragmentation of Bolivian women’s claims between local and international 
levels provides an interesting insight into the impact of organizational features that 
overlap with international dialogue and influence on policy.  On the national scene, 
indigenous women’s needs were ignored, and on the international scene, their 
communities were ignored. This indicates that there is an increasing awareness of 
indigenous women’s specific issues emerging, and being articulated in the 1990s, but also 
points out inconsistencies between local and international organizing. 
Another component of the international environment of the time is also evident in 
President Sanchez de Lozada’s goal of modernization for the state. This necessity was 
introduced by the conditions for modernization and decentralization imposed for World 
Bank loans in the 1990s. For example, the World Bank financed and supported the 
agricultural reform bill proposed by Sanchez de Lozada, although the World Bank did not 
favor communal land titling that was part of the original package of land reform (World 
Bank 1997). The World Bank’s preference eventually won out in the structural 
environment provided by the succeeding Banzer administration, who amended the INRA 
to include individual ownership and taxation of indigenous land (Postero and Zamosc 
2004: 202). For the purposes of the policy moment I am discussing here, indigenous 
causes gained some support from international sources, and this support translated into a 
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moderate policy outcome. This was possible due to the fact that international forces 
contained influence especially in regard to neoliberal advice, and land reform had 
received some support from neoliberal lending agencies. The influence of international 
features matter when states internalize the norms associated with international 
agreements and internationally promoted goals like modernization and economic 
development. This evidence thus provides conditional support for the role of international 
forces in promoting the success of indigenous women in policy. That international forces 
supported agriculture reform indicates some support for the hypothesis that international 
support can increase the chance of favorable policy toward indigenous women. However, 
the differences between indigenous women’s mobilization at the local versus the 
international level, and consequent outcomes of policy that fell short of the proposed 
needs of indigenous women, provide evidence that organizational and state 
characteristics may mitigate international effects. 
INRA Summary 
 Indigenous women’s efforts, and the outcome of those efforts to influence the 
INRA resemble the efforts and outcomes associated with education reform. Numbers of 
indigenous women mobilized in the effort are coded as high, while networks and 
women’s leadership are coded as weak and low, respectively, and these moderate 
amounts of resources contribute to the mixed nature of the outcomes of the INRA. For, as 
mentioned earlier, while the community benefitted from changes in the law, indigenous 
women’s equal access to land remained unaddressed, resulting in a mixed outcome for 
indigenous women’s policy efforts. In addition, the mixed outcome of the INRA is also 
associated with a partially open opportunity structure, and neoliberal influences, contrary 
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to the expectations of my hypothesis, do not interfere with indigenous women’s ability to 
make a difference in policy. Finally, the international community was supportive of 
indigenous women’s goals during this time, and this tends to support the idea that 
indigenous women fare better when international support is present. However, the ability 
of international support may be limited due to the nature of other important variables like 
state political opportunity structures. 
Domestic Violence 
 In 1995, indigenous women, along with various other sectors of women, 
organized widely to promote a new law that criminalized domestic violence. The 
government responded with the first legal instrument for the prevention and punishment 
of domestic violence, put in place with the adoption of Law 1675 in 1995. The law 
establishes the fight against violence as a policy of the state, and establishes measures 
and mechanisms for penalties and protection of victims (Bolivia 1995b). Responsibility 
for implementation of the law and educating the population was placed on the Office of 
Gender, Generational and Family Concerns, created in 1993 (Bolivia 2001:2). The 
attention paid to domestic violence during this time reflects an emerging consciousness 
about women’s concerns, about which indigenous women and other activist women were 
becoming increasingly vocal. These problems included education, health care, and legal 
issues confronting women. Domestic violence was a vital problem facing women of all 
classes and ethnicities, as an estimated fifty percent of married women experience 
domestic violence in Bolivia (Bolivia 2001:1). The law was passed in response to 
research gathered by the newly created Office of Gender and Generational Affairs, and 
the mobilization of tens of thousands of women activists reinforced the pressure on 
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government when progress on the bill stalled. The final outcome of the bill is coded as 
successful, because of the fact that indigenous women engaged in, and accomplished 
their stated goals on the domestic violence law.  
Organizational Characteristics: Human Capital Resources 
  The engagement of indigenous women in protests regarding domestic violence 
represents a unique perspective on the ways in which human capital resources in 
numbers, networks, and leadership affect the ability of indigenous women to succeed. 
Domestic violence is a potentially divisive community issue because it inevitably resorts 
to treatment of women by men, who are seen as allies in the fight for indigenous rights. 
Indigenous women faced challenges not only on the issue of confronting and punishing 
men for violence, but in convincing Andean women themselves that domestic violence 
was unacceptable in a culture that views violence in family relationships as “normalized” 
(Kellogg 2005: 135; Canavire-Bacarreza and Avila 2010:2; Deere and León 2001:53; 
Lucashenko 1996: 378; Van Vleet 2008: 163; Weismantel 2001). These cultural issues 
created a rift between indigenous activist women who wished to raise awareness of the 
problem, and those who felt it unnecessary to fight for what was viewed as a western 
feminist goal (Radcliffe and Laurie 2003: 393).   
 Regardless of the cultural obstacles to mobilizing on the issue of domestic 
violence, indigenous women recognized an urgent need for a domestic violence law in 
Bolivia. Various indigenous groups, including the Bartolina Sisa, merged with non-
indigenous women’s groups in several marches in 1995, demanding that the government 
pass the Law Against Domestic Violence or Violence in the Family, which had been 
introduced in earlier sessions and postponed (El Diario 1995k1). This measure outlined 
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the parameters of domestic violence offenses, enforcement and family aid centers, and 
punishment (El Diario 1995y, 1995b2). The issue of domestic violence was particularly 
salient among women from El Alto and Oruro, where studies had confirmed that Andean 
women of all classes and ethnicities suffered from domestic violence (El Diario 1995k1). 
In Cochabamba, dozens of indigenous women staged a demonstration in September 
1995, dressed in black and carrying signs memorializing women who had been abused 
and/or murdered by their spouses (El Diario 1995b2).  
 The participation of indigenous women and progress on the issue of domestic 
violence deserves a closer inspection. Like land reform, domestic violence poses a 
potential threat to indigenous solidarity for ethnicities that feel that all participants should 
be united in their claims to achieve success. This is the logic behind sidelining women’s 
issues in larger indigenous organizations. However, in the instance of domestic violence, 
indigenous women found themselves participating with other women’s organizations. 
While this fact contains its own historical class contradictions and tensions between 
feminists and other women’s groups, it is striking that indigenous women were able to 
put their gender issues up for government consideration in the absence of indigenous 
men. The overall coding of resources for the 1990s was moderate, reflecting high 
numbers, low women’s leadership, and weak network ties. However, the case of domestic 
violence diverges slightly from this because the networks between women were 
indicative of broader, non-indigenous alliances, which makes the coding of networks 
strong. In addition, as referenced above, indigenous women were able to lead on issues of 
importance specifically to women, and this means women’s leadership should be coded 
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as high in this instance.29 Therefore, high amounts of resources contribute to a successful 
outcome of domestic violence law, indicating support for the hypothesis that resources 
can increase the chances of a movement’s success. 
Organizational Characteristics: Frames 
  Indigenous women’s mobilization for a policy affecting all women relates to the 
frames of mobilizers. Indigenous women were a strong presence in getting a new 
domestic violence bill passed through Congress, but their claims were in favor of all 
women and made no specific ethnic claims, even though ethnographic evidence from the 
time period indicates that they were acutely aware of the special situation they faced in 
confronting domestic violence (Kellogg 2005: 135; Canavire-Bacarreza and Avila 
2010:2; Deere and León 2001:53; Lucashenko 1996: 378; Van Vleet 2008: 163; Radcliffe 
and Laurie 2003: 393). Indigenous women’s involvement in protests centered on 
“…urging the Legislative Power to promulgate the law against intra-familiar violence” 
(El Diario 1995b2). 
An unnamed Cochabamba organizer comments:  
This law is a conquest of the struggle of Bolivian women and its (the law’s) content is 
the result of long years of experience of feminine institutions in the work with victims 
of domestic violence and we will not permit the distortion of the very essence of any 
one of the articles. (El Diario 1995b2)   
                                                
 
29 The degree to which indigenous women were able to lead in non-indigenous women’s 
groups is uncertain, but the coding on the independent variable still warrants a “high” 
ranking since indigenous women were able to successfully mobilize about women’s 
issues outside of mixed-gender indigenous groups.  
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Throughout the effort, ethnicity does not enter into domestic violence frames. In this 
instance of indigenous women’s mobilization on behalf of all women, the outcome was 
positive; the government of Sanchez de Lozada ceased the delays on the bill and 
promulgated it in December of 1995 (EFE 1995c3). This information can be taken to 
support the hypothesis that broader frames (non-ethnic) are more likely to result in 
successful outcomes, but contradicts the expectation that indigenous women would not 
successfully mobilize with gendered frames. While no specific measures in the bill 
addressed the indigenous population as a particular target of improvement, the 
recognition and attempted repair of a social problem facing all women is viewed as a 
success in terms of policy influence. In line with the coding of indigenous women’s 
activism in the 1990s, the frames used by indigenous women were broad (non-ethnic), 
and non-gendered. But in the case of domestic violence, the frames employed were broad 
and gendered, which somewhat supports the hypothesis that frames designed to appeal to 
the broad, non-gendered and non-indigenous portion of society succeed. This information 
contradicts the hypothesis that gendered frames are damaging to women’s success. 
State Characteristics: Political Opportunity Structure (State Reforms) 
 In the case of the domestic violence law passed December 15, 1995 (Bolivia 
1995), the state structure and neoliberal commitments work together to advance the 
success of indigenous women’s policy ambitions. The Sanchez de Lozada administration 
viewed the domestic violence bill as an important move toward a “harmonization of law 
with modern circumstances” and responded favorably to women’s (including indigenous 
women’s) claims for gendered justice (El Diario 1995c3). This aligns with the 
government’s decision to include gender equality as part of laws that modernized the 
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state. Previous legal changes in Bolivia that contributed to this framework included the 
creation of an Office of Gender Concerns, the 1994 constitution’s provisions on human 
rights, the Law of Decentralization, and the Law of Popular Participation. While authors 
credit NGOs and civic organizations for national efforts to address the issue of domestic 
violence, the government also adopted a strong role in educating the population and 
creating a greater consciousness in society about the problem of domestic violence (Van 
Vleet 2008: 161; Moravek de Cerreto 2001:3; Bolivia 1995). Neoliberal commitments 
and a partially open political opportunity structure responded favorably to indigenous 
women’s demands. This provides support for the importance of political opportunity 
structures and some doubt regarding the harmful role of neoliberalism. It is important to 
note that the state structure was relatively more open toward this particular issue than in 
other instances of women’s activism for policy change. The restructuring of state 
processes that came from the need to accommodate neoliberalism with modern legal 
codes and institutions created a structural political opportunity that was advantageous to 
the policy efforts of indigenous women regarding domestic violence.  
International Influences 
Demonstrations by indigenous women on the issue of domestic violence 
coincided with the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995, as preparatory meetings 
began to create the forum for considering Bolivian women’s issues. During 1995, El 
Diario reported research on the conditions of women in the country during the months 
leading up the conference, including meetings discussing the poverty of women and the 
problem of domestic violence (El Diario 1995k1). As with agricultural reform, these 
preparatory meetings introduced the opportunity for indigenous women to coordinate, 
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plan, and to disseminate research findings on specific issues within the consideration of 
the domestic violence laws that affect indigenous women. 
The language involved in drafting the law includes the important features of 
previous international conferences within the United Nations and the Organization of 
American States. For example, the Domestic Violence Law included special language 
about the intent to “diffuse the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and the Inter-American Convention of the Organization 
of American States for the Prevention, Sanction, and Eradication of Violence against 
Women” (Bolivia 1995: Chapter 1, article k). Therefore, while the government’s action 
on the domestic violence law can be seen as a response to domestic pressure, the 
transference of international agreements about women into domestic law indicates that 
international support can contribute to positive outcomes. The case of domestic violence 
policy reflects the adoption of the ILO Accord 169 and CEDAW into Bolivian legal code 
in the constitution and the INRA, and supports the hypothesis that international 
influences, when aligned with state intentions, can further indigenous women’s interests.  
Domestic Violence Summarized 
The case of domestic violence law indicates that high amounts of human resource 
capital may have a strong impact on the outcomes of attempts to change policy, and this 
is especially highlighted in this chapter since only the case of domestic violence deviates 
from the general coding of moderate human capital resources. Networks and women’s 
attainment of leadership in the movement seem to be important factors that increase 
indigenous women’s chances of success, in line with the hypothesis about the importance 
of human capital resources. In addition, gendered, broad frames are consistent with 
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success for indigenous women’s movements, according to the analysis presented here, 
which contradicts the hypothesis that gendered frames would not be successful. This 
information does support the hypothesis that broad frames are positive features for 
indigenous women’s mobilization. The effects of a partially open political opportunity 
structure were positive in the case of domestic violence law, which confirm the 
importance of political opportunity structural openings. The effects of neoliberalism, 
however, are seemingly in contradiction with my hypothesis that it would negatively 
affect indigenous women’s outcomes, since neoliberalism is coded high during this 
period, and indigenous women’s efforts achieved limited success. Finally, the 
international environment was supportive of indigenous women’s concerns about 
domestic violence, and this supports the hypothesis that indigenous women’s policy 
efforts are influenced by international support, especially where state initiatives favor the 
goals.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
 My hypotheses about organizational, state, and international characteristics find 
mixed support from the evidence.  Social movement variables are highly contextualized 
and inter-dependent with other factors that affect policy success. Thus, high amounts of 
human capital resources, broad, non-gendered frames, partially open state structural 
opportunity structures, neoliberal commitments, and international influences all play 
varying roles within each case to produce varying outcomes.  
During the neoliberal period, indigenous women’s advancement as indigenous 
women was slow—for most cases, their cases of success would have to be swallowed 
under indigenous rights in general (as was the case of land and education reform) or 
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commit to a banner that included all women (domestic violence). Even with significant 
support from other indigenous groups, they may fail altogether (cocalera movement). 
Because of these complexities, characteristics should be viewed in the context of the 
relationship within organizations as well as those from without.  
 I hypothesized that frames—the language of activism—that appeal to the broader 
public would be more successful than those representing interests of indigenous women, 
throughout all periods of research. Specifically, broad, non-gendered frames were 
expected to increase the ability of movements to impact policy whereas ethnic and/or 
gendered frames were expected to decrease the ability of movements to succeed. The 
analysis in this chapter finds that indigenous women experienced mild success in the 
neoliberal period with broad, non-gendered frames. In the exception to this coding, 
domestic violence, where indigenous women used broad and gendered forms of 
expression, they were successful, which presents doubt about the hypothesis that non-
gendered claims would be more successful than gendered claims. While indigenous 
women were also successful to some degree in achieving success based on indigenous 
interests, indigenous women’s interests were not salient enough within organizations to 
increase their influence on policies (the INRA and Education reform). In the case of the 
cocaleras and their quest to end eradication, their impressive concerted efforts relied 
more on broad frames and met with failure. Unlike the issue of agriculture reform, 
however, there is no evidence that indigenous women even possessed their own frames 
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and interests related to coca, as women.30 For the case of Bolivia these findings do not 
support the hypothesis indigenous women’s frames need to be non-gendered or broad to 
succeed. If anything, the coding of the frames in this period as mainly non-gendered and 
broad seems to coincide with, at best, partial success (mixed outcomes). 
The question of the role of resources—particularly in the numbers mobilized for 
protest—is found to be an important one in this chapter. Resources are coded as moderate 
for the period of the 1990s, due to the combined effect of high numbers, low women’s 
leadership, and weak networks. The one exception to this was the domestic violence law, 
where women experienced strong networks and higher numbers of women in leadership 
positions, making the coding of resources high. The hypothesis that increased resources 
contributes to success is also supported by the failure of coca, wherein moderate amounts 
of human capital resources failed to impact policy. In the case of agriculture reform and 
education reform, moderate amounts of human capital resources are consistent with 
moderate results. On the other hand, the case of complete success in policy outcomes was 
domestic violence, which exhibited higher amounts of human resources than the other 
cases in this chapter. This indicates a rather strong correlation with the combined 
resource variables of this research.  
With regard to state characteristics, the first surprising finding is that the coding 
of neoliberalism as high may be correlated with mixed outcomes overall for indigenous 
women, a somewhat larger degree of success than expected. Partial successes on the 
                                                
 
30 But the case could be made that women are perhaps more vulnerable to eradication 




INRA and Education reform create some doubt about whether or not neoliberalism is 
decisively detrimental to outcomes. However, the failures of the cocalera movement, and 
domestic violence, did not seem to be directly harmed by neoliberal commitments. In the 
case of cocalera failure, the explanation lies with international and state structural 
opportunities, while the case of domestic violence success indicates that organizational 
features, like networks and women’s leadership, and opening state structural 
opportunities are important factors. Taken as a whole, however, the neoliberal 
environment may be thought of as less obstructive than expected. The combination of 
two mixed outcomes, one failure, and one success, at this point, provides little support for 
the hypothesis that neoliberalism harms policy outcomes for indigenous women.  
The political opportunity structure emerges as an important feature in the 
neoliberal period. Where political opportunities were closed, in the case of coca 
eradication, indigenous women’s broad frames, moderate resources, and international 
opposition created the conditions for failure. Where political opportunity structures were 
partially open, as with education and land reform, broad frames, moderate resources, and 
international support contributed to mixed outcomes. Open political opportunities also 
combined with broad and gendered frames, high amounts of resources, and international 
support, in the successful domestic violence case. Thus, the findings so far indicate that 
political opportunity structure plays a strong role in influencing outcomes, alone and with 
other variables. The case of domestic violence indicates that resources, neoliberalism, and 
international support are more influential under the right political opportunity structures. 
Like most of the other influences on indigenous women’s policy success, the 
international factor contains both contextualized and generalized lessons. International 
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support sometimes coincides with favorable outcomes for indigenous women, as was the 
case with the Beijing Women’s Conference and the influence of indigenous rights from 
ILO standards. While the ILO 169 contains no gender measures (Chase 2002: 28), it was 
nonetheless an important international structural feature that aided women in achieving 
their organizational goals of extending land rights of indigenous people. In other cases, 
particularly the case of cocalera protesters in the 1990s, international opposition seems 
highly influential, but this was largely because the state structure aligned with 
international interests on the matter. As the discussion of the state’s opportunity structure 
shows, the effects of international influences are not always detrimental, even under 
neoliberal auspices. In the cases of education and agricultural reform, indigenous women 
were able to press their claims with the support of international organizations (the UN 
and international lending agencies). However, it can also be noted that the 
acknowledgement by the World Bank of indigenous women’s special needs was not 
sufficient to promote the inclusion of affirmative action measures in those policies. The 
cases of INRA, domestic violence and education reform provide limited support for the 
international influence hypothesis. The three mixed and successful cases indicate that 
political opportunity structures must be sufficiently open for international factors to 
matter. While the cocaleras’ failure indicates that international influences matter in some 
instances, especially when international opposition combines with animosity from the 
state, when taken together, these cases provide little support for a direct role of 
international influences on policy.  
 This chapter has addressed the evidence related to the hypotheses outlined in the 
introduction to this dissertation. In the following chapter, I assess these hypotheses with 
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data from the period following Banzer’s second administration, 2001-2012. These cases 
provide additional analytical leverage on the dependent and independent variables 
































     DV Score 
























































*Frames: BNG= Broad, Non-Gendered; BG: Broad, Gendered 




















Interlude: Indigenous Women’s Social Movements 2000-2006 
 
This chapter investigates hypotheses about organizational, state, and international 
characteristics and their effect on the outcomes of women’s mobilization during the Gas 
War beginning in 2003. I analyze the outcomes of indigenous women’s policy efforts in 
the interim period between the neoliberal period and the post-liberal period after Evo 
Morales’ election. There are three phases of the Gas War that are discussed here. The 
final phase overlaps into the next period of post-liberal politics, but is discussed here for 
efficiency. The overall coding for the first two phases of the Gas War period were high 
organizational resources, ethnic, gendered frames, closed political opportunity structures, 
declining neoliberalism, and obstructive international environment. The last phase of the 
Gas War completes with very high resources, the same frames, a very open political 
opportunity structure, and an opposed international environment. The following pages 
address these independent variables and the outcomes on the Gas War, assessing the 
consequences for the hypotheses of this dissertation. Table 5 offers the outcomes of the 










Table 5: Selected Cases and Coding 
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Nationalization of Natural Gas 
While the importance of indigenous women’s protests and their contribution to 
the victory over ending water privatization practices is well documented (Bennett et al 
2005; Bakker 2008; Laurie et al 2002; Lewis and Olivera 2004), indigenous women’s 
protest over the nationalization of gas in vital policy moments in 2003, 2004 and 2005 is 
less documented and yet equally important.  Indigenous women were visibly engaged in 
protests against the decision of the Sanchez de Lozada government to privatize the 
natural gas reserves found within the country during 2003. They were also important 
figures in protests to urge Mesa to nationalize gas in 2004, and later to protest the 
referendum on gas issued by the Mesa administration in 2005. As scholars, NGO 
organizations, and journalists argue, the leadership of indigenous women was vital to the 
success of the movement (Monasterios 2007; Jiminez 2003; Liendo 2009; Paco et al 
2009; Vàsquez 2006). Their involvement was also indicative of a major shift in the power 
of indigenous women, as they became acknowledged as legitimate representatives of a 
large part of society (Monasterios 2007; Vàsquez 2006).  
Plans to privatize Bolivia’s natural gas reserves go back as far as Sanchez de 
Lozada’s first term in the 1990s (El Internationalista 2003; El Diario 1995a, 1997a, 
1997b, 1997c). In 2003, one year after his second election to office, the president faced 
massive national protests against the privatization of natural gas that shut down 
government offices and trade routes into cities. After his flight from La Paz to the United 
States, Sanchez de Lozada’s vice president, Carlos Mesa, assumed the presidency and 
attempted to resolve the nation’s crisis by putting the nationalization issue to referendum 
in 2004. The referendum, which was worded in confusing terms, was returned in favor of 
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the privatization of natural gas. This prompted even more protest by the nation’s 
indigenous people, who claimed the government intentionally misled voters (Dangl 
2005). On May 6, 2005, Congress passed a new law raising taxes from 18% to 32% on 
profits from foreign companies. However, Mesa refused to take any action on the bill, 
which meant that the Senate President had to sign the bill for it to be legitimate, 
according to Bolivian law (Gomez 2005). However, social movements rejected the law 
(which failed to be implemented anyway) and subsequent attempts by the Mesa 
government to call for a constituent assembly and a referendum on autonomy in the Santa 
Cruz region. Two years after Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation, Mesa resigned amid 
protests involving as high as a half million people, leaving the country under temporary 
rule of Supreme Court President Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé (El Mundo 2005; El Diario 
2005). This event opened the way for the election of Evo Morales and his executive 
decree on May 1, 2006 that nationalized hydrocarbons resources and declared the state 
the owner of the revenues (DeShazo 2006; Perreault 2008; CEDIB 2006).  
While the Gas War is viewed as one case, it exhibits several distinct data points to 
analyze. The first “policy moment” identified is the 2003 mobilization against 
privatization, ending with the ousting of Sanchez de Lozada. But this policy moment is 
coded as a failure, even though the president was replaced in response to the protests, 
because the end result was not policy change. The next important moment came with 
Mesa’s referendum, which is coded as a failure for indigenous women’s policy efforts. 
The final outcome and policy moment is defined in 2006 with the instatement of the new 
hydrocarbons executive decree. This moment is coded as a success for indigenous 
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women, who had not only participated in the successful mass sector uprising, but had 
taken on more prominent roles to accomplish this goal.  
Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement 
Organizational resources up until the 2006 election of Evo Morales are coded as 
high, due to the fact that high numbers of participants, high presence of women leaders in 
the movement, and moderately strong network ties existed to support indigenous 
women’s policy ambitions. Indigenous women’s resources were very high following 
2006, exhibiting high numbers, strong networks (this time within the government as well 
as the broader sector), and higher numbers of women in leadership positions. According 
to scholarly and news reports, the two most important sources of human capital resources 
throughout the conflict were indigenous women’s organizations and neighborhood 
associations (Monasterios 2007; Jiminez 2003; Liendo 2009; Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006; 
Vàsquez 2006). Neighborhood association politics are referred to as “basic needs” 
politics, and these survivalist motives cohabitate with the demands for indigenous 
sovereignty. This has resulted in a new kind of nationalism and citizenship built on re-
appropriating natural resources for the benefit of Bolivians. In addition, both 
neighborhood and indigenous movements find common ground for decolonization and 
mobilize on the basis of their ethnic subaltern status (Monasterios 2007; Vásquez 2006).  
Indigenous women joined forces with groups who had protested the privatization 
measures taken in the late 1990s (El Diario 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). In El 
Alto, these groups coalesced and organized marches, protests, roadblocks, and strikes 
during the Gas War of September–October 2003 with Aymara peasants, laborers, 
cocaleras, miners, the poor, indigenous residents, and eventually the middle class of La 
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Paz. Together, these diverse groups converged upon La Paz, creating enough turmoil to 
send President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada into exile in the United States. Nationalizing 
natural gas gained support among some middle-class residents of La Paz who led hunger 
strikes in rebuke of the government’s actions that had resulted in the death of over 
seventy people (Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006: 154). By June 2005, close to seventy-five 
percent of the population was in favor of nationalizing the gas industry in Bolivia (El 
Deber 2005; Lewis 2005), and by May 2006 that figure had grown to eighty-one percent 
(EFE 2006). This exhibits a broader range of support than perhaps any other cause 
supported by indigenous women in recent or distant memory. The evidence suggests that 
the broad range of networking with other groups in support of gas nationalization is a 
relevant resource to be considered. Indigenous men and women became important 
symbols of the movement, and were seen as representing the interests of the whole 
country (AmericasBarometer 2010, see Chapter 3). Furthermore, the leader of the MAS 
during this time was to be future president, and his agenda was identical to the highland 
natives with whom he had organized. Further, his well-documented history of mobilizing 
and promoting gender equitable policies goes back to his leadership of the Six 
Federations Coca Union in the 1990s (Vargas and Draper 2010). This extraordinary 
alliance would serve to benefit indigenous women’s goals for policy. One reason why 
ousting Sanchez de Lozada was not enough to change policy is that protest networks, 
while strong, did not yet possess strong roots within the government that was introduced 
with the MAS and President Morales’ electoral victories. Social movements may have 
other political effects with different levels of organizational resources, such as driving 
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presidents from office. But actual influence on policy requires high amounts of resources 
and a strong sense of agreement between the government and social movements. 
Women’s activity during mobilizations in the 2000s over natural resources, 
including gas and water, were remarkable exhibitions of a new indigenous female 
leadership emerging in civil society and social movements. Roles of indigenous women 
in this effort ranged from providing supplies, food, and childcare, to organizing and 
maintaining street occupations in the face of soldier and police violence (Vasquez 2006; 
Monasterios 2007; Jiménez 2004; Cabezas 2006). However, their strong presence in this 
struggle is not necessarily due to the elimination of barriers to indigenous women’s 
leadership within mixed gender organizations (local and national). As various scholars 
and indigenous women themselves have argued, indigenous organizations still contain 
many of the cultural dynamics that keep indigenous women from leading and from 
pressing the claims that affect indigenous women specifically (Bennett et al 2005: 26; 
Liendo 2009: 130-132; Vásquez 2006; Ramirez 2003; Americalatinagenera 2010). An 
extremely important determinant of their success is women’s emergence as leaders of the 
movement, which originated in survivalist activism within informal neighborhood 
associations and the larger and more organized indigenous women’s organizations. These 
organizations represent spheres where women do not confront mixed-gender group 
dynamics that interfere with women’s leadership. As Vásquez (2006) argues, “the fact is 
that the formal political institutions, especially the state, limit an even participation of 
women, they encounter a better space in collective actions, and as such (this) continues to 




While the majority of women’s duties remained in child-care and food provision 
during the marches, new leadership spaces were opening up for indigenous women, as 
evidenced through their strong roles in the Gas Wars (Vásquez 2006). Indigenous women 
from neighborhood associations and indigenous women’s organizations such as the 
Bartolina Sisa and OMAK Mujeres represented an unprecedented amount of mobilization 
and participation in protests and roadblocks. Indigenous women persisted even in the 
most dangerous confrontations with soldiers during which at least 67 people were killed 
in the massacre of October 2003 (Paco et al 2006; Vásquez 2006; Al Jazeera 2011). 
Human capital resources have been coded as high for the period covering the first two 
policy moments in 2003 and 2004, including high numbers of participants, high presence 
of women in leadership positions, and moderately strong network ties built within 
broader society. When these resources confronted the Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa 
administrations, their policy efforts were failures. This was largely because of a closed 
political opportunity structure. At various times, these two presidents were confronted 
with indigenous women’s powerful movements, and each time, the government treated 
their demands with superficial promises and delayed action. Once indigenous women’s 
resources included very strong networks, and as the political opportunity structure began 
to open after Morales’ election, changes in favor of the movement’s goals occurred. 
Taken together, this evidence provides support for the hypotheses that high levels of 
human capital resources are important factors affecting social movement success. 
Network ties within the government, as intuition would support, create better political 




Organizational Characteristics: Frames (Activist Language) of the Movement 
 
The first major solidified efforts against the gas privatization scheme were 
organized among the large indigenous population of El Alto, located near the capital of 
La Paz.  Vásquez (2006), Hylton et al (2004), Cabezas (2006) and Monasterios (2007) 
find that ethnicity was an important basis of identity and motivation for organizers and 
community supporters. The wiphala—the flag of Bolivia’s highland indigenous groups—
became a common sight at roadblocks and protests. “Pollera women participated holding 
their children while giving speeches in Aymara or castellano” (Ramirez 2003: 4). These 
same women fought to maintain control of their neighborhoods during the onslaught of 
military and police attacks (Ramirez 2003:5). While an opening occurred in political 
positions of all organizations for women during the natural resource conflicts, women’s 
leadership in the “politics of needs” generated more opportunities. Indigenous women’s 
activism is conducted in a framework that does not question the arrangements of mixed 
organizations dominated by men. These factors reflect indigenous women’s success in 
organizing around their reproductive roles, while emphasizing a discourse of 
complementarity and collectivity that rejects any feminist or individualistic positions 
(Vásquez 2006). For example, as Aymara activist Norah Quispe from El Alto comments, 
“we do not mediate our force without the force of all, with much affection and much 
compromise (MujeresLideres 2012). 
While based on traditional roles as family care providers, indigenous women’s 
activism began to more clearly represent a gendered and ethnic dimension because it 
related to their roles as indigenous women, even while they took on roles in representing 
the interests of their own communities and all of Bolivia (Cabezas 2006).  The neglected 
 
 161 
spheres of their organizing were enhanced by the nature of the issues of natural resource 
privatization because these issues were elemental to basic individual and community 
survival (Cabezas 2006). Cabezas’ (2006) recording of indigenous women involved in 
the Gas War reveals the painful experiences for indigenous women in providing for their 
families, and the discrimination they face in doing so, which provided partial motivations 
for their participation: 
As women, when we have a “wawa,”31 in work, they do not accept you. “With 
your pollera you are lumpy like a cow.” They (employers) always criticized us 
like this. My husband does not work anymore, and does not maintain me. Now I 
have four children. My children are in school. I have returned to work, but I earn 
little. In Bolivia, women work, but earn little. The man earns, say, one thousand 
and women earn four hundred bolivianos…And what our husbands earn does not 
cover us, and because of that we work hard for those four hundred bolivianos to 
maintain our children, so they do not suffer from (want of) food, so that they do 
not suffer from (want of) clothes. The “wawas” ask for clothes, health, shelter and 
food. Four things. We women have suffered much. (Cabezas 2006:77) 
Women’s desperation resulting from economic problems has become an integral 
part of their activist message: government policy must change because their role in 
carrying on generations and providing for them is seriously threatened. Thus, as the 
activist above describes, indigenous women’s suffering created the motive for organizing 
                                                
 
31 Aymaran word for baby or small child. 
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about national issues; it also created the frames around which they based their legitimacy 
to influence public opinion and government action.  
The frames of the movement throughout the gas nationalization struggles have 
been coded as gendered, ethnic, and broad, and these are associated with success and 
failure in the Gas War. Women’s frames adopted gendered, broad, and ethnic language 
during the many protests throughout the Sanchez de Lozada or Mesa administrations, but 
these frames did not result in successful policy outcomes. Broad, ethnic and gendered 
framing was not conducive to successful outcomes until after the election of Evo 
Morales. This points to the fact that organizational characteristics interact with state 
characteristics to produce outcomes on policy efforts. Thus, the hypothesis that 
indigenous women need broad frames receives little support from the analysis of the case 
of gas nationalization. Indigenous and gendered framing does not harm indigenous 
women’s efforts; the combination of ethnic frames and generic claims produce success 
under the right circumstances, especially political opportunity openings in the state. 
State Characteristics: State Structural Opportunities/Reforms 
The two presidential resignations in Bolivia between 2003 and 2005 are events 
representing the consequences of heightened social movement protests against a closed 
political opportunity structure. Even though protests over Sanchez de Lozada’s plans to 
nationalize gas drove him out of the country, the end result was little more than a change 
in personnel instead of policy. As Aymara activist Benita Quispe poignantly lamented: 
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“the same chola in another pollera: nothing has changed” (Cabezas 2006: 83). 32  The 
pressure boiling over from unyielding government attitudes on the gas nationalization 
issue created chaos and even momentary collapses, but these events did not reflect an 
open political opportunity structure. Instead, they reflected the government’s failure to 
negotiate. Carlos Mesa succeeded Sanchez de Lozada as president, but failed to follow 
through with what was named the “October Agenda,” in which he agreed to address 
nationalizing the production and distribution of natural gas, bring Sanchez de Lozada to 
trial for deaths of civilians, and to convene a Constituent Assembly to address the 
inequalities of the poor indigenous majority (Perreault 2006: 150-151; Webber 2005b). 
However, Mesa’s referendum and continuance of the plans for the sale of gas dictated 
only eighteen percent royalties to be paid from reserves handled by foreign petroleum 
companies, an insulting decision for the nation’s indigenous (Webber 2005b). Thus, the 
time period saw no significant change in policy on gas privatization. The political 
opportunity structure within the state from Sanchez de Lozada’s second term until the 
end of Mesa’s term is coded as closed. This feature coincides with failure for indigenous 
women’s policy efforts in the first two major outcomes on this policy (the demand for an 
end to privatization and Mesa’s referendum). These outcomes are consistent with the 
expectation that closed opportunity structures would create obstacles for indigenous 
women’s policy goals, while openings would yield greater policy successes. Movements 
proved themselves strong enough to impact the political system through forcing 
                                                
 
32 “Chola” is a more derogatory term for indigenous woman, and the “pollera” is the 
traditional indigenous skirt.  
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presidents out, but change in policy required a significant change in political opportunity 
structures.  
In May 2005, women marched along with various other sectors of society in the 
tens of thousands to protest Congress’s promulgation of the new hydrocarbons law. The 
law had actually symbolized the legislature’s willingness to cooperate with social 
movement demands in the sake of government stability. However, the move was too 
little, too late, and protesters re-iterated the call for full nationalization (Gomez 2005). El 
Alto and La Paz once again became the sites of violent confrontations with police over 
attempts to take crucial sites like the Plaza Murillo, which contains the Presidential 
Palace (Lewis 2005). This period also saw the mobilization of regional right-wing forces 
that campaigned for a referendum on autonomy in the gas-rich department of Santa Cruz, 
which still threatens secession from the Bolivian state (Webber 2005b; Lewis 2005). This 
region housed the main opposition to the nationalization of gas. As protests and 
roadblocks effectively shut down the capital city of La Paz, President Mesa was forced to 
resign from his presidential post in June (Associated Press 2005). This opened the way 
for the election of President Morales, who quickly moved to nationalize natural gas 
during the first months of his presidency. In response to overwhelming mass support, 
Morales issued a decree that companies must turn over field operations to Bolivia’s 
national oil company (Weintraub 2007: 1; Perreault 2008:1). The connection between 
social movements and the election of Evo Morales based on the platform widely 
campaigned for by indigenous women reveals that the structure of the state has an 
important impact on indigenous women’s policy success. The opening of state structural 
opportunities results in policy success after social movement politics become national 
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politics. As hypothesized, opening (closing) political opportunity structures—in this case 
a very open political opportunity structure in the form of an indigenous and highly 
beholden president—greatly impact women’s policy efforts. During the last phase, the 
variable of state structural opportunities interacts with the presence of networks between 
indigenous women and the government to create more favorable outcomes for indigenous 
women. This instance of social movement mobilization is also instructive to the fact that 
political opportunity structures not only affect social movement goals, but can be 
changed by them, as the protracted nature and eventual success of indigenous women 
within the indigenous movement illustrates.  
State Characteristics: Neoliberalism  
Sanchez de Lozada’s and Mesa’s decisions to advance the neoliberal and 
economic project of preceding governments and continue with plans coordinated with the 
IMF and private international companies for the sale of gas are representative of the 
impact of clinging neoliberal commitment (Webber 2005; BBC 2004; Perreault 2006, 
2008).  When these governments met with protest about allowing natural resource 
revenues to leave the country, their reactions ultimately led to failure to change the policy 
in favor of indigenous women’s preferences. In response to Mesa’s failure to fulfill the 
October Agenda in 2005, popular social forces, led by Evo Morales and the movement 
MAS (Movimento a Socialismo) remobilized against the state. They struck first with the 
El Alto Water War in January and March, and, second, with the Second Gas War of May 
and June (Webber 2005; Webber 2005b; BBC 2004; Agramont 2012). These events, 
culminating with Evo Morales’ election, brought about weak neoliberal commitments of 
the state, as the coding revealed in Chapter 3.  
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The neoliberal variable changes through the period of the Gas War, beginning 
during a declining neoliberal era (2003), which covers the first two failed attempts to 
influence policy. As long as governments remained committed to neoliberal policies, 
extreme measures like nationalization could not take place. Changes had to go beyond 
individual leaders and include the overarching goals of the government—including the 
decline of neoliberal commitment. This substantial change was accomplished with 
overwhelming MAS victories during the 2005 presidential and congressional elections 
(electionguide.org 2013).  These victories signaled the beginning of the fusion between 
social movements and a new, leftist government. This change all but sealed the final 
successful outcome. To summarize, the importance of the role of neoliberalism is 
illustrated by indigenous women’s failures under neoliberal governments and the 
eventual success of their efforts after neoliberal commitments had become weak. 
Indigenous and indigenous women’s success in achieving gas nationalization shows 
remarkable increases in indigenous women’s influence on policy, especially compared to 
the previous period when no amount of protest was able to halt the neoliberal march 
toward privatization.  
International Forces  
Two major components of the international environment affected outcomes on the 
issue of natural gas: international trade and international lending. The international 
environment is coded as obstructive due to relevant international actors in opposition to 
the nationalization of gas. The historically antagonistic relationship between social 
movements and international trade reached crisis levels in the case of newly found 
natural gas reserves in 2003. These reserves had been found subsequent to the partial 
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privatization of the YPFB (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos) and other state-
owned sectors of the economy during Sanchez do Lozada’s first term in office during the 
1990s Private companies laid claim to the rights to profits from these resources (Webber 
2005). Previous experience with privatization and resulting lay-offs decreased public 
acceptance of privatization schemes and led to a new nationalist movement that promoted 
nationalizing natural gas for Bolivia (Webber 2005; Energy Information Administration 
2012; Perreault 2006: 152). According to news reports and scholars’ analyses, several 
factors conditioned indigenous women’s response to natural gas privatization plans. The 
first related to the initial plans to export gas through an agreement with Chile, with whom 
Bolivia’s relations have been tense since the loss of territory in the war of 1879 (Energy 
Information Administration 2012; Webber 2005; Hodges-Copple 2007; BBC 2004; 
Hylton et al 2004; Perreault 2006, 2008).  Similarly the agreements were also unpopular 
because they benefitted Californian and Mexican industries. Initial proposals by Evo 
Morales, then a member of Congress, included a pipeline agreement with Peru instead of 
Chile and a larger amount of gas revenues to be kept in country by increasing taxes and 
royalties by 32% on the two largest natural gas producers (Energy Information 
Administration 2012). However, indigenous women and other social movement 
organizations pushed further and demanded nationalization. As Kohl (2004) reports, 
before the 2000s, popular reactions against agreements with the IMF were scattered and 
sector-centric, with unions of each sector protesting at the time of sale of their industries 
throughout the 1990s. These protests were ineffective in halting sales or preventing the 
loss of 14,795 jobs during the second half of the 1990s (Kohl 2004: 899). International 
influences were a visible (and audible) part of indigenous women’s agenda in the 2000s, 
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as each cycle of protest between 2003 and 2005 concerning gas nationalization created 
“increasingly broad coalitions of an increasingly clear critique of privatization” (Kohl 
2004: 893). 
International companies and lending institutions placed a great deal of pressure on 
the Bolivian government to increase privatization of natural resources in the country as 
conditions for further lending (Kohl 2004; Eurodad 2006; PBS 2002; Samper 2003). As 
Kohl (2004) and La Razon (2003) report, in early 2003 the IMF demanded that the 
Bolivian government reduce its deficit from 8.5% to 5.5% of its GDP, or by $240 
million. The government agreed to cut spending by $30 million and to raise another $80 
million from hydrocarbon taxes, as well as $90 million from a new universal income tax 
(Kohl 2004: 894; La Razon 2003; Samper 2003). As various sources describe, as budget 
problems resurfaced in the country, new rounds of negotiations with the IMF and World 
Bank occurred. These negotiations created more embittered protests from the indigenous, 
women’s, and broader sector social movements (Kohl 2004: 902; Hodges-Copple 2007; 
BBC 2004; IMF 2003). The agreements forged between the Mesa government and the 
IMF expired in March 31, 2006, and Evo Morales declined to sign a new memorandum 
of understanding with the agency, after which the IMF cut off new lines of credit to 
Bolivia (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2006; Weisbrot 2007). Instead, he issued a decree 
nationalizing the country’s natural gas reserves. 
While Bolivia remained committed to neoliberalism and the IMF and World 
Bank, international opposition to nationalization acted in concert with other political 
structures (especially the Executive) to impede indigenous women’s goals.  In the last 
phase of the Gas War, Evo Morales’ government de-aligned with these institutions and 
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the neoliberal design in general, resulting in favorable outcomes for indigenous women’s 
goals. The inability of the same level of opposition to block indigenous women’s efforts 
in the final phase shows that international opposition must require other variables to be 
influential. When indigenous women confronted the 2003 and 2005 governments, 
international factors had more influence on neoliberal governments, which consistently 
responded with policies that kept them in IMF and World Bank favor. In the final phase 
of the Gas War, international opposition was unable to impede social movement efforts 
because of opening structural political opportunities as well as weak neoliberal 
commitments.  
It is also useful to pay attention to the amount of protest and mobilization that 
international forces cause. International forces may have less power to impede social 
movements’ progress when they are the cause of social movement protest. In accordance 
with the expectations established in this research, international factors require an 
alignment of state and organizational factors—but especially the state—in order to be a 
real support or obstacle to indigenous women’s outcomes.   
Conclusions 
 Several variables of interest are highlighted by the case of gas nationalization. 
First, very high resources, brought about through strong networks with the government, 
were present during the final success, but less so during the previous attempts to change 
policy. Indigenous women’s use of gendered, ethnic, and broad frames during the Gas 
War indicates that gendered and ethnic claims do not damage indigenous women’s 
chances of success, contrary to the framing hypothesis. This is true especially when these 
types of frames reach a government that has created political opportunities, as did Evo 
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Morales’ government. The existence of political opportunities within the current 
administration and the positive outcome for indigenous women also increases confidence 
in the hypothesis that political open opportunity structures increase indigenous women’s 
chances of favorable policy outcomes. Weak neoliberal commitment occurs with the 
successful outcome on the dependent variable, while failures are associated with stronger 
neoliberal commitment. Interestingly, however, international influences are conditionally 
important. International opposition to the nationalization of gas succeeded when 
neoliberal commitments were high and political opportunity structures were closed to 
indigenous women. The IMF was unable to stop the momentum of social movement 
demands once neoliberal commitments within the state had become much weaker. The 
Gas War illustrates the importance of understanding the interactions between 
organizational, state, and international characteristics, as specific combinations of coding 
on these variables result in different outcomes. Specifically, broad, ethnic and gendered 
frames, very high resources, closed political opportunity structures, neoliberal 
commitments, and international opposition result in failure. Changing the state variables 
to open political opportunities, neoliberal decline, and strong networks with the state, 
results in success. This observation leads to the conclusion that state features are 












Organizational, State, and International Influences on Policy, 
2006-2012 
 
In this chapter, I investigate the impact of organizational, state, and international 
characteristics on the outcomes of indigenous women’s efforts to influence policy.  The 
subsections below discuss findings of process tracing and historical analysis of 
indigenous women’s policy efforts regarding gasoline and food prices, the TIPNIS 
conflict, and land reform. Each policy illustrates some innovation in organizational 
features, including high amounts of human resource capital and women’s leadership in 
the movement. This analysis also illustrates newer forms of language and differences in 
demands made on the state and the corresponding high amounts of public support gained 
by the movements. The sections below consider the state’s role—especially 
neoliberalism’s decline and the openness of state structures—in whether policy 
succeeded or failed, and provide evidence that state features are critical influences on 
indigenous women’s policy outcomes. In addition, policy tracing includes the influence 
of international factors that might impact the outcome, and as hypothesized, international 
factors matter conditionally. They can contribute to positive outcomes in a favorable 
domestic environment and political opportunity structure. Table 6 presents the cases and 








Table 6:  Selected Cases and Coding 
Policy Outcome 
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Gasoline and Food Prices 
After indigenous women and the rest of civil society had won the war against gas 
privatization in the early 2000s, their ability to tackle government policy on other issues 
was illustrated well by the protests they led during the early months of 2011. Plans to end 
government subsidies on gasoline in the country had been announced and abandoned 
previously by the Morales administration, until the government unexpectedly acted to 
remove the subsidies in late December 2010 (Shahriari 2011). Bolivian consumer prices 
grew 1.76 percent from November to December 2010, the highest jump since May 2008 
(Shahriari 2011). Massive protests in response to the immediate hikes in food prices 
(including sugar, chicken, rice, and beef) sent the government scurrying to reinstate the 
gasoline subsidy. While this initial victory was hopeful, the price hikes continued to crisis 
levels, leading to further and wider protest. Eventually, the government signed an 
agreement to quiet the unrest, but this time the compromise, a minimum wage increase, 
would not improve the situation faced by indigenous women. The government also failed 
to respond adequately to the resulting food shortages and price increases, which most 
affected indigenous women. Therefore, the outcome of these protests was mixed; it 
counts as a success in that the government rescinded its decision to cut subsidies, and it 
counts as failure in that the government did not respond to alleviate the rising food prices 
for indigenous women. 
Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement  
The number of indigenous women participants in protest has been coded as high, 
women’s leadership is high and networks are coded as strong, resulting in a coding of 
moderate human capital resources. In one protest alone, Los Tiempos estimated that 
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eighty percent of the protesters were “peasant” women (Los Tiempos 2011b). Gas and 
staple food items soared in price, and the production of food decreased by 35% from 
earlier seasons, despite government attempts to control prices by prohibiting exportation 
of food products (Vreeken 2011). According to news reports, organizations’ attempts to 
get government attention on the issue continued until at least August (ANF 2011), with 
protesters demanding that the government instate price controls to alleviate the suffering 
of the poor communities (La Jornada 2011; ANF 2011). While initial efforts to influence 
subsidization policy were successful, demands that the government alleviate the food 
crisis went largely unmet.  Indigenous women were aligned with informal sector vendors, 
teachers, laborers, and transport drivers to press their claims against the rising costs of 
feeding families (Alcoreza 2011; ANF 2011; Los Tiempos 2011). These alliances with 
other sectors were evidence of the broad appeal of indigenous women’s activism that at 
least initially increased the amount of human capital resources available to them.    
In May 2012, the government reached agreements with unions over salary 
increases that were initially demanded because of increases in the daily cost of buying 
food (ANF 2012). In this instance, the issue of gas shifted into opportunities for other 
sectors to make demands of the government, and before the food crisis could be solved in 
favor of indigenous women and neighborhood associations, the Centro Obrero Boliviano 
(Center for Bolivian Workers) had seized upon the opportunity to shift public attention to 
the situation facing workers. While concessions to workers, including teachers, police, 
and medical workers, were made (including a salary increase across the board), few 
tangible concessions were given to indigenous women who had mobilized in reaction to 
the government’s decision to end gas subsidies. The concessions made to increase 
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salaries only affect workers in the formal economy, which constitutes a small part of the 
overall economy. In the early 2000s, the estimated size of the informal economy in 
Bolivia was among the largest in the region, accounting for 67.1% of the Gross National 
Product of 1999/2000 (Schneider 2002: 12). The World Bank (2004) reports that about 
84% of the indigenous population and 67% of the non-indigenous population are 
informally employed (World Bank 2002). In addition, over 60% of indigenous women 
are informally employed, compared to less than 40% of indigenous men, 40% of non-
indigenous women, and 28% of non-indigenous men (World Bank 2009:13). Thus, many 
indigenous women would not benefit from wage increases. 
Human capital resources are coded for this period as very high, considering the 
broad networks in support of indigenous women as well as their impressive leadership on 
the issue. The mixed outcome due to indigenous women’s efforts on the problem of gas 
and food subsidies reveals that high amounts of human capital resources, including those 
gained from broad networks, do not, as hypothesized, clearly lead to policy influence for 
indigenous women. The evidence from this case does not support the hypothesis that 
indigenous women’s efforts will succeed when their needs are placed at the front of the 
agenda d. While women were able to advance their claims from within their own 
organizations and with their own voice, their ability to lead on the issue was still not 
productive in terms of creating a solution to the problem they confronted. Perhaps 
counter-intuitive to the expectations of the role of strong networks and wide-ranging 
support, indigenous women’s efforts were used to further the goals of other 
organizations, while their own demands went largely unmet. This represents a potential 
risk to organizing for broader issues in the hopes to advance indigenous women’s claims; 
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ultimately their voices may be lost in future protest cycles or in negotiations with the 
government.  
Organizational Characteristics: Frames of the Movement 
 Indigenous women’s frames of activism on the issue of gas and food subsidies 
were very much aligned with their roles as indigenous women, reflecting not only 
gendered, but also ethnic, language in their framing of issues. For example, Adriana 
Salamanca, president of the Female Civic Committee in Cochabamba, stated, 
“…(indigenous women) in Cochabamba now we are treating the theme of the family 
basket because we are the most affected by the administration of the home economy” 
(ANF 2011). Corina Ramírez of the Bartolina Sisa stated, “As women, we are going to 
rise up because we are passing crisis. For this reason, we have entered into a state of 
emergency” (ANF 2011).  
Indigenous women acknowledged their relationship to the situation at hand and 
found their relevance and their influence in this practical relationship. It is important to 
note that although indigenous women’s frames are related to their roles as indigenous 
women, the substance of their claims relates to issues that affect the entire country. Since 
indigenous women experience poverty most acutely and act as home administrators, they 
have a special knowledge of the needs and demands of the broader social sector. 
Although indigenous women related their roles as women to gas and food subsidies, they 
acknowledged the importance of the issue to the whole of society, and the framing of 
their activism effectively communicated this intent.  
Much like the story of the Gas War, gas and food subsidies constituted causes that 
generated concern within, and then activism from, a wide range of indigenous women’s 
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neighborhood associations and organizations, including Mujeres Creando, Bartolina Sisa 
and OMAK Mujeres (Organization of Aymaran Kollasuyo Women). Indigenous 
women’s mobilization regarding the gasoline subsidy cuts occurred because of crises in 
basic nutrition, an arena of life that indigenous women are more likely to feel first, and 
most acutely, during times of scarcity or price hikes (Bennett et al 2005; Godoy 2004).  
Indigenous women’s frames have been coded as containing ethnic and gendered 
language combined with broad sector frames during this period. My hypothesis that the 
language of participation influences indigenous women’s policy success –particularly the 
expectation that broader frames would be more likely to succeed—gains little support 
from the evidence presented here. Indigenous women’s mobilization was not particularly 
ethnic-centric, although their claims to legitimacy stemmed from their experiences as 
indigenous women. But the framing of the issue was one of broader community interests, 
as were the actual demands put forth by indigenous women. This strategy met with initial 
success but ultimate disappointment. Analyzing a case of failure points out that while the 
language of activism and human capital resources are quite important facets of 
indigenous women’s policy efforts, they do not capture the entire puzzle of what leads to 
social movement success.  
State Characteristics: State Structural Opportunities/Reforms 
The 2009 elections resulted in a profound victory for Evo Morales and the MAS 
(Movement Toward Socialism), which produced an open political opportunity structure 
for indigenous women. The social movement of MAS put forth the first president to be 
re-elected in successive terms with more votes than in the first election. After 2009, MAS 
now controlled 25 out of 36 Senate Seats and 82 out of 130 seats in the House of 
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Deputies (Bolivia National Electoral Court 2010). This electoral victory solidified both 
the power of the left and the social movements that had supported MAS’s ascent during 
the 2005 elections. This was an impressive structural change in favor of social 
movements because the MAS government held onto important alliances with social 
movement organizations. These organizations included the Bartolina Sisa and indigenous 
and labor federations, such as the COB (Central Workers Union of Bolivia) and 
CSUTCB (Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) (Rockefeller 2007; Bueno and 
Datta 2011). But this structural change presented limitations. News reports and public 
statements by indigenous female activists indicate that the government’s decision to end 
gas subsidies had sparked opposition from a significant base of his support (BBC 2011), 
and this included indigenous women’s and neighborhood organizations. The state moved 
to end gasoline subsidies, thus raising the price of gasoline by close to 70 percent, in an 
effort to prevent gasoline smuggling to countries with higher prices and to bolster the 
Bolivian economy (Valdez 2011; Los Tiempos 2011; Martin 2011). According to 
Namecia Achacollo, the government’s rural development minister, food export controls 
had been adopted in order to prevent food being smuggled to countries “such as Peru” 
(Valdez 2007). While Bolivia produces most of its own food, the imports of corn and 
sugar during 2011 increased by 68% to compensate for the lack of domestic output. 
Floods and severe drought during 2010 created even more shortages and a 10 to 50 
percent increase in the cost of all foodstuffs (Valdez 2011; Van Auken 2011). These 
conditions continued to fuel protest against the government. The evidence that the state 
only conceded to a small, formally employed sector of society after an early 
reinstatement of the gas subsidy, is a somewhat surprising outcome given that indigenous 
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women had made a great deal of headway prior to this movement. Their advances were 
evident in the Constituent Assembly of 2009, and in the previous gas war. The political 
opportunity structure is coded as extremely open during the period of protest, making this 
outcome unexpected. In effect, indigenous women had made great strides in altering the 
political structure to their advantage, so that they faced an environment that should have 
been conducive to their claims.  
One possible contributor to the government’s action and non-action on the gas 
subsidy case is the small commitment symbolized by the minimum wage increase, which 
was decidedly lower than the overall demands of the population to curb food prices. In 
addition, Morales’ decision on eventually ending the subsidy has been publicly re-iterated 
(ANF 2011), indicating that despite the overall political openness to indigenous women’s 
claims, on this issue, the political opportunity structure is only partially open. Thus, the 
government’s over-riding commitment to budgetary soundness is the primary explanation 
for why indigenous women’s efforts achieved the moderate or mixed result. 
State Characteristics: Neoliberalism  
Neoliberal commitments have been coded as weak during the 2000s, especially 
after the period of Evo Morales’s election. The expectation that declining neoliberalism 
would be a positive factor for indigenous women’s success is not borne out by the 
outcomes associated with gas subsidies. The government of MAS and the election of 
Morales may have signaled an important shift in the commitment to neoliberal policies, 
but the ending of subsidies was a market solution to budget imbalances. This indicates 
the presence of a mixed economic strategy (Filho 2012). This means that a declining 
favor toward privatization as witnessed during the social upheaval over natural gas and 
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water is not necessarily associated with triumph over market problems in every situation. 
Evidence of this comes from the fact that, throughout the crisis, Morales apologized for 
the government’s abrupt move in eliminating the subsidy, but insisted that it had created 
a drain on the government that would have to be scrapped (ANF 2011). The initial 
response to rescind the gas subsidy decision was not enough to end massive and angry 
protests, two of which were powerful enough to have Morales removed from public 
appearances by his security forces (Van Auken 2011; Valdez 2011; BBC 2011). While 
the government discussed possibilities of using its food stockpiles to accommodate the 
shortage (Shahriari 2011), protests continued, with unions (represented by the COB) now 
demanding even greater action by the government: increases in salaries for state 
employees of 15%.  Protesters demanded price controls or increasing subsidized food 
provision  (La Jornada 2011; ANF 2011; Alcoreza 2011; ANF 2011; Los Tiempos 2011). 
Instead, the government reached a pre-agreement with the COB (Centro Obrero 
Boliviano or Central Bolivian Workers) in April to commit to an 11% increase in 
salaries, after which the workers agreed to suspend strikes and roadblock activities for 
twelve days (AFP 2011a). The public scuffle over wages, ultimately overshadowing the 
issues around food and gas, finally came to an end in January 2012 when Morales issued 
Supreme Decree 1213. The executive order increased the minimum national salary to 
close to U.S.$143, under an agreement with the COB (ANF 2012). As mentioned above, 
these moves were insufficient to address the crisis that had occurred for indigenous 
women, the group that originally led the social movement activity on the issue. The 
existence of minimal neoliberal commitments during the Morales administration did not 
signal the success of indigenous women’s policy efforts on the matter of gas and food 
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subsidies. Conceding to the smaller group of formal workers who constituted indigenous 
women’s network entailed less expense and effort from the government than conceding 
to indigenous women, neighborhood associations, and other popular groups in the nation. 
But this strategy is not unique to the neoliberal form of government, because all 
governments must make budgetary decisions, and the decision to cut gasoline subsidies 
was, according to the state, aimed at eliminating subsidies for the middle and upper class. 
This case indicates that declining neoliberalism and leftism are not enough to ensure 
indigenous women’s success in policy efforts. A government structure that has a 
commitment to other aims, regardless of the leftist ideological leaning, may create 
sufficient political closure to impede a movement’s goals. Therefore, political 
opportunity structures emerge again as important interaction terms with the variables 
investigated.  
International Forces  
The mobilization against gas subsidy cuts and food costs is portrayed in news 
reports as a domestic issue, but while the role of international influences seems muted, 
there are international subtexts to the need to raise gas prices in the first place. The role of 
international influences overall for this period is coded as supportive of indigenous 
women’s issues, but the details involved with gas subsidies reveal differences from the 
overall environment. As alluded to in the previous section, the smuggling of food and 
gasoline to neighboring countries such as Peru, Chile, and Brazil was a significant 
concern to Bolivian authorities (Harrington 2011; Rimero 2011). Unlike Venezuela, 
which heavily subsidizes gasoline but is an oil-rich country, Bolivia’s high subsidies 
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must be financed by other sources, such as their natural gas exports. In addition, the New 
York Times reported that, 
Energy analysts say the low domestic fuel prices in Bolivia have dissuaded 
foreign energy companies from drilling new oil wells and increasing production 
inside the country. Mr. Morales’ nationalist policies have also limited foreign 
investment in Bolivia’s natural gas industry, prompting neighboring countries like 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to seek new sources of fuel. This has deprived 
Bolivia of revenue and left Mr. Morales with little choice but to try to raise 
gasoline prices, a market-oriented move that his supporters immediately rejected. 
(Romero 2011) 
 
While the IMF33 and World Bank have not made removal of gas subsidies part of 
Bolivia’s loan conditionality, both lending institutions have made public their position 
that the practice of subsidizing gas in Bolivia and other developing economies constitutes 
a drain on resources that disproportionately benefits the upper classes (Croady et al 2010; 
IMF 2007; World Bank 2010). At the November 2010 G-20 summit, the International 
Energy Agency, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the 
World Bank argued that removing subsidies is a "triple win solution" that enhances 
energy security, reduces greenhouse gas emissions, and produces overall economic gains 
(Martin 2011; International Energy Agency et al 2010). The report from these 
proceedings agrees with other IMF and World Bank publications that well-designed rural 
electrification subsidies and better-targeted compensation packages for the poorest 
                                                
 
33 The IMF suspended new credits for Bolivia in 2006 (IMF 2012). 
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households are more suitable for protecting the most vulnerable from rising gas prices 
(International Energy Agency et al 2010; IMF 2007; World Bank 2010).  
International forces for this period are coded as highly supportive for indigenous 
women’s policy interests based on international support for indigenous issues and the 
ratification of international accords surrounding indigenous and women’s rights.  
However, the basic characterization of international forces on the issue of gas was 
unsupportive, or obstructive of indigenous women’s interests. While on its face, this 
seems to confirm the hypothesis that international forces may impede or contribute to 
indigenous women’s success, comparisons with other cases reveal the flaw with this 
assumption. The case of the Gas War was one where indigenous women first encountered 
international opposition and an unfavorable political structure, but they overcame these 
conditions. Thus, the existence of international opposition, which was by all accounts 
lower than it had been during the Gas War, is unlikely to be a major reason for the 
decision to remove or reinstate gas subsidies. 
Gas Subsidies Summary 
 The initial success and later failure for indigenous women’s claims during the gas 
subsidies protests is a surprising mixed outcome, given that similar organizational, state, 
and international characteristics provided successful outcomes on similar issues during 
this period. But while resources are coded as high, including strong network ties, the 
existence of these networks made a remarkable difference by creating a range of 
preferences for the government to consider. The mixed outcome is likely due to the 
nature of the networks and the political opportunity structure regarding this issue. 
Important is that political opportunities are relatively closed in the case of gas and food 
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subsidies as a result of the government’s determination to accomplish other goals (in this 
case, budgeting). Finally, while international opposition aligns with a moderate outcome 
in this case, the actual weakness of international influence on Bolivia gives reason to 
doubt that it makes a substantial impact on the outcome. 
Land Reform Revisited 
The reforms made to the INRA since the election of Morales have signified 
victories for indigenous people and indigenous women, and INRA policy is coded as a 
successful case of policy influence. Indigenous women’s mobilization to demand gender 
equity in land distribution gained new momentum during the post-liberal period. 
Inequitable land titling for indigenous people as a community was still the operating 
norm, and despite previous reforms (including INRA), land inequality in Bolivia 
remained the most extreme in Latin America (CEDLA 2010). In addition, land titling for 
women was a focal point of indigenous women’s involvement during their supportive 
activism throughout Morales’ presidential campaign and during protests calling for a new 
constitutional assembly (Bueno and Datta 2011;Villarroel 2011). Morales began working 
on indigenous reform during his first year as president, producing Law 3545 in revision 
to Law 1751 (INRA). The law mandated redistribution of nearly 48 million acres and 
appropriation of illegally held or idle lands (Bolivia 2006). It also gave, 
guarantee and priority to the participation of women in the processes of clearing 
and distribution of lands. In case of marriage and free conjugal unions or titles 
executed will be emitted in favor of both conjugees or cohabitating partners that 
work the land, consigning the name of the women in the first place. Equal 
treatment will be offered in other cases of joint-ownership between men and 
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women who work the land, independently of their marital status. (Bolivia 2006: 
Final Disposition 8)34 
Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement 
Indigenous women’s resources are coded as very high for the case of land reform, 
reflecting large numbers, strong networks, and high amounts of women’s leadership in 
the movement. While there was initial success for the demands for gender equality in 
land titling, indigenous women’s movements argued that there was need for more 
extensive reform to address the difficulty women faced in acquiring property titles. A 
web release from Ukhamawa Noticias (2009) revealed that 60 organizations, including 
governmental, non-governmental, and local, supported and sent delegates to the National 
Meeting for the Access of Women to Land, which met on October 30, 2009. In their 
press release, the combined activist groups argued that: 
56 years after the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Degree, and 13 years after 
the INRA law, our right to access to land is not guaranteed. In the period 1997 to 
2006, out of 29,063 titles issued, only 4,973 were done for women. That is to say, 
that only 17 of every 100 titles that were issued were for women. (Ukhamawa 
Noticias 2009: 2)35 
  
In addition, indigenous women called upon the state to honor the constitution’s 
protections against discrimination, the state’s adoption of CEDAW (Conference to End 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), and to make the political decisions and 
                                                
 
34Ssee also Köppen 2008; Jordán 2010, and Fundación Tierra (2010).   
35 This data is corroborated by information released by Fundación Tierra (2010)  
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create administrative and technical methods that would guarantee their right to access and 
the titling of land. They further acknowledged that these goals required indigenous 
community and village organizations to eliminate practices that limit rights of women to 
land (Fundación Tierra 2010; Ukhamawa Noticias: 2).  
Human capital resources, including networks and women’s leadership, have been 
categorized as very high during this period. But while broader networks were an 
important feature of the movements discussed in this chapter, the resources of networks 
for land reform remained quite rooted within indigenous organizations and the 
indigenous movement. While these were powerful organizations, the networks with 
broader sectors of society were not a major resource from which indigenous women drew 
during the demonstrations to pass reforms to agricultural law. But while indigenous 
networks might have signified “weak” networks during the 1990s, these networks now 
have strong relationships to the government, and these relationships emerge as important 
resources for indigenous movements in themselves. The massive involvement of 
indigenous women’s organization Bartolina Sisa and the lower tropical indigenous 
groups over the land issue (represented under the umbrella organization CIDOB or 
Indigenous Confederation of Bolivia) provides support for the hypothesis that large 
amounts of human capital resources increase indigenous women’s chances of influencing 
policy. The case of land reform also provides an encouraging piece of evidence that 
indigenous women’s leadership and networks are important human capital resources.  
Organizational Characteristics: Frames of the Movement  
Indigenous women’s frames of the land issue were mostly gendered and ethnic. 
During the National Meeting for the Access of Women to Land, rural women interviewed 
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by Inter-Press service complained that, in practice, laws and declarations, including the 
recent revision to INRA in 2006, were largely ignored in male-dominated sectors of rural 
communities. They also referenced the habits of governmental institutions to put up a 
host of excuses to evade compliance with land titling regulations. In addition, in the 
Andean highlands in western Bolivia, where the population is largely indigenous, 
requests by single women to own land individually were rejected by their communities, 
further disadvantaging women who were not married (Chavez 2009; Jordán 2010). 
UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) investigator Verónica Navia 
reveals that in addition to concerns that land is still not being equitably distributed, in the 
lower eastern lands, the legal aspect of giving indigenous women land titles has not 
overridden the culture and customs that persist in obstructing women’s access to the land. 
“The access for women to land is almost zero” (Navia 2010). Although these 
impediments still exist to women’s ownership of land, by 2008, Evo Morales’ 
government had distributed over 10,000 land titles to indigenous women, more than any 
of the previous governments (Amazonia.bo 2008; Chavez 2009). Indigenous women’s 
groups, international NGOs and domestic organizations, also implemented programs tot 
assist women in the quest of attaining land titles in their name (Bartolina Sisa 2011; 
UNIFEM 2011). 
While gender remains forcefully on their agenda, indigenous women also 
maintained pressure on governments to make additional changes to INRA that benefitted 
the entire indigenous community. Also, as Navia (2010) states,  
In some lowland communities where they have lands, it is insufficient. For 
example, in the community Sotos La Vertiente there are thirty families in one 
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community, and communal property is only one hundred and four hectares, and 
that leaves only approximately three hectares per family. (Navia 2010) 
Therefore, the gendered problem of land titling continues alongside a general scarcity of 
land titles for certain groups.  
During field research conducted in June 2011, I was present during plans by 
indigenous women at a Bartolina Sisa meeting to organize a march to pressure the 
government to make additional changes to the INRA (Ley 1715), including establishing 
new firms dedicated to fertilizer production, seed bank provision, communal 
commercialization support, and support for farming mechanization. These items were 
integrated into Ley INRA in June 2011 (ABI 2011). When questioned about the 
perceived benefits of the protest marches and proposals made to the government, a couple 
of informants from within the group indicated two major factors. First, the early 2011 
hike in food pricing had clearly necessitated their action on food security in Bolivia. 
Second, the relationship between agriculture and the people who worked the land was 
going through a much-needed change in the country. While the “cities” (especially La 
Paz), produced the important monetary business of the country, they also experienced a 
strong dependence upon the countryside for basic foodstuffs. During the food revolts of 
2011, indigenous women had already maintained that their own experiences as 
indigenous women authorized them to speak on the real issues and demands made on the 
government. The basic food insecurity encountered in 2011, they argued, was a result of 
ethnic and gender discrimination in land ownership. As producers of agriculture, and thus 
important providers to the country and the economy, they argued that they should be 
given land to work that would increase their economic opportunities while solving the 
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domestic food crisis (Buice 2011). The ability to press for further changes to the statutes 
for the improvement of their community communicates their involvement and leadership 
on more than specified, gendered dimensions. Much of their involvement in the 2000s 
highlights this new role within social movements and the government itself. Indigenous 
women’s frames surrounding agriculture reform contained ethnic, gendered frames, and 
were associated with successful outcomes. This finding contradicts the hypothesis that 
broader frames and claims would be necessary for a marginalized female group to gain 
significant influence.  
State Characteristics: State Structural Opportunity/ Reforms 
  A vitally important structural factor affecting indigenous women’s success in land 
reform issues is the unique relationship between the Morales government and the MAS 
social movement, which is comprised of mainly indigenous social movement 
organizations. Analysts point out contradictions between the MAS as a social movement 
and a “state actor” (Mayorga 2008:6).36 MAS, which identifies itself as a social 
movement and not a political party, engages in decision-making within the governing 
apparatus and holds powerful positions in terms of influencing policy (Mayorga 2008:6). 
As Larson (2008) argues,  
Ultimately… the legitimacy of this government rests with the MAS’ broadest and 
most volatile constituency—the nation’s indigenous underclass, which makes up 
almost two-thirds of the nation’s population (and which correlates, almost exactly, 
                                                
 
36 Analysts have expressed concerns that a governing social movement may begin to lose 
its participatory, bottom-up organization in favor of the pattern of hierarchy and co-
optation that occurs in many populist parties (Mayorga 2008:6).  
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with that two-thirds of the population that lives below the poverty level). (Larson 
2008:9) 
 In addition, action by the state on land reform was inevitable given the fact that 
land reform goals resounded within the earlier movements regarding natural resources 
(water and gas). These had been keynotes of MAS’ political campaign during the 2006 
elections (Urioiste 2007:1). The evidence that state structure highly favored indigenous 
women on the issue of land reform supports the hypothesis that an open political 
opportunity structure is likely to lead to success.  
State Characteristics: Neoliberalism 
Weakening neoliberal commitments affected land reform in various ways. 
Specific to the reforms of 2006, two main principles stand out as anti-neoliberal. The first 
was the mandate that all new land grants must be under collective titling and that those 
communities that wish to have access to a given community territory must renounce their 
family property rights. The second was that the new reform made large landholdings 
illegal and provided for the state appropriation of “idle” lands. The attack on “idle” lands 
is actually directed at landholders who maintain properties upon which they draw a 
continual stream of credit: these speculation lands are now subject to appropriation by the 
state, which has, incidentally, along with the issue of nationalizing natural gas from the 
eastern region, fueled opposition coming from the landed elite (Urioiste 2007:5).  
Indigenous women had been denied land by government foot-dragging and elite 
opposition for many years. The new anti-neoliberal stance of the government meant that 
goals dismissed by previous governments could be re-articulated and accommodated. 
Mandating that property titles be either joint or in women’s names is an affirmative 
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action move that goes above and beyond the prohibitions against discrimination found in 
many bills (Education Reform and the Law of Popular Participation, for instance) during 
the 1990s. Aside from the economic implications, the move to make land more gender-
equitable falls in line with many other affirmative action moves by the Morales 
government, including his appointment of indigenous women to the Constituent 
Assembly’s committee, Pacto Unidad, and his appointment of indigenous women to his 
cabinet. Thus, the coding of weak neoliberal commitments coincides with a positive 
outcome for indigenous people on the issue of land reform, as hypothesized. 
International Influences  
International influences for the issue of land reform are coded as supportive. The 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples establishes that “states 
shall provide effective mechanisms for the prevention of, and redress for … any action 
which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources 
(United Nations 2008: Article 8, Section 2b). In addition, ILO 169 contains specific 
provisions regarding the rights of indigenous peoples to indigenous lands and territories, 
which were addressed by the legal changes in the 1990s regarding indigenous peoples. 
One measure includes the first passage of the INRA in 1996.  In addition to these 
agreements, indigenous women called upon the state to honor the signing of the CEDAW 
and prevent discrimination on land titling (Ukhamawa Noticias 2009: 2; Fundación 
Tierra 2010).37 As discussed in previous chapters, these commitments have been adopted 
into the legal code in Bolivia, representing an important inter-play between international 
                                                
 
37 This data is corroborated by information released by Fundación Tierra (2010)  
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and state structures on the issue. The international environment is supportive of the 
general idea of greater land distribution for indigenous people. However, in many ways, 
the continued pressure on the government to expand land titling to indigenous people 
remained a highly domestic issue, and movements directed complaints and demands to 
the national government. The issue also consisted mainly of domestic actors involved in 
the negotiations over amendments to the INRA. The overall international support for 
indigenous land rights between the INRA negotiations in 1995 and those in the 2000s 
changed little while land policy outcomes changed significantly. This is because state 
structures during the 1990s were less committed to gendered land distribution (or 
indigenous distribution at all), and were therefore less likely to incorporate international 
advice. This changed with MAS and Morales’ commitment to social justice. In addition, 
indigenous people’s movements have used these agreements to attempt to force their 
governments to honor the norms and standards established by adopting these statutes into 
law. Therefore, international agreements have some indirect effect on mobilization and 
policy outcomes. Therefore, the hypothesis that international forces are important for 
policy outcomes is qualified to include the importance of political opportunity structures 
and other variables in conjunction with international variables. It could be said that 
international influences matter when the right domestic structures fall into place. 
Land Reform Summary 
 Of the cases studied in this dissertation, indigenous women’s most significant 
accomplishment is the revisions made to the INRA in 2006, after Morales’ election. 
Women’s land ownership is a subject that once placed them at odds with their state and 
their communities. In the 1990s, this conflict was enough to effectively silence the 
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gendered ramifications of land tenure in Bolivia. But the open political opportunity 
structure that came with new connections to the state and ongoing international support 
aided the renewed mobilization effort of indigenous women. This effort displayed an 
emerging leadership of women in addition to impressive state connections. Therefore, the 
connections between organizational and state resources are vital components of the 
success of land reform in the 2000s.  
The TIPNIS Conflict 
The struggles of indigenous people in the National Park and Indigenous TCO 
Isiboro-Secure (hereafter referred to as TIPNIS) provides an interesting test of the 
hypotheses about the role of organizational, state, and international characteristics on a 
social movement’s ability to influence policy. The TIPNIS region covers around 1.1 
million hectares in the foot of the Andes Mountains and reaches to the Bolivian Amazon. 
TIPNIS is located in the center of the country in the departments of Cochabamba and 
Beni. Residing in this territory are indigenous Yuracaré, Chimaàn and Mojeño, a group of 
communities totaling around 90,000 people (Farell 2012). Plans to build a highway 
through the territories initiated in 2003 during Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s second term 
in office. Mobilization on the issue among men and women from the three different 
ancestral groups occupying the TIPNIS region began in 2006. Objections intensified in 
2010 when Evo Morales promulgated Law 005, which approved the protocol of financing 
the highway between Brazil and Bolivia. This took place after the granting of the land 
titles in the TIPNIS region after the 2009 changes to land reform (Echazú 2011; Saucedo 
2012; L. Press 2012). Indigenous protesters argued against the plans on two major 
constitutional grounds: Article 30, guaranteeing indigenous rights to be consulted on state 
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decisions regarding their territories, and Article 347, which promotes the mitigation of 
environmental damage (Farell 2011). Two laws have since been passed regarding the 
TIPNIS territory, the first a law that halted construction on and protected the territory 
(Law 180) and, two months later, a law which referred the matter of consultation on the 
highway to referendum (Law 222). Today, plans for the highway are in progress, as the 
consultation referendum returned a vote in favor of consulting the indigenous groups 
before construction began. The plans supposedly hinged on whether or not a majority of 
indigenous groups approved of the highway plans, in accordance with constitutional 
consultation rights. Indigenous activists were opposed to this measure, as they felt the 
government would manipulate the consultation process. The results of the consultation 
results are seemingly in favor of the TIPNIS highway, as the government claims that 47 
out of 48 of the groups consulted have signed on to the highway construction. Yet, 
TIPNIS activists state that 52 communities reject both the road and the consultation 
process, leaving the outcome hotly disputed (Achtenberg 2012a). On October 6, 2012, 
Morales signed a contract for the first segment of the highway, claiming that the process 
has properly observed constitutional indigenous rights (Achtenberg 2012, 2012a). This 
outcome results in a failure for indigenous women’s goals for the TIPNIS region. 
Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement 
Indigenous women’s resources during the TIPNIS movement were impressive in 
numbers and indigenous women’s leadership in the movement, but possessed weak 
networking ties, thus the level of their overall resources was moderate. The failure of the 
TIPNIS case represents the final discussion of policies targeted by indigenous women in 
the post-liberal, Evo Morales era. Indigenous women from the lowland areas of Bolivia 
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have been paramount figures in the conflict over highway construction plans for the 
TIPNIS (Achtenberg 2012; Terrazas 2012; Erbol  2012b). While the larger Andean and 
Quechua groups in Latin America have been most visible in protests throughout most of 
Bolivia’s history, the emergence of smaller indigenous groups seeking a change in their 
political fortunes presented a new challenge for ethnic rights in the region. 
The largest of numerous protests, marches, and demonstrations were the VIII and 
IX Marches of the Indigenous, both taking place between August 2011 and April 2012. 
According to news reports, around 400 indigenous women representing 34 villages in the 
east, Chaco, and the Amazon, began marching in August 2011 with the elderly, children, 
and pregnant family members included in the procession (Saucedo 2012; L. Press 2012; 
FFLA 2011). Between April and June 2012, at least 1000 marchers, the majority of them 
women, led another march from the lowlands to La Paz, this time with over 300 children 
accompanying family members (Achtenberg 2012; Chavez 2012a).  Both marches were 
highly publicized in national and international media. While this was a positive factor for 
the coverage of activists’ issues, it also brought criticisms from NGOs like UNICEF and 
government ministries who feared health risks due to the exposure of children to the 
harsh Bolivian winter (Achtenberg 2012; Achtenberg 2012b).  
While large numbers of marchers were a strong resource for indigenous women, 
several events created significant impediments to the efficient mobilization of resources 
in the indigenous movement on the TIPNIS conflict. First, in 2011, the Organization of 
American States agreed to mediate a discussion over the conflict, and convened a meeting 
with cocaleros, commercial interests, and municipal authorities, but excluded the sub-
central TIPNIS groups, which were the most vocal in opposing highway construction on 
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cultural and ecological grounds (Echazú 2011). This exclusion prompted further protest, 
and exposed various divisions within the indigenous movement as a whole. Also, at the 
end of December of 2011 the Indigenous Council of the South (CONISUR), representing 
some TIPNIS communities, marched in favor of the highway’s construction, as they 
argued it would help provide the benefits of development, including easier access to 
healthcare and education (L. Press 2012). Divisions between indigenous women’s 
organizations are also apparent from news reports that include both statements of support 
and opposition about Morales on the TIPNIS issue from such organizations (El Deber 
2012; GARA 2012; Achtenberg 2012b; Mujeres Creando 2012; ANF 2012b; Achtenberg 
2012). This tension was enough to rattle residents of Caranav, a MAS stronghold, when 
the IX March of the Indigenous, led by women, passed through, narrowly avoiding 
violent confrontation (El Deber 2012; Achtenberg 2012b). Protesters again avoided 
clashes as the TIPNIS activists made their way into La Paz on June 28, 2012, with pro-
Morales Aymara protesters occupying the streets several blocks away (Chavez 2012b). 
The fragmentation of the networking potential for indigenous women in the TIPNIS case 
aligns with my hypothesis that high amounts of human capital resources in networking 
with other social movements would be beneficial to their efforts. The absence of cohesion 
on the TIPNIS issue resulted in weak network ties for the movement and harmed their 
ability to reach a favorable resolution on this issue,  
The mobilization of women has, as identified, been an important force in the 
TIPNIS movement, and some nationally recognized women have attained leadership 
positions within the conflict.  Among these leaders are former drug smuggler Bertha 
Bejarano (her followers are called “the Berthas”) and María Galindo of Mujeres Creando 
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(Achtenberg 2012). Galindo accused the Morales government of committing the same 
crimes against protesters as seen during the 1990s cocalera attacks on women 
(Achtenberg 2012), making an explicit connection to the cocalera struggles to end 
eradication, which were led by Morales himself. She also pointed out in August 2012 that 
out of the forty-five TIPNIS authorities supporting the road’s construction, none were 
women (Achtenberg 2012). However, as one social commentator observes, TIPNIS 
women appear to be major protagonist in the struggle,  
but they have little power within their respective popular movements and are 
largely relegated to traditional roles (such as childcare and cooking on the TIPNIS 
march), which legitimize the patriarchal social structure. Rather than articulating 
their own demands, women are exploited by male leaders to advance their 
political agendas. (Achtenberg 2012) 
Therefore, while indigenous women used impressive amounts of human capital resources 
to press for the TIPNIS cause, it is likely that these narrow spaces for women’s leadership 
have stunted the movement’s ability to achieve the policy outcome they desire, bringing 
down the value of the numbers of women engaged in protests. In addition, while 
indigenous women have gained support from other groups in society, they have not even 
managed to solidify networks within other indigenous organizations, which remain 
divided. Together, the lacking leadership of women and the narrowness of their networks 
indicate a coding of moderate human capital resources, which deviates from the overall 
coding of the resources variables during this period. This evidence supports the 




Organizational Characteristics: Frames of the Movement 
To press their demands regarding the TIPNIS highway construction, indigenous 
women relied upon gendered and ethnic frames. Indigenous women’s participation in the 
fight for the TIPNIS territory has been well documented in news sources, with indigenous 
women citing environmental and cultural concerns that affect their roles as women. They 
also are vocal about what they view as an opaque plan of Morales to construct the 
highway for the easier transportation of coca (Friedman-Rudovsky 2012; Lijeròn 2011). 
The concern about Morales’ “coca highway” project is reinforced by the fact that the 
Federal Treasury will fund a $32 million contract awarded to EBC, a state-owned 
contractor, and AMVI, a community enterprise owned by three cocalero union 
federations (Achtenberg 2012a). 
 Responding to criticisms regarding the possible health effects to children in the 
marches, María Galindo of Mujeres Creando defends their participation as a cultural and 
gendered issue, arguing, “asking women not to bring their babies (to protests) is like 
asking them not to participate in social struggles” (Achtenberg 2012). Mariana Guasania, 
the Secretary of Gender for the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia 
(CIDOB), argues, “the reality of indigenous women in eastern Bolivia is distinct because 
we live and feel the defense of our habitat and the natural resources that sustain our 
families” (Erbol 2012). These statements in response to social criticism allowed 
indigenous activists the opportunity to educate the public about the relationship between 
their cultural beliefs and the political goals they possessed (Achtenberg 2012; Erbol 
2012). The presence of children in marches drove home the idea that women’s opposition 
to the highway was related to the wellbeing of generations, and that their protection of the 
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land was a responsibility that had been culturally bestowed upon them. Indigenous 
women’s attempts to halt the highway construction represent the use of both indigenous 
and women-specific frames. The advance and retreat of the government and social 
movements at different times on this issue brings up the question of whether or not the 
TIPNIS conflict failed because it pertained to an indigenous minority (unlike the quite 
populous Andean Quechua and Aymara). Also, unlike the cases of gas nationalization, 
TIPNIS activism did not contain sufficiently broad-reaching claims. Therefore, the issue 
of the TIPNIS and its ultimate failure may reveal much about whether or not ethnic-
specific claims of smaller, non-dominant indigenous groups are able to influence policy.  
Indirect evidence of the impact of indigenous women’s marches and organization 
is evident in Morales’ jesting acknowledgment of indigenous women’s activism in a 
meeting with a group of young male cocaleros of Cochabamba in early 2012. During this 
meeting, he joked that the men should seduce the young women activists so that they 
would accept the construction of the highway (Erbol 2012). The comment evoked an 
immediate feminist and indigenous backlash (though in this instance one can barely tell 
the difference between them) against the display of disdain and trivialization of 
indigenous women’s efforts. Indigenous women retaliated in protests and news releases 
that claimed that Evo was “machista,” “disrespectful,” and “patriarchal” (Erbol 2012; 
Mujeres Creando 2012). The emergence of indigenous female criticism of the Morales 
regime from a feminist standpoint reveals how the dynamics of ethnicity and gender can 
be extremely paradoxical. A president who passed legislation to ensure equal land access 
to women, and later a law to protect women from political violence, became a symbol of 
the problem of under-valuing women’s contributions and patronizing their efforts. 
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Indigenous women’s increasing resort to feminist arguments is an interesting feature of 
social movement organization in Bolivia, where indigenous women remain quite 
conservative. The frames of indigenous women have been coded as ethnic and gendered. 
In this case, the adoption of gendered frames along with the community claims of 
indigenous women has, in this case, had little impact on their ability to influence policy.  
State Characteristics: Structural Opportunities/Reforms 
While the overall coding of structural opportunities for this period have been 
coded as very open, indigenous women from the TIPNIS region faced a structure that 
was not open to their demands. Morales first addressed the demands of the TIPNIS 
mobilizations by passing a law protecting the territory in October 2011 (Los Tiempos 
2011c; L. Press 2012). While the law temporarily halted the construction of the highway, 
the government sought ways to circumvent the TIPNIS protests and continue building. In 
February 2012, Morales passed Law 222 for Consultation with the Inhabitants of the 
TIPNIS, and in July 2012, he announced a constitutional referendum on the plans for 
highway construction through the territory (l. Press 2012). Several members of the 
TIPNIS region rejected this referendum and the already-initiated consultation with 
consenting communities (Melendres 2012; L. Press 2012; Bolivia Weekly 2012).  
Government minister of Public Works, Vladmir Sánchez, announced that the 
referendum on whether or not to continue plans in the TIPNIS region would proceed 
according to the rules of “concertation,” which he distinguished from “consensus,” in that 
plans to work toward the involvement of all the affected communities would be executed, 
but that,  
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Consensus means that of 100%, if there is one person not in agreement, it cannot 
be made. This is not the concept of the constitution of the state. From the 29th of 
July to the 3rd of September, the government executed the consultation between 
communities that wanted to be consulted, between 19 communities in the 
colonized zone of Isiboro Sécure, and which are affiliated with the cocalero 
federations of Chapare. (Melendres 2012) 
 
Under this method of consultation, the communities that abstained from participation in 
the process would be forced to “respect the participation of the communities that have 
decided to go forward with the process” (Melendres 2012). In another article, Morales is 
quoted as stating, “whether they wanted it or not,” the highway would be built (Osorio 
2011).  
The president further rejected the complaints of Amazon indigenous communities, 
pointing out that “some demonstrations are understandable. It is our obligation to listen to 
[demands], we are listening, but some [demands] seem [more like] ambitions, whims, and 
worst of all, [the demands] are being used by opposing groups” (L. Press 2012).  
Indigenous female activists continue to publish materials and make public 
announcements about the allegation that 32 out of 69 of the TIPNIS communities 
represented in the dispute had not had their voices heard during the alleged consultation 
process undertaken by the government, meaning that prior consultation had, again, failed 
(CIDOB 2012b). While the government insists that it had consulted 48 out of the 69 
communities and that 47 had approved the highway, the TIPNIS leaders dispute the 
 
 202 
results and cite their own surveys showing that 52 communities reject the road and the 
consultation (Actenberg 2012b).  
In September 2011, news reports depict a violent clash between police and 
protesters, with police firing on and detaining women along with their children (Alejo 
2012; CIDOB 2012; Reuters 2011). Responsibility for the brutal reaction by police was 
placed on indigenous women for an event the previous day, wherein Foreign Minister 
David Choquehuanca was forced to lead indigenous women marchers through a police 
barricade set up to impede their progress to La Paz. The minister filed charges of 
kidnapping against 6 of the indigenous female activists, which were subsequently 
dropped for lack of evidence. In September of 2012, La Razon and CIDOB both report on 
an investigation opened by the executive branch to determine where the orders for the 
violent activities of police in September 2011 had originated. Morales is quoted as saying 
that the National Police acted unilaterally, and that the executive branch did not order the 
brutal repression of indigenous rebellion (Alejo 2012; CIDOB 2012).  This investigation 
is another reaction by the government to appease the lowland groups after the XIX 
Indigenous March encountered intense police and citizen opposition. However, 
repressive reprisals by police forces have occurred as recently as July of 2012 in La Paz 
(Corz 2012). While the overall state political opportunity structure is coded as very open, 
the state’s structural opportunities for indigenous people have largely been closed to the 
TIPNIS women. The Bolivian government is determined to proceed with the highway, in 
spite of a great deal of opposition from people who supported the president’s rise to 
power. Thus, the state of affairs of the TIPNIS conflict, at this point in time, supports the 
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hypothesis that closed political opportunity structures will impede indigenous women’s 
policy success. 
International Characteristics 
The international environment is highly supportive of indigenous women’s issues 
regarding the TIPNIS conflict, based on principles outlined in various international 
accords. While news reports of the land issue reference mainly domestic targets for 
mobilization, the TIPNIS activists invoke both domestic and international agreements to 
support their claims that their guaranteed rights by the 2009 constitution were denied. 
They have argued,  
The failure to do prior consultation violates international agreements ratified by 
Bolivia such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and International Labor Organization Convention 169. (Kenner 2011) 
The TIPNIS movement’s resort to invoking international law reflects the fact that 
international accords have a bearing on the issue of the TIPNIS activists’ claims.  
International forces are coded as, in general, supportive of indigenous women’s 
issues, but aside from the unsuccessful attempt at mediation by the Organization of 
American States in 2011, international forces respected Bolivia’s internal conflict on the 
TIPNIS issue. Therefore, while the appeals to the ILO and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples have been made, the issue of highway construction through 







 The outcome of failure on the TIPNIS issue reflects a number of interacting 
variables, especially networks and state political opportunity structures. With moderate 
amounts of human capital resources due to weak networks, indigenous women were 
unable to influence policy in the direction they desired. The use of gendered, ethnic 
claims is also associated in this case with indigenous women’s failure. In addition, state 
political opportunity structures, while very open during this period, were closed to 
TIPNIS women’s goals. Successful cases in this chapter highlight the role of networks 
within the government, combined with an open political opportunity structure, as 
important contributors of success. Conversely, indigenous women in the TIPNIS conflict 
show a lack of government connections through networks and political opportunity 
structures. Finally, international forces are found to be supportive, but unable to push 
indigenous women’s issues at the domestic level.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
Organizational Characteristics: Resources and Frames 
The policies in this chapter reveal a number of important considerations and 
potential generalizations about the way different social movement variables interact in 
policymaking for indigenous women. The cases of failure and mixed outcomes (TIPNIS 
and gas subsidies) involve different values on several resource variables. The TIPNIS 
activists experienced human capital limitations like fragmentation from other indigenous 
groups, in spite of mobilization of impressive numbers of participants in protests and the 
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leadership of women. 38 The case of gas and food subsidies suffered from impediments in 
organizational networking, which hindered their success, while land reform illustrates the 
importance of strong networking ties with government and high presence of women in 
leadership positions. 
The use of gendered and ethnic frames in the TIPNIS case aligns with the 
hypothesis that such frames would be less associated with success than broad and non-
gendered frames. However, this finding does not hold given the successful outcome on 
land reform, where indigenous women used similar frames. The mixed outcome 
associated with the gas subsidies protests is surprising based on the hypotheses that broad 
frames, high amounts of women leading in the movement, and networks with other 
organizations would increase chances of success. Gender and ethnic-specific frames for 
land reform were successful, contrary to the framing hypotheses. In addition, the TIPNIS 
conflict expressed indigenous and gendered frames, while the gas subsidy issue contained 
gendered, indigenous and broad-sector frames. Both of these attempts resulted in failures 
for the movement. Rather than indicating that the frames of movements are not 
important, this fact indicates that different frames gain support, encourage collective 
action, and influence policy outcomes in ways not captured by the hypotheses. Movement 
frames do not always have to be judged worthy because the movement favors all citizens; 
perhaps public support occurs in these cases because the movement goals are deemed 
just. 
 
                                                
 
38 Although at least one observer sees indigenous women’s leadership mainly as an 




State Characteristics: Neoliberalism and State Structural Opportunities  
The effects of declining and minimal neoliberal commitment are called into 
question based on the evidence in the cases in this chapter. For instance, the TIPNIS 
conflict, under a declining neoliberal model, might be expected to resolve in favor of the 
disadvantaged group opposing development plans, but this has not occurred. The land 
reform issue supports the idea that weak neoliberalism increases indigenous women’s 
chances for policy success. However, the existence of neoliberal vestiges in the 
government may have contributed to the neglect of indigenous women’s concerns in the 
gasoline and food subsidy issue. Yet, the overall expectation would have been that 
minimal neoliberal influence would contribute to a successful outcome; political 
opportunity structures explain why the outcome was mixed instead of successful. 
 Regarding the effects of state structural reforms and opportunity openings that 
might aid indigenous women, the analysis produces strong conclusions. On the one hand, 
state structural closings or only partial openings determined the failure of TIPNIS and a 
mixed outcome for subsidy protesters. Very open political opportunity structures coincide 
with strong movement resources to produce success. The overall conclusion from these 
data points indicates a very strong correspondence with expectations of the political 
opportunity structure hypothesis. 
International Influences 
The role of international forces varies along with outcomes of policies in this 
chapter. Like the Gas War, land reform illustrates how international opposition or support 
must accompany favorable state structures to matter to the outcomes for indigenous 
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women. Women were unable to get land reform passed under earlier, less favorable 
opportunity structures, with the same type of international support. A similar finding is 
that when outcomes do not match international intent, as with the TIPNIS case of failed 
support, state structures and the government’s stance on the issue primarily determined 
the outcome. For the gas and food subsidies issue, vague international opposition does 
not seem to have mattered as much as networks, political opportunities and state goals. 
These findings confirm the expectation that international influences may matter, but only 
in combination with the right state conditions.  
Conclusions 
  The varied outcomes and differences on the independent variables within these 
cases indicate that there are reasons to look closely at the constellation of organizational, 
state, and international components that fuel success for indigenous women. Networks 
matter to policy efforts, and have both positive and negative consequences. In addition, 
while gendered, indigenous and ethnic frames are hypothesized to be less likely to 
succeed than those that represent the broader sector of society, they meet with success in 
the 2000s land reform. Therefore, the gendered or ethnic nature of activist framing seems 
to be relatively unimportant for policy outcomes. Finally, the fact that state structures 
matter grants possible insight into when we might expect indigenous women to be 
successful in other Latin American countries. The existence of a leftist leadership and the 
decline of neoliberal influence are important determinants of indigenous women’s 
specific outcomes, but matter most when the political opportunity structure is open. 
 This chapter has summarized the findings that relate to indigenous women’s 
protest and outcomes on policy in the 2000s. The next chapter makes more focused 
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comparisons between the policies discussed in the previous chapter, and those discussed 
in this chapter, attempting to determine what lessons can be learned from the changes in 








































Organizational, State, and International Influences, an Overview of the Past 
Two Decades 
 
This chapter addresses the outcomes generalized across time periods in order to 
assess which variables and their combinations influence indigenous women’s policy 
outcomes. These three particular time periods, and especially comparisons between the 
neoliberal and post-liberal period, give significant analytical leverage over the research 
question because of the changing values in independent variables. The general coding for 
the neoliberal period included moderate human capital resources, broad, non-gendered 
frames, partially open opportunity structures, and supportive international influences. For 
the case of education reform and the INRA, these characteristics produced mixed 
outcomes. Deviations from the overall coding in resources result in one success 
(Domestic Violence), and deviations from international support and political opportunity 
structure result in failure (coca). The intermediate period between these two periods 
(approximately between 2000 and 2005) exhibits declining neoliberal commitments, high 
human capital resources, broad, ethnic, and gendered frames, closed political opportunity 
structures, and international opposition. These variables resulted in two failures for the 
Gas War. During the 2000s, the general coding included very high human capital 
resources, broad, ethnic, and gendered frames, very open state opportunity structures, and 
overall supportive international influences. These circumstances produced two successful 
cases, the final gas nationalization victory and gendered land reform success. Gas 
subsidies resulted in a mixed outcome, and deviated from the overall coding in political 
opportunity structure and organizational resources. The failed case (TIPNIS conflict) 
occurs when the political opportunity structure and resources deviate from the overall 
 
 210 
coding of the period. The combined lessons from these cases indicate that political 
opportunity structure impacts the final outcome and interacts with other variables to 
increase their impacts as well. Overall, the outcomes associated with indigenous women 
in the post-liberal period were more favorable than the outcomes of the neoliberal period 
and transition period, despite the fact that the post-liberal period seems only marginally 
more successful. Indigenous women were able to achieve gender parity goals in many of 
their endeavors during the latter period. In addition, the magnitude of the issues in the 
2000s can be said to be greater because they were hard cases due to their challenge of the 
neoliberal design. The scope of indigenous women’s activism was also greater in the 
post-liberal period compared to the neoliberal period, with women mobilizing on behalf 
of Bolivia as often as for indigenous women’s specific needs. I hypothesized that 
organizational characteristics, state characteristics, and international influences would 
impact indigenous women’s success in policy. The following discussion relates to how 
these features have varied over time and what their outcomes indicate for the hypotheses 
in question.  
Organizational Resources 
 Table 7 illustrates the ordinal rankings/coding of human capital resources along 







Table 7: Human Capital Resources 
                                               IV Score                     DV score 
Neoliberal Period 
Coca                       Moderate (1)      1 
INRA            Moderate (1)      2  
Education Reform           Moderate (1)      2 
Domestic Violence   High   (2)         3  
 
Transition Period  
  Natural Gas (T1)                      High (2)                                  1 
  Natural Gas (T2)                      High (2)                                  1 
 
Post-liberal Period 
Natural Gas (T3)          Very High (3)        3 
Land Reform           Very High (3)      3 
Gas Subsidies               High (2)      2 
TIPNIS                High (2)      1 
  
 Moderate amounts of overall resources (1), high amounts in numbers (2), very high amounts in numbers 
(3) 
*Resources scores are based on average coding of 3 indicators: numbers in participation, women’s 
leadership, and networks within organizations 














The resources scores on each case reveal several major conclusions. First, when 
resources are moderate, the outcomes are associated with, at best, mixed outcomes, and at 
worst, failure. In addition, when resources are high, the outcomes are associated with 
three failures, one success, and one mixed outcome. This indicates that resources by 
themselves are not enough to guarantee success. However, according to these cases, the 
only way to achieve full success is with the deployment of high or very high human 
capital resources. Important is that success happens when these levels of resources 
combine with partially or very open political opportunity structures. The only full 
successes were the final phase of the Gas War, the domestic violence law, and land 
reform, two of these occurring after the election of Evo Morales. While looking at the 
values of human capital resources alone helps understand the value of this variable, 
looking at them across time periods reveals that success is achieved more often when 
human resources are coded as very high. The Gas War, protests over gas subsidies, the 
INRA (2006), and the domestic violence law provide good examples of high to very high 
human capital resource mobilization. Numbers of participants are important to these 
cases, but networks stand out as important variables. While scores of indigenous women 
were present to conduct protests, demonstrations, roadblocks, and strikes, they also 
attracted a large number of people from networks within society that would assist them in 
achieving their goals. For example, during the Gas War, teachers, landless, poor people, 
miners, cocaleros, laborers, parts of the middle class, and finally, the president, 
comprised the networking resources available to indigenous women in their struggles. 
Indigenous women’s networks consisted of mainly indigenous organizations in recent 
attempts to influence the INRA, seemingly indicating weak networks. However, their 
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human capital resources were magnified by a deepening relationship within the state, 
making them more likely to succeed.   
Four cases fall into the categories of moderate human capital resources due to 
networking troubles or the existence of narrow, ethnic-centered networks. The result of 
fewer networking resources is ultimately a lower amount of human capital resources 
altogether, and this situation applies to coca eradication policy failure and mixed 
outcomes in education and agricultural reform. In the case of coca eradication, 
indigenous women lacked strong and broad ties with non-indigenous social movements. 
This negative outcome aligns with the hypothesis that networking is a vital human 
resource that contributes to policy success. The outcomes of education and agriculture 
reform as moderate also reveal that the best-case scenario of weak networking is a 
moderate or mixed outcome. Additional illustrations of the role of networks are found in 
the outcomes of the gas subsidies and TIPNIS cases, where high resources in numbers 
were deployed, but networking troubles lowered the value of these resources. Networks 
overwhelmed indigenous women’s efforts in the gas subsidies case, and were 
insufficiently tied to the government and other social movements in the TIPNIS case. The 
gas and food subsidies case is important because it introduces a nuanced understanding of 
networks. The literature on resources indicates that networks are usually important 
additive resources for social movements (Lucero 2008; Rousseau 2011; Klandermans 
1984; Gordon and Jasper 1996, Snow, et al 1986; Diani and McAdam 2003; 




The situation relating to low women’s leadership in education reform, coca 
policy, and INRA of the 1990s may have important lessons for indigenous women’s 
success. While the failure of coca reform is explained by a number of other factors aside 
from the leadership of women, the failure of education reform and the INRA of the 1990s 
to intentionally and effectively address indigenous women’s marginalization is related to 
their low levels leadership within the indigenous movement. These outcomes contrast 
with the INRA demands of the 2000s, where a new leadership of indigenous women 
successfully pursued changes in the law that assured female land ownership and access. 
This guarantee was one they had been unable to accomplish in the 1995-96 mobilizations 
about land reform.  
Women’s roles in passing the domestic violence law in 1995 were the exception 
to moderate resources in the neoliberal period. This instance revealed the possibilities of 
indigenous women’s pursuit of gendered policy when removed from the indigenous 
setting that reinforces the notion of community over gendered demands. Indigenous 
women were vibrant participants in the domestic violence law protests, but they were by 
no means the only social movements engaged in the effort. Middle class women’s 
organizations and indigenous women’s organizations in various parts of the country 
emerged together to defend the rights of women.  
The differences in types of organization in which women find leadership are 
important. For example, TIPNIS female leaders operate within mixed-gender 
organizations, while indigenous women’s involvement during the Gas War and the gas 
subsidies protests was primarily within neighborhood associations. The latter are women-
dominated groups, where the leadership is based on traditionally female roles of 
 
 215 
conducting the labor of needs provision to families and communities. The TIPNIS 
organizations have female leaders, and indigenous women and their families have 
constituted a large number of protesters and marchers, but critics still note the 
marginalized status of indigenous women who are primarily given traditional female 
roles to play in the movement. Looking at the INRA and education reform in the 1990s, 
when women lacked leadership and still achieved favorable outcomes for the community, 
it is not clear that the TIPNIS conflict fails simply due to this dynamic of women’s roles 
within organizations. However, as the issue of the INRA in the post-liberal period 
illustrates, the change in leadership roles between the periods may promote women’s 
interests more acutely and successfully.  
The fact that several failures used high human resources brings attention to the 
necessity of looking to other factors in conjunction with organizational resources to 
explain social movement success. Political opportunity structure is the most relevant. The 
failures in TIPNIS, the Gas War, and mixed outcomes in cases of gas and food 
subsidization illustrate that closed political opportunity structures can neutralize the force 
of high and very high amounts of social movement resources.  
The first hypothesis of this research is that high amounts of social movement 
resources would increase indigenous women’s chances of success. The outcomes related 
to organizational resources indicate that high amounts of human capital resources, 
especially leadership of women and networks, are necessary but insufficient for achieving 
success in policy matters.  Looking closely at the cases of success, where women used 
high amounts of resources to their benefit, they also confronted partially or very open 
political opportunity structures.  
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The cases in this dissertation reveal that higher amounts of resources are more 
commonly found during the post-liberal period than in the neoliberal period and the 
interim period. When combined with favorable political opportunity structures, high and 
very high amounts of resources help women succeed in their goals. This research 
corroborates the resource mobilization viewpoints (McCarthy and Zald 1977; 
Klandermans 1984) by finding that resources are an important component of social 
movement research, but also justifies arguments by some critics of resource mobilization 
(for example, Brysk 2000) that resources present an incomplete picture of the causes and 
consequences of activist mobilization. 
Organizational Frames 
Table 8 presents the nominal rankings of frames divided by time period, along 
























Table 8: Movement Frames 
                            
                                                     IV Score  DV score 
Neoliberal Period 
  Coca         BNG              1 
  INRA       BNG                          2 
  Ed Reform       BNG                                    2 
  Domestic Violence      BG               3 
 
Transition Period  
  Natural Gas (T1)                      EGB                                     1 
  Natural Gas (T2)                      EGB                                     1 
 
Post-Liberal Period 
  Natural Gas      EGB          3 
  Land Reform      EG    3    
  Gas Subsidies     EGB    2 
  TIPNIS      EG    1 
   
H2: Broad, non-gendered frames (BNG); ethnic, gendered frames (EG); ethnic, broad, gendered frames 
(EBG/mixed); Broad, gendered frames (BG) 















Comparison of the frames in the cases during the 1990s illustrates that non-
gendered, broad frames correlate with failure and mixed outcomes. But ethnic, gendered, 
and broad frames are also associated with successful and failed outcomes in the post-
liberal period. Ethnic, gendered frames in the post-liberal period, along with broad and 
gendered frames during the 1990s, are also associated with success and failure. All of the 
absolute successes involve gendered frames. Out of the three cases of success, two used 
ethnic and gendered frames; one used broad and gendered frames. This research 
concludes that organizational frames may lead to different outcomes, depending on the 
organizational and structural context of the issue.  
The transition and post-liberal period presents a time period where indigenous 
women mobilized about issues specific to indigenous women in addition to their concerns 
for the community. Indigenous women were visible, and made claims to the government 
based on their needs as indigenous women in these instances. In the case of the INRA 
and the Gas War, their efforts were successful once the political opportunity structure 
changed with Evo Morales’ election. In the case of the Gas War, gas subsidies, the INRA 
and the TIPNIS conflicts, gendered claims were combined with rhetoric and framing that 
presented the issue to the public as an indigenous women’s issue. In addition to gendered, 
and ethnic frames, in the cases of the Gas War, gas subsidies, and domestic violence, 
broad sector concerns were also integrated into their frames. Indigenous women defended 
the stakes of labor, neighborhoods, miners, and other parts of society in their activism. 
The only case of indigenous women’s activism that issued gendered, and non-ethnic or 
broad claims was domestic violence, which was a successful case of mobilization in the 
1990s. The cases of the INRA (1996), education reform, and coca are examples of non-
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gendered, broad “campesino” framing. The outcomes associated with these policies 
indicate that, with the INRA and education reform, indigenous claims mixed with broad 
public framing was at least a somewhat acceptable formula. However, the same formula 
met with failure in the case of coca. This indicates the importance of other parts of the 
environment in affecting the success of social movement activities. These outcomes 
indicate that, contrary to my hypothesis about the role of frames, indigenous women can 
promote their ethnic and gendered issues simultaneously and succeed. This fact is also 
evidenced through the second INRA outcome and the Gas War. However, the case of the 
TIPNIS conflict and gas subsidies indicate that indigenous female frames are not 
guarantees of success. Other important elements come into play in creating success, 
especially state-specific features that may not be captured by the assessment of 
organizational frames.  
 To generalize from the evidence presented here on frames, these cases reveal that 
there is good reason to deconstruct the language used in a movement and the public 
reaction to that language. There is significant evidence that frames have evolved 
significantly since the neoliberal period, when the use of ethnic and gendered language 
was minimal. This understanding leads to a firmer grasp of the cultural issues 
surrounding indigenous women’s activism. However, the extent to which this language 
influences policy outcomes is highly contextualized, and the outcome of similar frames 
ultimately depends on the issue and other organizational and state variables. Whereas my 
reading of the language of social movement frames led me to hypothesize that gendered 
and ethnic claims and frames would not be as successful as broad claims, deeper 
investigation into each case revealed a much more nuanced story than my original 
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hypothesis assumed. For one thing, ethnic and broad claims often occur together, and 
more rarely, with gendered claims included. For another thing, it seems that indigenous 
issues, when framed broadly, as “peasants,” did not fare any better (in fact, they fared 
worse) than indigenous issues that used an “indigenous/native” repertoire. Studying 
frames of indigenous women’s movements reveals the importance of the interaction of 
the variables under study, especially political opportunity structure. Scholarship on 
frames and cognitive/cultural approaches has testified to the importance of language to 
the emergence and maintenance of social movements (Snow et al 2004; Davies 1999; 
Gamson 1992; Carroll and Ratner 1992; Caniglia and Carmin 2005), and I test these 
theories in the area of policy influence of social movements. An important nuance to 
studying the cultural/cognitive or framing approach is suggested here, wherein 
indigenous women’s frames are seen as having an indirect role in influencing policy, 
especially through interacting with other variables. This conclusion is also in line with the 
suggestions of other scholars to integrate the cultural and structural approaches for a 
more complete vision of social movement outcomes.  
 Political Opportunity Structure  
Table 9 presents the ordinal rankings of the political opportunity structure across 
the two time periods, along with scores on the dependent variable, as a summary of the 







H3: Closed POS (1); Partially Open POS (2); Very Open POS (3) 













Table 9: State Political Opportunity Structure  
                                                    IV Scores          DV Score 
Neoliberal Period 
Coca     Closed (1)               1 
INRA              Partially Open (2)   2  
Education Reform  Partially Open (2)    2 
Domestic Violence  Partially Open (2)         3 
 
Transition Period  
  Natural Gas (T1)                      Closed (1)                                        1 
  Natural Gas (T2)                      Closed (1)                                        1 
 
Post-Liberal Period 
Natural Gas     Very Open (3)              3 
Land Reform    Very Open (3)     3  
Gas subsidies                         Partially Open (2)   2 




Comparison of the political opportunity structures between time periods indicates 
that partially open political opportunity structures are associated with mixed outcomes 
(INRA, education reform) and success in the cases of domestic violence during the 
neoliberal period. Closed political opportunity structures contributed to failed coca 
protests during this same period. In the “transition period” roughly between 2000-2005, 
closed political opportunity structures resulted in failure for the first two phases of 
indigenous women’s involvement in the Gas War. During the post-liberal period, 
extremely open political opportunity structures are associated with a somewhat more 
positive set of outcomes: natural gas and the 2000s land reform are successes. However, 
the TIPNIS and gas subsidies experienced failed and mixed outcomes, due to partially 
open or closed political opportunity structures with respect to these issues. The post-
liberal period witnesses two full successes, whereas the neoliberal period experiences 
only one full success. Between and throughout time periods, openness of political 
opportunity structure is highly correlated with successful outcomes for indigenous 
women. There is also a correlation between very open political opportunity structures 
combined with very high amounts of human capital resources—specifically the resources 
associated with networking strength—and favorable policy outcomes. Therefore, the 
cases of land reform in the 2000s and gas nationalization in the same period show that 
strong networks and very open political opportunity structures are conducive to success. 
Conversely, very open political opportunity structures combined with weak networking 
ties, or network failure, as exhibited in the case of the TIPNIS and gas subsidies, result in 
mixed or failed outcomes. Finally, the chances of success under partially open political 
opportunity structures increase with strong networks, as indicated by indigenous 
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women’s successful outcome on the domestic violence law during the 1990s.The 
hypothesis that state political opportunity structures are elemental to social movement 
successes obtains strong support from the evidence analyzed in this research. However, it 
also indicates that other variables should viewed in conjunction with state opportunity to 
understand policy outcomes for indigenous women.  
 The coding of the TIPNIS conflict and gas subsidies deviate from the overall time 
period coding of state political opportunities. Even though these movements faced the 
Morales government, with its numerous commitments to indigenous people and social 
movements, the gas and food subsidies and TIPNIS case present mixed and failed cases, 
respectively. This contrasts with the case of the INRA in 2006, during which changes to 
land reform laws in favor of indigenous women were associated with a very open 
political opportunity structure. This difference is due to competing goals, both between 
different social movements and between social movements and the government. For the 
gas subsidies case, clashing objectives between the poor and budget-sensitive 
government officials hampered success. In the case of TIPNIS, the Morales government 
favors the highway construction for economic and political motives over indigenous 
support. As mentioned previously, state opportunities may need to be investigated more 
thoroughly in light of the networks of social movements making demands.   
The issue of ethnicity should also be unpacked when it relates to the TIPNIS and 
the political opportunity structure. While there is an overall positive relationship between 
indigenous people and Evo Morales, the less populous groups in Bolivia have, since the 
1990s, teetered from time to time in support of the leader, citing, among other things, 
allegations of his involvement in possible narcotics trafficking (El Diario 1995w22; 
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Friedman-Rudovsky 2012). The involvement between the executive branch and social 
movements since the campaign and election of Evo Morales has been unprecedented, but 
his reaction against the TIPNIS demands were not reflective of the loyalty expected out 
of an indigenous president.  Taking a more cynical view of the matter, it could be said 
that the less influential indigenous groups may face the old political opportunity structure 
formerly facing the newly empowered Aymara and Quechua indigenous.  
In general, the comparison between the three time periods reveals the crucial role 
played by political opportunity structure in influencing outcomes. This fact is illustrated 
through more favorable outcomes under post-liberal structural openings and through the 
fact that political opportunities increase the impact of other variables like networks and 
international influences (discussed below). The cases in this research therefore provide 
strong evidence in favor of the political opportunity perspective (Tilly 1989; Tarrow 
1998). The findings are also consistent with other work on indigenous movements in 
Latin America that has identified political opportunity structures as having significant 
influence over social movement outcomes (Albó 1991, 1994, 2002; Gustafson 2002, 
Lucero 2003; Pallares 1999; Van Cott 2000 Yashar 2005; Zamosc 1994; Lucero 2008). 
Neoliberal Commitment 
Table 10 below presents the ordinal rakings of neoliberal influences over the three 
time periods along with the outcomes on the dependent variable as a summary of the 






Table 10: Neoliberal Commitment 
 
        IV Scores         DV Scores 
Neoliberal Period 
 Coca                    Strong (3)    1 
  INRA                             Strong (3)    2 
  Ed Reform                      Strong (3)                          2 
  Domestic Violence                 Strong (3)    3 
  
Transition Period  
  Natural Gas (T1)                       Declining (2)                                  1 
  Natural Gas (T2)                       Declining (2)                                  1 
 
Post-Liberal Period 
 Natural Gas                        Weak (1)              3 
  Land Reform                            Weak (1)              3 
  Gas Subsidies      Weak (1)              2     
  TIPNIS       Weak (1)              1 
 
H3b: Weak Neoliberal influence (1); Declining Neoliberal influence (2); Strong Neoliberal Influence (3) 














Two out of the three most successful cases occurred under weak neoliberal 
influences. In the 1990s, strong neoliberal commitments were associated with two mixed, 
one success and one failed outcome. In the interim period, declining neoliberal 
commitments were associated with two failed outcomes on gas nationalization. During 
the 2000s, weak neoliberal commitments were associated with one failure, one mixed 
outcome, and two successes, which seems to indicate that weak neoliberal influences 
affect indigenous women’s success rates positively. This observation is called into 
sharper relief when we consider that the unimpressive outcomes of cases in the 1990s 
were less in contradiction of neoliberal policies than they became in the 2000s. Thus, the 
seemingly surprising rates of success in the 1990s under neoliberal governments is 
overstated even by the rare occurrence of success in the domestic violence law, which, it 
should be pointed out, does not contradict neoliberal goals. The presence of two 
successes in the 2000s is much more impressive than it seems precisely because of the 
ability to challenge neoliberal commitments. 
 I hypothesized that neoliberal influence would be associated with less favorable 
outcomes for indigenous women’s policy efforts. The evidence provided from the cases 
exhibiting strong neoliberal influence, however, requires a more nuanced understanding 
of the role of economic policy on indigenous women’s outcomes. The assumed tendency 
of neoliberal governments to ignore indigenous justice is not a given feature, viewed from 
the perspective that Sanchez de Lozada integrated indigenous demands into policies. 
Succeeding governments (including Sanchez de Lozada’s own second term) 
demonstrated the dismissive air most ordinarily associated with neoliberal policies. While 
the first Sanchez de Lozada administration’s policies for indigenous peoples in the 1990s 
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were arguably political, co-optative attempts to avoid an indigenous rebellion like the 
Zapatista uprising or Sendero Luminoso, the few concessions made to indigenous people 
during this time were largely considered victories for the indigenous movement as a 
whole. These outcomes are especially evident in education reform, the INRA of the 
1990s, and the domestic violence law. In the case of the efforts to influence the 
government’s decision to eradicate coca plants, the failure of indigenous women to 
succeed was likely unrelated to the neoliberal slant of the government. Instead, it was a 
reflection of international pressures and the political opportunity structure facing them on 
this particular issue.  
Having qualified the period of neoliberalism as one that does not necessarily 
impede the success of indigenous women’s policy efforts, it is useful to note that the most 
impressive gains for indigenous communities and for indigenous women occurred under 
a government exhibiting weak neoliberal commitment. These cases include the INRA in 
2006, which not only increased the pace of land titling to all indigenous people but also 
made the titling provisions for indigenous territories gender egalitarian. This measure 
resulted in more favorable outcomes for indigenous women’s property ownership. Still, it 
is important to note that these outcomes are still in the preliminary phases and that 
indigenous women, particularly those of the lowland regions still express discontent with 
the process of securing women’s equal access and rights to land. However, even a 
provisional outcome for women in indigenous land titling is a sign of progress. In the 
1990s, indigenous women were unable to bring the issue of women’s titling to the 
national indigenous federations, much less directly to the state. While this fact indicates 
the importance of the nature of the political opportunity structure, it also indicates that the 
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issues with distributing land to indigenous people and to women are more easily resolved 
within a more leftist economic framework. The same can be said of the Gas War, as 
proven in the final phase emphasized in the past two chapters. Previous scuffles between 
social movements and neoliberal governments had managed to produce enough strife to 
send President Sanchez de Lozada into exile, but not enough to guarantee that 
intermediate governments would submit to indigenous demands. Neoliberal scores were 
continually strong until around 2005, when social movements ousted Carlos Mesa and 
campaigned for Evo Morales. The success in the Gas War coincides with a sharp break 
with neoliberal commitment, as evidenced by the president’s first initiatives involving 
indigenous people (land reform) and the nationalization of revenues from natural gas.  
However, the cases of the TIPNIS conflict and the gasoline subsidies protests are 
at first, surprising exceptions. Although neoliberal influence was weak, the TIPNIS 
territorial dispute still engages the issue of indigenous land rights and whether or not the 
quest for economic development39 through the construction of a highway overrides the 
environmental and cultural concerns of ancestral groups living there. This seems to be an 
odd choice for a country whose priority has been increasing autonomy and supporting 
indigenous people and leading an environmental revolution. However, if the quest for 
economic development through more stable trade routes is a sincere motive behind the 
highway’s construction plans, Evo Morales faces an economic concern common to all 
                                                
 
39	  It is relevant to note that opponents to the highway’s construction accuse Evo Morales 
of attempting to construct a “coca highway,” since the proposed route travels between the 
coca-growing Cochabamba region through the eastern part of the country to Brazil 




countries. Regardless of the level of neoliberal commitment, countries grapple with how 
to promote economic development. These failures, in light of low neoliberal 
commitment, also illustrate the importance of political opportunity structures, which were 
closed for the case of TIPNIS, and partially open in the case of gas and food subsidies. 
The issue of gas subsidies represents another surprise because in this instance, as 
opposed to the TIPNIS case, the demands came from indigenous women who had been 
the staunchest supporters –namely Quechua and Aymara native women. The uprisings 
against gas subsidies were not easily resolved, even considering that government reacted 
within days of violent protests to reinstate gas subsidies. The elimination of this particular 
subsidy, as noted elsewhere, was more a measure to curb the benefits gained by the 
middle class and business than to harm the poor. In this case, however, the mixed 
outcome was likely not due to the neoliberal-style solution that eventually was abandoned 
(at least temporarily). The evidence seems to indicate that indigenous women’s demands 
for food price controls and assistance were not met because of conflicting goals of the 
political structure and overwhelming networks.  
Generally, the evidence supports the hypothesis that weak neoliberal 
commitments are associated with success for indigenous women. However, the evidence 
is not overwhelmingly conclusive when we consider that declining neoliberal 
commitments result in a range of policy outcomes. However, the ability to overcome 
neoliberal commitments during the latter phase, along with the period obtaining one more 
success than the earlier period, indicates that weak neoliberal commitments may 
contribute to the outcome for indigenous women. Thus, some evidence supports the quite 
common claim that neoliberal governments are detrimental to social movement aims in 
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Latin America (Nash 2005, Speed 2006, Kellogg 2005, Yashar 1999, Lavrin 1993, 
Bouvier 2009; Chong 2007; Eber and Kovic 2003; Gonzales and Kampwirth 2001; 
Langer 2003; Yashar 2005; Jacquette 2006; Deere 2001).  Leftist government and 
neoliberal weakening are positive factors for particular groups’ political goals, but this 
research indicates that they are neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve success. 
International Influences 
 Table 11 presents the scores of the variable of international influences across time 
periods along with the outcomes of the dependent variable as a summary of the findings 

















Table 11: International Influences 
 
               IV Score                            DV Score 
Neoliberal Period  
Coca            Obstructive (1)   1 
   INRA           Supportive (2)   2 
Ed Reform           Supportive (2)   2 
Domestic violence           Supportive (2)   3 
 
Transition Period  
  Natural Gas (T1)                 Obstructive (1)                          1 
  Natural Gas (T2)                 Obstructive (1)                          1 
 
Post-Liberal Period 
Natural Gas            Obstructive (1)              3 
Land Reform            Supportive (2)   3                   
Gas Subsidies           Obstructive (1)   2 
TIPNIS            Supportive (2)   1 
 
H4: Obstructive International Influences (1); Supportive International Influences (2) 















International influences have the most inconsistent coding of all of the variables 
investigated in this study. Where an overall environment of support for indigenous issues 
prevailed, sometimes opposition on a particular topic warranted a separate coding for a 
particular case. This was true for the cases of coca, natural gas and gas subsidies, which 
were opposed by international forces.  International opposition occurs along with failure 
of the Gas War in two phases, mixed outcomes of gas subsidies, and a failed coca policy 
effort in the 1990s. Finally, out of the mixed outcomes cases—the first INRA, education 
reform, and gas and food subsidies—gas subsidies were the only opposed movement. 
While coca and two gas nationalization protests faced international opposition and failed, 
the final phase of the Gas War succeeded in spite of international opposition. This 
evidence is too inconsistent to support the hypothesis that international opposition harms 
the policy outcomes indigenous women want. 
The story of international influence provides limited support for the inverse 
assumption of the international hypothesis, that international support increases chances of 
success. The best evidence for international support comes from the domestic violence 
law, which received strong support from abroad during the Beijing Women’s Conference. 
However, the outcomes of the INRA and education reform during the neoliberal period 
did not align with international support for affirmative action measures. International 
support has also had limited influence on the outcome of the TIPNIS conflict.  
The most impressive evidence for the importance of international opposition is 
found in the effect of international aid on coca policy in the 1990s, but that effect, too, 
has ceased to be an important contributor. The United States has ceased its aid to Bolivia 
in recent years, and coca eradication laws are being more favorably negotiated for 
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indigenous people. In October 2010, the Bolivian government annulled a law that cut the 
legal production of coca leaves by one third, after coca growers (many of them women) 
blocked the main road to La Paz from the Amazon region. The law was ultimately 
annulled because coca growers had not been consulted, and the government promised 
that future changes would be conducted under the rules of co-ordination and consensus 
with social movement organizations (Cabitza 2010). While this case is not treated in this 
dissertation for reasons of space, this outcome contrasts sharply with the 1990s outcomes 
on coca eradication when cocaleras faced international and state obstruction to their 
goals.  
Understanding the exact relationship between indigenous rights and international 
influences is an intricate process, since we must acknowledge that in some cases, 
international involvement, as in the case of coca and the Gas War, is the target and the 
reason for protest to begin with. Thus, international involvement in Bolivia’s affairs 
engages more than one level of the process of indigenous women’s attempt to change 
policy. Sometimes it incites protest, and it may, in the same case, continue to exist as an 
opposition to the goals of the movement, as in coca protests and the Gas War.  
Through close investigation of the policies in this dissertation it is possible to 
discern under what circumstances international influences are likely to have the greatest 
impact. For example, indigenous women’s attempt to influence outcomes on the INRA 
and education reform met with mixed results, not because international influences are 
unimportant contributors of success. The main reasons are other mitigating factors, 
especially organizational weakness, neoliberal tendencies behind reforms, and partial 
state structural openings that existed on these cases. Comparisons within the case of the 
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Gas War reveal the importance of state political opportunity structures and weak 
neoliberal influence.  The demands to nationalize gas reserves in the country were 
opposed by international forces, and while Mesa and Sanchez de Lozada held the 
presidency, indigenous demands were not met. The attempts to change policy would only 
be successful with the election of Evo Morales, whose election signaled an enormous 
shift in political opportunity structures as well as a dampening of neoliberal 
commitments. Comparisons between the case of gas nationalization and coca eradication 
reveal a similar conclusion. The closed political opportunity structure combined with 
international opposition to cocalera demands resulted in poor outcomes for indigenous 
women. However, international opposition was unable to override a very open political 
opportunity structure and declining neoliberalism to promote gas privatization. These 
findings indicate weaker influence than suggested by scholars of international social 
movements, who posit that international influences have a strong impact on outcomes 
(Brysk 2000, Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000, Rice and Van Cott 2006; Yashar 2005). While 
international factors are an important feature, an integrated approach provides a more 
thorough view of the additional variables conditioning indigenous women’s policy 
outcomes. 
Further Discussion and Conclusions 
A broader view of the cases reveals that combinations of certain variables are 
conducive to favorable policy outcomes for indigenous women. First, successful 
outcomes result from high to very high amounts of organizational resources, partially to 
very open political opportunity structures, and international support. This evidence is 
provided in the case of the domestic violence law, land reform, and the final phase of gas 
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nationalization. Cases of failure result from the combination of international opposition, 
moderate to high resources, and closed political opportunity structures, as seen in the case 
of coca and the first two cases of gas nationalization. The cases that resulted in mixed 
outcomes reveal partially open political opportunity structures, obstructive international 
influences, and moderate to high amounts of resources.  
Case study and process tracing analysis reveals that moderate and high amounts 
of resources interact with partially open political opportunity structures to produce mixed 
outcomes. Specifically, when networks and women’s leadership in the movement are 
absent, bringing down the overall value of human capital resources, they achieve, at best, 
moderate outcomes when confronting closings or partial openings in political opportunity 
structure. This is seen in the cases of the first INRA, education reform, and gas and food 
subsidy protests, where women’s leadership was lacking or where significant networking 
issues arose. One conclusion to draw from this evidence is that only high to very high 
resources—and especially leadership and networks—combined with partially to very 
open political opportunity structures produce complete success within this sample of 
cases. This demonstrates the importance of organizational resources as well as political 
opportunity structures, which I address more fully below. High amounts of resources by 
themselves are not able to overcome closed or lukewarm administrations, as the TIPNIS 
and gas subsidies cases reveal. But no case achieved success without high amounts of 
resources (domestic violence, land reform in 2006, and gas nationalization); therefore 
high and very high resources seem necessary but not sufficient to achieve policy success. 
The cases discussed in this research also reveal that opportunity structures are interactive 
because strong networks with the government contribute to achieving the “very high 
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resources” mark. This relationship is demonstrated in the cases of natural gas (final 
phase) and land reform (2006).  
Political opportunity structure is an important guiding variable to the outcomes in 
this research. While the other variables exhibit a range of outcomes for any given level, 
political opportunity structures do not. Political opportunity structures seem to never 
produce success or mixed outcomes when they are closed. Only partially or very open 
political opportunity structures have the potential, under all combinations of variables, to 
produce favorable policy outcomes. Moreover, partially open structures may produce 
success, but very open political opportunity structures seem to further ensure success, as 
indicated by the final phase of natural gas and the 2006 land reform. A partially or very 
open structure may thus be necessary, but not sufficient to produce success, given that 
partially open structures produce mixed outcomes. But very open structures coinciding 
with very high resources does seem to be sufficient to result in favorable policy for 
indigenous women.  
Neoliberalism is shown to be important, but it is not necessary, nor sufficient to 
produce favorable outcomes. Strong, declining, and weak neoliberal scores are all 
associated with failures, while strong and weak neoliberal scores are also associated with 
successes. In cases where neoliberal governments produced successful policy for 
indigenous women, they confronted partially or very open political opportunity structures 
and used high amounts of resources. However, where weak neoliberal governments 
confronted social movements with high amounts of resources, and closed political 




Finally, international support or opposition is another highly contextualized 
variable in this research. International support seems to be more influential in the 
neoliberal period, as support combines with partially open political opportunity structures 
and moderate resources to produce moderate or mixed outcomes. In addition, 
international opposition contributes to failure under closed or partially open political 
opportunity structures in the coca, transition-period natural gas, and TIPNIS cases. But 
looking outside of the cases of failure, international support coincides with a range of 
outcomes. International support correlates with mixed and failed outcomes (INRA and 
Education Reform moderate outcomes, TIPNIS failure) as often as does international 
obstruction (coca failure, natural gas failure, gas subsidies mixed outcome). Case study 
research reveals that international influence requires the presence of other variables like 
the political opportunity structure to register any impact on indigenous women’s policy 
outcomes. Table 12 illustrates the summarized independent and dependent variable 
scores across all cases. 
(Table 12 here) 
The preceding discussion placed the hypotheses under scrutiny in the context of 
changing variables over the different time periods. There is significant support for the 
hypothesis that high amounts of human capital resources increase indigenous women’s 
chances of success. The evidence also reveals a higher amount of human capital 
resources at indigenous women’s disposal during the post-liberal period than in the 
previous two periods, which partially explains the greater rate of success after 2006. 
Higher amounts of organizational resources are important influences, but state 
opportunity structures can either enhance organizational resources or result in lowering 
 
 238 
their effectiveness. Significant changes in frames accompany the changes between the 
neoliberal and post-liberal periods, with gendered and ethnic language becoming more 
prominent in the latter. There is limited to no support for the hypothesis that non-
gendered and broad or non-ethnic frames would be more strongly correlated with success 
than gendered and ethnic frames. All sorts of combinations of ethnic, broad, and 
gendered frames produce varied outcomes. This points to the fact that frames may be 
important, but that their impact on policy is conditioned very much by other factors, 
especially political opportunity structure.  
There is also strong support for the hypothesis that political opportunity structures 
influence indigenous women’s chances for success. Indigenous women experienced more 
significant success during the open political opportunity structure in the post-liberal 
period. State political opportunity structures are found to be very important alone and in 
conjunction with other variables like international influences and organizational 
resources. These interactions also point to the importance of specific contexts that reveal 
various causal pathways to the outcome of success. In all, very open political opportunity 
structures are highly correlated with success, while closed political opportunity structures 
are correlated with failure. Partially open political opportunity structures are correlated 
with mixed, failed, and successful outcomes. Although the post-liberal period contains 
the most permissive political opportunity structure in the three time periods investigated 
here, this does not serve the gas subsidies protesters, or the TIPNIS activists in the final 
outcome. These outcomes point to a closure in political structures to those proposals.  
Next, neoliberal commitments are shown to be conditionally important because 
indigenous women’s successes are more common when neoliberal commitments are 
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weak, and less common when they are strong. Finally, international influences viewed 
over the three time periods reveals little support for the hypothesis that international 
support/opposition would contribute to/impede indigenous women’s success. The main 
lesson from international forces and neoliberal commitments is that their influences must 
coincide with important state political features—like opportunity structure—to contribute 
to outcomes. This is made especially clear by the cases experiencing international 
opposition, which require closed political opportunity structures to work in obstructing 
indigenous women’s goals. The examples of this can be found in the ultimate outcome of 
the Gas War, where movement goals were aligned with state goals and thus were able to 
overcome international opposition.  
This chapter has presented an overview of the variables across the three time 
periods to reveal which variables, and combinations of variables, have contributed to 
indigenous women’s policy influence. The next concluding chapter summarizes the main 
findings of this dissertation and presents a discussion of the implications and further 











Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
Contributions and Implications 
 
      The research on indigenous women’s policy efforts in Bolivia concludes with 
several implications for the social movement theories addressed here. First, this study 
expands the literature on social movement resource mobilization by highlighting the 
nuanced relationship between material and logistic resource capabilities. Resources like 
high levels of female leadership in the movement and strong networks are proven to be as 
important, if not more so, than mere numbers in participation. This is evidenced through 
the fact that throughout the nineties, numbers of indigenous women were quite strong in 
activist movements. In later periods, networks and leadership emerged to support these 
numbers and led to greater success. Thus, this research somewhat justifies scholars’ 
expectation that expanded personal resources, professionalization of leadership 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977) and access to broader social networks (Klandermans 1984) 
matter greatly to social movements. In addition, strong ties within the government are 
essential tools that aid women’s outcomes, and we see this influence the Gas War’s final 
phase and land reform in 2006. However, the cases within this study also show that the 
resource of networking may have positive and negative effects, evidenced in the ultimate 
outcome of the gas subsidies case. The major findings of this research provide support for 
scholarship focusing on the role of networks as mainly positive resources (Powerll and 
Friedkin 1986; Gordon and Jasper 1996; Diani and McAdam 2003; Kalndermans 1993). 
However, some of the evidence found here also resonates with findings of scholars that 
identify negative potential for networks as well (Kitts 2000; Shentov 2003; Olzak and 
Uhrig 2001; Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Rojas and Heaney 2008). Different types of 
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networks have different consequences for social movements; they may promote success 
or they may inhibit it (Kitts 2000; Rojas and Heaney 2008). Networks may inhibit 
mobilization because of competition for resources and the draining, or “spill out,” of 
resources from one movement to the next when networks form (Rojas and Heaney 2008; 
Hadden and Tarrow 2007). To my knowledge, this drain of resources has not been 
investigated in terms of government policy output, which adds to the generalized 
knowledge about networking and its impact on social movements. Further, while scholars 
have identified negative potential impacts, the focus on competition for resources 
overlooks the role of government alliances, which this research identifies in the cases of 
land reform (2006) and the Gas War. More important, this research identifies the negative 
consequences of “anti-networking” in the TIPNIS conflict, which means that social 
movements had competing multiple claims that nullified TIPNIS networking potential. 
This same dynamic was also present to a lesser degree in the initial resistance of some 
indigenous groups to education reform, while other indigenous groups supported it. 
Overall, this research provides some evidence on when indigenous networks are 
potentially negative: too broad a network can create fragmentation in rewards and 
ultimate loss of voice for smaller groups, especially when multiple claims are being made 
in partially open political opportunity structures. 
The major findings of the research also affirm Brysk’s (2000) argument that 
resource mobilization has limited explanatory value. However, my study contradicts her 
findings that the limited power of the theory relates to the insufficiency of resources for 
this particular group, because indigenous women’s resources have greatly expanded. I 
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expected that resources would need to combine with other variables to be effective, and 
the analysis confirms this expectation.  
This study also applies frames in a new theoretical setting, extending it beyond 
explanations of social movement emergence. While I hypothesized that frames that 
garner broad support would be most beneficial to women’s policy outcomes, the findings 
do not support my assumptions. Focusing on broad, general, non-gendered frames did not 
aid indigenous women. Using campesino frames, they were less likely to gain support 
and government concession. As they began to express indigenous, native, and female 
identities, however, their standing in the movements and within the country changed 
dramatically, leading to more significant successes. The post-liberal period also shows 
that in other policies, indigenous women succeeded with ethnic and gendered frames 
combined with those representing the broader society. While it is hard to generalize from 
these broad findings, there seems to be an advantage to gendered and ethnic framing 
compared to non-ethnic and non-gendered framing. In addition, broad sector framing is 
also helpful.  The frames explored in this dissertation reveal an interesting display of 
characteristics found by various scholars to be important for providing diagnostic and 
prognostic solutions, and motivation for activism (Snow et al 2004; Gamson 1992; 
Carroll and Ratner 1992; Caniglia and Carmin 2005). Similarly, present here are 
characteristics that other scholars identified for their ability to inspire meaning and 
sympathy with potential supporters as well as potential participants (McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly 2001; Rousseau 2001; Caniglia and Carmin 2005). The exact impact the nature 
of this language had on actual policy outcomes, however, is not definitive, but it seems 
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that when activist language is more specific, it has better chances to gain public support 
and result in positive outcomes for indigenous women.  
The roles played by resources and frames were conditioned by accommodating 
state structures, and this study finds that state structural features play an inescapably 
strong role in the success social movements have in changing policy. Thus, like Jenkins 
and Klandermans (1995), I find evidence that success is largely contingent upon the 
political environment. As Tarrow (1983), Tilly (1978), Goodwin (1997), McAdam (1996) 
and others argue, various types of political opportunities prove to be important for 
indigenous women’s outcomes. Among these are the position of alignments within the 
system, the formal opening of opportunities within the state, alliances with other groups, 
and the state’s potential for repression. While this idea is intuitive in nature, indigenous 
women’s participation in unlikely successes sheds light on which state changes will 
accommodate social movements. This research supports the findings of indigenous social 
movement research that emphasizes the role of state structural opportunities in various 
types of outcomes (Albó 1991, 1994, 2002; Gustafson 2002; Lucero 2003; Pallares 1999; 
Van Cott 2000 Yashar 2005; Zamosc 1994; Lucero 2008). 
  Neoliberalism does not always guarantee failure for indigenous women. However, 
the cases of land and education reform illustrate that strong neoliberal commitments are 
only partially beneficial to indigenous women. Minimal neoliberal commitments by the 
governments are associated with a more successful period. These findings align with 
those of many scholars that treat neoliberalism as a variable in Latin American social 
movements (Langer 2003; Yashar 1999, 2005; Jacquette 2006; Deere 2001; Nash 2005, 
Speed 2006, Kellogg 2005; Lavrin 1993, Bouvier 2009; Chong 2007; Eber and Kovic 
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2003; Gonzales and Kampwirth 2001).  But it is worth noting that in “quantitative” terms, 
two successful, one mixed, and one failed case in the post-liberal period barely out 
perform the neoliberal period. However, the weight and scope of the issues, as I argued in 
Chapter 6, makes the successes in the post-liberal period qualitatively more impressive. 
This is due to the unexpected outcomes associated with gas nationalization and 
indigenous women’s specific issues in land reform. I find that weak neoliberal 
commitments do not ensure success, as evidenced with the outcomes of the TIPNIS 
conflict and the gas and food subsidies cases. To generalize across cases, neoliberal 
commitment plays a role in explaining final outcomes, but structural changes are 
necessary preconditions for success and failure. In addition, it bears noting that some 
policies are more likely to succeed under strong neoliberal commitment because of the 
nature of the demands in the policy. The varied degree of challenge to neoliberalism 
represented by the cases highlights that social movements face different political 
opportunity structures about different issues. These nuances leave room for further 
exploration on these variables. 
Finally, transnational literature on social movements gains mixed support from 
this study. While international indigenous movements, globalization forces (the IMF and 
World Bank), and geopolitical issues are interwoven into the substance of many issues 
that concern indigenous women, other factors must come into play before international 
forces prove to be highly influential on policy. This finding indicates a weak 
contradiction of the scholarship that indicates a somewhat stronger role of international 
support (Razavi 2009; Castillo 2006; Lind 2002; Brysk 2000; Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000; 
Rice and Van Cott 2006; Yashar 2005; Rousseau 2011; Hernández Castillo 2003; Sierra 
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2001, 2007; Kampwirth 2002, 2004; Speed et al 2006). The findings also somewhat 
contradict the expectations that globalization and like international forces can effectively 
harm indigenous women’s outcomes (Rakowski 1994; Oliveira and Roberts 1994). This 
study contributes to the ongoing literature on transnational movements by highlighting 
often overlooked facets of international relations in influencing domestic decisions, such 
as the role of illegal trade and geopolitical resentment (not U.S.-related). It also 
contributes to the international literature by stipulating that there are times when 
international influence is more effective than others.  
Comments on the Study and Directions for Future Research 
The strength of a case study approach to studying indigenous women is found in 
several factors: the abundance of qualitative information versus quantitative information, 
the ability to trace potential causes, and the appropriateness of case study materials for 
the depth of the research question being asked. The question driving this research –why 
indigenous women became more successful in the post-liberal period in Bolivia—
necessitates the sort of detailed analysis provided in this dissertation. This method 
enables the dissection of various influences on policy outcomes, and finds that 
international influences and organizational characteristics do not explain successful 
outcomes well by themselves. In addition, the insights into movement repertoires and 
accompanying changes in outcomes requires intensive qualitative understanding of the 
cultural and linguistic references found within indigenous women’s activism.  
Indigenous women’s experiences in Bolivia provide general lessons for 
indigenous and other minority movements in Latin America. Especially in terms of the 
minority status associated with indigenous people and the legacy of patriarchy affecting 
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women, Bolivia’s policies and indigenous women’s lives reflect common circumstances 
in Latin America. Bolivian outcomes have relevance for Peruvian, Chilean, and 
Ecuadorian indigenous movements, due to cultural similarities between Andean countries 
and similar policy areas of activism. There, indigenous women are also engaged in broad 
and ethnic-centered movements regarding the protection of natural resources and native 
autonomy. For example, protests over water privatization have raised the question of 
consultation rights in Peru, where the executive has vetoed congressional moves to grant 
indigenous groups rights to weigh in on agreements with foreign investors (US Water 
News Online 2009; Reuters 2009). Other countries have seen campaigns by indigenous 
women to include constitutional provisions or other legislation to improve access to 
sanitary drinking water emerge, including Colombia (Martinez 2007) and Ecuador (Ortiz 
2010). These movements should consider whether the strategies employed by indigenous 
women in Bolivia over the Gas Wars and land reform have application in their own 
political environments.  
The importance of the role of leadership of women has significant lessons for 
marginalized groups of women everywhere, and may even apply to other marginalized 
groups within mixed-group movements. Gendered (or minority) leadership is especially 
relevant to indigenous women in other states of Latin America, due to the consistent 
nature of their marginalization there. Bolivian women’s experiences from cases like the 
domestic violence law, the second agricultural reform, and the final phase of gas 
nationalization may be generalized to predict that marginalized peoples’ social 




The domestic violence law and gas nationalization cases exhibit the importance of 
networking with broader society, providing a lesson that can be extrapolated to other 
social movements of marginalized people. The sometimes- unpredictable role of 
networks should be fully explored in the future to see if cases like the gas subsidy 
protests and the TIPNIS conflict, where networks introduced problems, produce similar 
outcomes.  This case may be especially significant for the Mexican Zapatista movement, 
which has strong indigenous and transnational ties, but lacks strong networks and 
alliances within the state. When, and to what extent, do networks have detrimental effects 
on social movement organizations? What ethnic and gendered connotations remain 
unsolved by network dynamics? This dissertation has revealed a potential area of 
discovery for the literature on social movements and indigenous women’s movements in 
particular. 
Another feature of organizations that can inform the study of other regions and 
social movements of marginalized ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups is the framing 
and cultural findings in this research. First, this is a beginning attempt to extend framing 
hypotheses beyond explanations of emergence and determine the impact of frames on 
outcomes. This research also has more general applications about all social movements, 
who must communicate their goals to supporters and participants. This reality requires 
further investigation into the linguistic and cultural aspects of social movement 
organizing. Do social movements benefit from specific activist language, or does the 
hypothesis about general, broad frames apply to some cultures? What types of repertoires 
are truly more likely to garner public support? The overlapping goals and frames of gas 
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nationalization and gas subsidies in the post-liberal period are important findings about 
the complexities of language that should be applied to other movements. 
Identified changes in state structure may also be extrapolated to studies of other 
Latin American social movements that face governments with similar capacity for change 
toward leftist government. Indigenous movements, and perhaps other marginalized 
groups (gays, Afro-Latinos, landless people) may be expected to make stronger impacts 
under declining neoliberalism or leftist governments due to tendencies toward more 
affirmative action measures. Also, cases like land reform, gas nationalization, and the 
TIPNIS conflict reflect attempts to balance social justice with environmental and natural 
resource pressures, which are similar social movement concerns in other developing 
countries. These lessons may apply to indigenous and non-indigenous social movements 
in other social movements around the world. Where changes in organization, state, and to 
a lesser degree, international factors, are occurring, social movements may have an added 
advantage.  
Finally, international forces should be analyzed alongside organizational and state 
characteristics to analyze their influence. From the coca case to the nationalization of gas, 
various international influences are shown to exert very different levels of influence on 
the outcomes. The ten cases present a wide number and range of potential international 
influences. In addition to the role of international lending agencies, globalization, and 
U.S. domination, future research should consider geopolitical issues like territorial, 






 The preceding chapters have analyzed the policy outcomes that accompany 
organizational, state, and international changes in Bolivia between 1994-2012. While 
indigenous women have not always gotten the policies they want in the post-liberal 
period, the changes in organizational and state characteristics witnessed during this era 
seem to provide more favorable conditions for policy success. The observations in this 
study indicate some support for the resources and state hypotheses, while leaving in 
question the exact role of frames of activism and international forces. In essence, high 
amounts of resources, weak neoliberal commitments and political opportunities are vital 
components to creating success for indigenous women’s policy efforts. Most important 
among these are the state variables, particularly opening political opportunity structures.  
The investigation of frames created by indigenous women does not present firm 
conclusions about their influence on policy. But this research gains relevant insight into 
the identity, cultural, and activist messages of indigenous women, which are analytically 
and practically useful. Indigenous women now play a more important role in leading 
movements, and do so while broadcasting an identity of indigenous femininity. These 
intersectional assertions of power by indigenous women have coincided with increased 
political influence. Indigenous women’s experience in Bolivia illustrates that there is a 
complex but meaningful relationship between language and empowerment. At a 
minimum, we must understand this relationship to grasp the purpose behind indigenous 
women’s organizing. To the more optimistic, we could understand the evolving language 
to mean that indigenous women have achieved a great deal of empowerment just by re-
claiming ethnicity and embracing gendered issues. Framing likely affects policy 
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outcomes in more indirect ways than captured in this research, and has demonstrated 
importance in the way women organize. While indigenous women petition governments 
for items that affect them personally, they have also successfully mobilized on issues that 
reflect broader societal and international concerns. The scope and range of their successes 
in policy outcomes point to the fact that governments, and social scientists, should pay 
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Questions Asked of Qualitative Data—Chapter 3 
 
1. Were women able to amass significant resources for mobilization? 
2.  Was there evidence of strong female leadership? 
3. Were frames and discourses consistent with broader public interests? 
4. Did the state structure produce political openings for indigenous women? 
5. Were indigenous women able to take advantage of political openings? 
6. What factors of the international environment entered social movement discourses? 
 
7. Were NGOs engaged in social movement discourses? What were their contributions? 
How have they changed over the time period in question? 
 
8. Do social movement organizations show solidarity networks with other organizations 
or groups? 
 
9. Are social movements encouraged or discouraged by increasing or decreasing public 
support? 
 
10. Does neoliberalism moderate, hinder, or promote success of women in indigenous 
movement? 
 
11. Do leftist qualities moderate, hinder, or promote success of women in indigenous 
movements? 
 
 Questions Asked of Qualitative Data –Chapters 4, 5, and 6 
 
1. Did the action taken by government address any specific claims made by IW? 
a. If action addressed IW claims, was it publicly cited as a response to IW? 
 
2. Did the action taken by government address non-indigenous issues supported by IW? 
 
3. Were framing frames representative of a broader population? 
 
4. Were networking/alliance capabilities mentioned as a contributor to success? 
 
5. Were within-organization dynamics conducive to indigenous women’s specific claims? 
 




7. Did opponents within society attempt to influence the decision-making process? 
 
8. Was the economic program of the administration conducive to meeting IW claims? 
a. Were statements made that indicated tensions between economic policy and 
demands of IW? 
b. Were issues that produced tension between economic policy and IW resolved 
in 
favor of IW? 
 
9. Was the international economy a significant factor in IW claims and government 
response? 
a. Did actors reference globalization as a hindrance or an aid to their claims? 
b. Were lending conditions a hindrance to the claims of IW? 
c. Was international political influence cited as an important factor? 
d. Was international political influence a resource for IW? 
e. Was international political influence a topic of contention? 
f. Did international political organizations support or oppose government’s 
stance?     
g. Were international political accords a resource for IW 
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